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FOREWORD 
This meeting is on a subject about which I confess to have strong 
feelings. Since World War II, the problem of divided nations has been 
causing the United States a lot of trouble in every part of the world. 
The United States not only participated in two wars in Korea and 
Vietnam, which were dual-system nations, but paid a high price in 
blood and money for its involvement. 
The Vietnam solution was clearly not a very satisfactory one for 
the United States or for the Vietnamese people. The Korean solution 
was a truce, not a final settlement. We have yet to find a way to unify 
the two systems into one national entity by peaceful means. 
Germany is a model by which to compare the other cases, 
particularly the China case, one of the most difficult and intransigent 
examples of conflict between two governments and two social 
systems. Germany appears at present to be a reasonably successful 
compromise, whereby the two German governments live side by side 
at peace and have substantial interchange of trade and visitors. A 
question with which we should deal is how permanently successful 
that compromise is likely to be and what promise the German model 
offers in some adaptable form for Korea or for China. 
I have just returned from a trip to the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
specialists were talking about these very problems. The idea of 
peaceful exchanges of persons and goods between the two Koreas 
seemed to interest officials and scholars in Moscow. East Germany 
still concerns the Soviet Union very much, particularly as it relates 
to the situation in Poland, since the lines of communication to East 
Germany through Poland are a very important strategic asset for the 
Soviet Union. If peaceful relations between East and West Germany 
broke down, the situation in Poland would be more acute, and indeed 
tension would rise throughout Europe. 
It can be seen that these issues are dynamic. They require much 
elucidation, and that is what we hope to achieve here in these 
discussions. 
i 
RayS. Cline 
December 1, 1981 
PREFACE 
The Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies 
and the University of Maryland School of Law were delighted to 
co-sponsor this Conference on Multi-System Nations and Internation-
al Law, held at the International Club Building in Washington, D.C. 
on June 23, 1981. This distinguished gathering of worldwide 
specialists on international law and political science presented a vast. 
amount of information and a wide range of perspectives on the topic 
at hand, within the period of a single day. Limitations of space made 
it possible for only a select group of government officials, academi-
cians, business representatives and journalists to attend the confer-
ence, but the enthusiastic response of those present clearly indicated 
that the results wou.ld be of interest and use to a far greater audience. 
In order to ensure that the conference proceedings gain the widest 
exposure and greatest utility possible among scholars, legalists, 
foreign policy specialists and others, we have agreed through joint 
effort to produce this publication of conference papers and oral 
summaries for general distribution. 
Despite primary attention devoted to the international legal 
aspects associated with multi-system societies, a consensus of opinion 
quickly emerged on the fact that legal systems do not exist in an 
abstract context. To the contrary, a recurrent theme throughout this 
conference was the inescapable interaction of law and political reality 
in dealing with multi-system nations. And, quite apart from function-
ing in a political vacuum, the divided nations themselves are 
confronted with the reality of involvement by, and strategic competi-
tion among, external global powers. Experience demonstrates that 
these factors, in many cases, act as a "stumbling block" to unification 
or as a preservative of status quo fragmentation. 
Beyond these points, however, wide variation exists in the 
separate experiences of Germany, Korea and China in the interna-
tional system of the twentieth century. The conferees made an 
admirable presentation of comparisons and contrasts between those 
experiences, and of their own unique perspectives on the potential 
evolution of these multi-system societies. 
Our thanks go to all of those who participated in this conference, 
and to the American Society of International Law for its active 
interest in the event. Professor chiu would like to thank David 
Simon, David Salem and Lyushum Shen for their assistance in the 
course of editing the manuscript for publication. 
Hungdah Chiu Robert L. Downen 
Professor of International Law Director of Pacific Basin 
University of Maryland School Studies, CSIS 
of Law Georgetown University 
December 1, 1981 
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INTRODUCTION 
John Morton Moore 
In exammmg the subject of multi-system nations from the 
standpoint of international law, two central issues emerge. One is 
conflict management and the second is self-determination. 
In the last 2,000 years, we have tended to create institutions 
which were rather effective at stopping the previous war. Because it 
was assumed that World War I was an accident- the result of a 
diplomatic system gone awry- the League of Nations system was 
designed to eliminate war by accident. The U.N. Charter deals with 
war by aggression across clear international boundaries, primarily in 
response to World War II. The East-West split, however, has curbed 
the effectiveness of that system. 
At present there are two fundamental challenges to the U.N. 
Charter: nuclear weaponry (and the resultant need to maintain a 
strategic balance), and the mixed civil-international setting. The 
latter is the principle realized form of conflict in the international 
system (along with its associated terrorism). 
The most dangerous and central of these mixed civil-
international settings is the multi-system nation. Two examples of 
U.S. involvement in this area are the conflicts in Korea and 
Indochina. From these two conflicts, it can be seen that the United 
States must make it abundantly clear that Article 2, subparagraph 4 
of the U.N. Charter (the prohibition of force as a modality of major 
change) must apply between the entities in a multi-system nation. 
This principle should apply in conflict management no matter what 
characterization any side wishes to give either entity. A Major 
question to be addressed at this Conference should be the following: 
What might U.S. policy do in areas where this principle is not clear 
in order to make it so? 
The other central issue which arises in the examination of the 
multi-system nation phenomenon is self-determination. In examining 
this matter, does one look to aspirations for unification, or to 
aspirations for separate national identity? The basic question, at any 
rate, is how does self-determination apply in the multi-system nation 
setting? It is to be hoped that this Conference will make a major 
contribution in both areas. 
Ill 
Foreword 
Preface 
Introduction 
Chapter I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
RayS. Cline 
Hungdah Chiu and Robert L. Downen 
John Norton Moore 
Assessing the International Status of Partitioned Nations: 
Theories and Findings Ray E. Johnston 1 
Comments by Hungdah Chiu ..................................................... 36 
Chapter II 
The International Law of Recognition and Multi-system 
Nations- with Special Reference to Chinese (Mainland 
-Taiwan) Case Hungdah Chiu 41 
Chapter III 
The Unification and Division of Multi-system Nations: A 
Comparative Analysis of Basic Concepts, Issues and 
Approaches Yung Wei 59 
Chapter IV 
Multi-system Nations and International Law, with Special 
Reference to Dutch Practice Ko Swan Sik 75 
Comments by Hungdah Chiu .............................................. 110 
Chapter V 
The Case of Germany 
Comments by Jiirgen Domes 
Chapter VI 
Gottfried-Karl Kindermann 
Divided Nations and International Law, the Case of the 
113 
116 
Two Koreas Nam-Yearl Chai 119 
Comments by Seung Hwan Kim and Se Jin Kim ............. 136 
Chapter VII 
Taiwan's International Status Ralph N. Clough 141 
Chapter VIII 
Divided Nations and International Law: The Case of 
Taiwan Aleth Manin 160 
iv 
Chapter IX 
Recognition policy with respect to Multi-system States: 
The Case of China Morton A. Kaplan 167 
Chapter X 
Overall Evaluation Robert Sutter, Yung Wei, Stephen 
Guest and Ko Swan Sik 177 
Appendices 
1. Divided Nations and International Law: Political Reality 
and Legal Practice Yung Wei 183 
2. Basic Facts Concerning Two Chinas, Two Koreas, and Two 
Germanys .. . ................ ... ... ... . ..... ......... ......... ... .. .. . .. .. ... .. . ... . .. .. . 188 
3. Program of the Conference and List of Participants ......... 191 
4. Biographical Notes on Contributors .................................... 197 
Index ............................................................................................. 199 
v 

Chapter 1 
ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF 
PARTITIONED NATIONS: THEORIES 
AND FINDINGS 
Ray E. Johnston 
Introduction 
It is an ironic fact that in this age of widespread political 
partition so little is known about the empirical processes by which 
nations are divided and partitioned. Few efforts have been made to 
isolate partition as an empirical phenomenon and explain its causes 
and effects. Even more ironic, political partition is one of man's most 
frequently used conflict-resolution devices. Partition is used to 
settle cases of both civil war and international war as well as less 
rancorous disputes among domestic interests and communal factions. 
Still more ironic is the fact that partition tends also to cause disputes 
and may well be the cause of the final dispute. Other ironies can also 
be found. In this age of internationalism and interdependence of 
nation-states, political partition and division are more extensive and 
intensive than at any other time in human history. While interna-
tional integration is being touted as a solution to the historical 
conflicts of Europe, pan-Africanism in the post World War II years 
has failed to overcome the parochial claims and counterclaims of 
nationalism based on older colonial boundaries and partitions. 
Paradoxically, as political empires wane, economic empires of the 
multinational corporations find rampant nationalism a natural 
milieu within which to build new imperial powers based on control of 
complex technological capital and concomitant natural resources. 
There is no magic in "unification" and "reunification" - in that 
direction also lies conflicts and human disaster. A single world 
governrrwmt, in this year of cold war escalation and runaway defense 
budgets, appears more and more utopian. In assessing the interna-
tional status of multi-system nations - partitioned nations, perhaps 
the best one can do is an attempt to develop strategies to aid the parts 
to peacefully co-exist, recognizing the legitimacy of each while 
(1) 
2 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
developing a new international integration of the divided units. 
Almost twenty years ago Sulzberger made a similiar call: 
Partition is this century's awkward form of compromise and we 
have seen Ireland, Korea, VietNam and Germany divided with 
each segment claiming the national name. Is the day coming 
when Russia will call East Germany Prussia, when Jordan calls 
itself Palestine, when South and North Vietnam resume their 
former titles, respectively Annam and Tonkin? Could that 
facilitate de facto acknowledgment of these unhappy separations? 
Such changes need not end the dream of unification. Would they 
imply a new political epoch has begun or facilitate new 
approaches to old problems that old approaches could not solve?' 
A Caveat: In our search to understand and evaluate or determine the 
international status of divided, partitioned, or multi-system nations, 
we should not restrict ourselves to the more dramatic and politically 
volatile cases of nations such as Germany and Korea. What is needed 
by the social scientist and the statesman alike is a theory of the 
causes and effects of political partition and political integration of 
systems at various levels of political organization. Our theory should, 
at a minimum, explain the divisions of such entities as Cyprus and 
The Samoan Islands on the one hand and the creation of Singapore or 
the division of Pakistan on the other hand. I have argued below and 
in other writings that a general theory of partition would explain the 
divisions of metropolitan areas and nation-states alike. While bold, 
the call is not unreasonable. 
F11pm this caveat, I can turn to a general summary of the purposes 
of this paper. While I had several research goals in mind, the central 
purpose was to present some general conceptual tools and 
frameworks to be used in assessing the international legal status of 
"multi-system nations" or, as defined herein, partitioned nations. The 
significance of the problem is indicated by a presentation of the 
extensiveness of partition and division in the world today. Following 
this survey of the divisions of the contemporary world I have 
presented a logical, or, if you will, an epistemological analysis of the 
concepts of "dual-system" and "multi-system nations". This analysis 
aids in focusing attention upon the unit of analysis to be treated as a 
1. L. Sulzberger, "New Labels for a New Era," The New York Times. February 
17. 1964. 
INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF PARTITIONED NATIONS 3 
partitioned nation and whose status is to be assessed. In addition to 
the exploration of several approaches to the problem, I present a 
historically derived typology of partition and offer some new concepts, 
however incomplete, on sovereignty disputes, durability of partitions 
and boundary disputes. The paper concludes with an application of an 
integration framework to assess the international and sovereignty 
status of Taiwan. 
THE EXTENSIVENESS OF PARTITION 
Eight years ago (1973) when I wrote that the phenomenon of 
political partition enjoys a broad contemporary scope and lengthy 
historical lineage, the United Nations listed some 135 nation-states 
and a dozen or so trade blocs and treaty organizations.2 Since that 
time, the globe, including the seas and oceans, has been further 
partitioned and bounded. The recorded increase in the number of 
nation-states is at a rate of about 2.4 percent per year. Over the 8 
years, this represents a 19.4 percent increase in the number of 
nation-states; which are now counted at 161. These increases may be 
slightly misleading. They do not represent an increase in the absolute 
number of partitions in the world. This holds since most of the new 
nation-states moved from other forms of territorial status to the 
sovereign state status. What this movement may well suggest is that 
nationalism and the potential for partition are not waning; if 
anything, both potentials appear to be increasing.3 
The extensiveness of partition is also illustrated by sovereign 
claims over both polar caps and the seas and oceans of the world. The 
North Pole is still disputed, with Russia, Norway and Iceland 
debating different techniques and theories of claiming sovereign 
status over the pole. The status of Antarctica is disputed with the 
United States refusing to recognize any claims of sovereignty. No less 
than seven states claim Antarctica. Australia, Belgium, Chile 
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of South Africa 
and the Soviet Union have all made various claims to Antarctica, and 
2. Information Please Almanac 1981 Atlas And Yearbook <New York; Simon and 
Schuster, 19811. 
3. Ray E. Johnston, "Partition as a Political Instrument". 27 J. cw INTI.. AvvAms 
159-74 <No.2, 19731. 
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all have signed a treaty in 1959 which neutralized the polar 
continent. 4 
However claims of sovereignty persist through increasing claims 
being made over the ocean. In 1950 five per cent of the world's 
sixty-two coastal states claimed territorial seas 12 nautical miles 
wide. In 1977, the figure had risen to 45 percent with about 7.6 
percent of the total area of the oceans so claimed. According to the 
Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) every state has the 
right to establish a territorial sea not in excess of 12 miles; in 1977 
twelve different widths were claimed by 123 countries.5 The status of 
the oceans and seas continues to be disputed. The United Nations is 
attempting to provide the legal basis for a variety of statuses, but 
"there are still deep divisions separating the positions of important 
states and major groups of states on fundamental issues." 
Some years ago, Jean Gottman, provided an appropriate view of 
the extensiveness and endurance of the proclivity to partition the 
world. 
"Our political world is a limited one: it extends only -over the 
space accessible to men. Accessibility is the determining factor: 
areas to which men have no access do not have any political 
standing or problems. The sovereignty of the moon has no 
importance today [1952- how quickly history moves.], because 
men cannot reach it nor obtain anything from it. The antarctic 
had no political standing before navigators began going there, 
but since it was made accessible by its discoverers, the icy 
continent has been divided into portions like an apple pie - and 
all these portions are distinct political compartments in which a 
• 
number of international incidents have occurred. When the first 
explorers land on the moon (The American flag is now unfurled 
thereon) the earth's satellite will pass from the field of astronomy 
to geography textbook and lunar political problems will appear 
and grow steadily. As, with improved techniques, men got within 
their reach the riches of the ocean's depth beyond territorial 
waters, the sovereignty and legislation of these abyssnal spaces 
became a matter of concern for political authorities. . . ."6 
4. Harm J. de Blij, Systematic Political Geography, !New York: John Wiley and 
Sons, Inc., 19731 p. 127 ff. See also Norman J. G. I'ounds, Political Geography !New 
York: McGraw-Hill second edition 19721, pp. 101-121. 
5. J.R.V. Prescott, Boundaries And Frontiers. !London: Croom Helm ltd., 19781, 
p. 136. 
6. Jean Gottman, "The Political Partitioning of Our World: An Attempt at 
Analysis", 4 WoRLD PoLITICS, (No. 4, 19521, p. 513. 
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There is no better conclusion to a section dealing with the extensive-
ness of political partitions. 
A HIERARCHY OF DIVISION 
By 1981 there were an estimated 4,362 million people worldwide 
living in tens of thousands of local administrative and communal 
units, which are in turn part of 161 sovereign states and 57 "related 
territories." These states and territories are in turn represented by, 
are members of, or are constrained by regional and international 
economic, political and defensive organizations. Most of these orga-
nizations from the sub-state level to the international level are 
geographically based. Some have no territorial base and are func-
tionally differentiated as to tasks they perform. Such an example is 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World 
Bank). At the top of the hierarchy is the United Nations which is the 
only multi-purpose and almost universally represented world organ-
ization. With the exception of the highest level, there has been an 
increasing number of divisions at all the lower levels. This hierarchy 
is shown in the table below: 
Table 1: A Hierarchy of Local and World Organizations Partitioning of the Globe by 
Type and Name of Organizations: Number of divisions increase as the levels 
of universality are lowered. 
LEVEL IV: The United Nations 
LEVEL III: Economic Partitions 
EEC, BENELUX,ECSC, 
IMF, COMECON, EFTA, 
CARIFTA, ASEAN 
OPEC, ECOWAS, BRIT· 
ISH COMMONWEALTH 
OECD, IBRD. 
Political Partitions 
OAS, OAU, ARAB 
LEAGUE CENTO 
Defensive 
Partitions 
NATO, WTO 
ANZUS 
LEVEL II: 161 Sovereign Nation-States and 57 related Territories LEVEL 1: 
Subnational and Territorial divisions, administrative units, communal units, char-
tered, and unincorporated areas and peoples. These units number in the tens of 
thousands, most of which divide people by functional and geographical criteria. This 
table is not exhaustive but does include most major divisions. 
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In the progression from the higher to lower levels of partitions 
there is a diminution in (a) geographical territory subsumed, (b) 
population size, and (c) range of responsibilities and powers. Howev-
er, with the progression from the higher to lower levels there is an 
increase in the level of value consensus, communal integration, 
leadership integration, individual participation and access to func-
tions. The functions and powers at the lower levels tend to be much 
more specific and concrete in terms of everyday life. Almost any state 
or territory at level II provides an example of the subnational 
divisions. I have selected the French Government Areas of 1968 for 
this paper simply because of the availability of data: 
Table 2: The Hierarchy of French Government Areas in 1968 
Name of Unit type 
Department 
Arrondissement 
Canton 
Commune 
Number of Units 
95 
322 
3209 
37,708 
Average Area 
(square Kml 
5804.7 
1712.5 
171.9 
14.5 
Source: THE STATESMENT'S YEARBOOK 1973, <MacMillan Co., London!, p. 4. 
Subnational partitions frequently occur for many of the same 
reasons which nations and surpanational regions and functions are 
divided and partitioned. One primary reason is the search for the 
"consensual community." Both leaders and followers in partition 
movements hold the notion that separation of a group from the larger 
society will produce an almost utopian community of similar people 
who share similar ideas and actions. Another reason for subnational 
partition is conflict resolution and conflict management. For exam-
ple, even administrative units such as Michigan's Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) are divided into several geographical 
regions. The policies and decisions made for each region affect very 
different kinds of people. The northern Michigander is a rural 
oriented person, a conservationist who is less likely to advocate 
metropolitan beaches and parks than the southern, urbanized 
Michigander. The department's regional boundaries reflect these 
potential conflicts of interest in the state's population. Still another 
reason for sub-national partition is the search for economic and 
political advantage. Thus many new sub-divisions, incorporated 
townships, and water and sewage districts are founded for almost 
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entrepreneurial concerns. They take on the form of an investment 
group or elite in search of a mass clientele. As Daniel Elizar reports, 
other reasons for sub-national partition are size and population 
diffusion, place of living and occupation, administrative effectiveness 
and efficiency. 7 
The statuses of partitions about which we are concerned are 
those at the national and supranational levels. Subnational divisions 
and partitions (while frequently of questionable status) are deter-
mined by the law and customs of the state. No matter what the basis 
of the status of a particular partition is in national and international 
law, few if any are maintained by accident; therefore, if we are to 
understand their status we must understand why they are created 
and maintained. 
CONCEPTS OF DUAL-OR MULTI-SYSTEM NATIONS 
AND POLITICAL PARTITION 
If by political division one means factions and sub-units, all 
nations are divided. The study of the politics of divided nations, by 
such a definition, would take in the entire universe. Hence, in the 
desire to narrow our focus, the introduction of terms like "dual-
system nations" and "multi-system nations" will certainly improve 
our science if, in fact, the concepts carried by such terms are clearly 
specified and possess explanatory power. These two terms immediate-
ly beg the questions of defining what is meant by system and what is 
meant by nation. My understanding is that the term "system" is used 
to describe the existence of a governmental regime claiming auton-
omy and legitimate authority over both a people and a geographical 
territory. The term "nation", from the writings so far presented to 
me, is a little more mystical. I take it that scholars like Yung Wei 
really refer to the Chinese people in using the term. However, they 
never really specify which people are Chinese and which are Tibetan, 
which are Mongolian, which are Burmese and so on. Nation is a word 
that is all encompassing or all excluding and is used to include those 
who are "in" and exclude those who are "out" of political favor. 
Political geographers like Roger Kasperson and Julian Minghi fare a 
little better in defining nation as a racial, ethnic, linguistic, and 
7. Daniel J. Elizar, American Federalism; A View From The States. !New York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 19661, pp. 130-40. 
8 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
cultural group of people marked by feelings of kinship, of belonging 
together, of being a culturally common kind ofpeople.8 While this is a 
little more specific it leaves us with no clear and exclusive rationale 
to go from the concept to empirical measurement. 
Despite these conceptual shortcomings, I will attempt an approx-
imation of the meaning of a dual-system and a multi-system nation. 
"Such a nation is, evidently, one in which two or more governments 
claim to represent the entire national grouping." With the exception 
of Korea (North and South), there is perhaps no such system on 
earth. None of the three Chinese governments claims autonomy over, 
or guardianship of, all Chinese people. Nor do the German or Dublin 
governments make such claims, and so we could enumerate some 35 
or more cases of recently divided or partitioned nations.9 
Still another way to use the terms is as descriptions of the 
situation of two or more competing regimes, both claiming sovereign-
ty over the same people and territory and both having effective 
control over some part of the people and territory. As rare as this 
situation is, it appears to exist in areas such as Korea, Germany and 
China/Taiwan. As descriptive terms of real situations our concepts of 
dual-system and multi-system nations lose their theoretical univer-
sality, but gain in unique empirical application. As such we could call 
the dual-system nation one in which two regimes have risen having 
some control over territory and people with at least one of the 
regimes claiming legitimate right to represent the whole. This sounds 
similar to the case of East and West Germany today. A multi-system 
nation would be similarly defined to describe a situation in which two 
or more regimes have arisen with at least one claiming to be the 
legitimate government of the whole. Again, however, we have to 
question the scientific value of such conceptual labors. Since the ideas 
describe unique historical events they contribute little to scientific 
knowledge or to theories of political cleavage, division and partition 
of nations. 10 
8. Roger E. Kasperson and Julian V. Minghi, The Structure Of Political 
Geography, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 40-41 and passim. 
9. I am currently updating Norman J. G. Pound's "History and Geography: A 
Perspective on Partition", 18 J. OF INT'L AFFAIRS <No.2, 1964), pp., 161-172, where he 
notes 25 to 35 cases of partition. The three Chinese governments are Peking, Taiwan, 
and Singapore. 
10. Yung Wei, "The Unification and Division of Multi-System Nations: A 
Comparative Analysis of Basic Concepts, Issues, and Approaches", A paper prepared 
for and delivered at Symposium on Functional Integration and Divided Nations, Seoul. 
Republic of Korea, October 6-7, 1980, reprinted in Chapter III of this book. 
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The realities of the world are such that China has two 
governments claiming the legitimate right to rule a specified people 
and territory. Both governments have legitimacy within part of that 
territory and control of part of the population. Within the parts more 
or less separate systems of leadership, administration, economics and 
social-cultural life have come about. In Germany, again, two separate 
entities have occurred, with two separate and differing economies, 
cultures and social patterns. One government - East Germany -
still claims in its party dogma to represent the whole. However, both 
parts have recognized the right of the other and have entered into 
agreements of co-existence. New states are rising from the old; it is 
still possible to tear these new German states down, to reamalga-
mate, but the costs would undoubtedly run into hundreds of 
thousands of lives. What we are dealing with are political cleavages, 
divisions and partitions. Whether we call them dual-system or 
multi-system nations doesn't alter that fact. We need to recognize 
how these cleavages, divisions and partitions come about, how they 
are maintained, and how they evolve toward new integrations or 
toward violent forms of conflict and destruction. 
Before turning to concepts of cleavage and partition, I want to 
note that the idea of multi-state nations has become quite popular 
with the increased interest generated in the area of minority group 
politics, ethno-nationalism and human rights. The idea of the 
multi-state nation is well exemplified by the Kurds and Albanians. 
Both groups are more or less identified with a specific geographical 
region; each group also has its own habits, cultures, language, 
historical identifications and communal identifications. However, 
each group finds itself controlled by more than one sovereign 
nation-state system. The Albanians find the majority of their 
population claimed as citizens of both Albania and Yugoslavia. The 
Kurds live in Southeastern Turkey, Northern Iraq, Northwestern 
Iran and part of Russia. This territory is more or less contiguous and 
forms what is once known as Kurdistan. Such a multi-state nation 
may provide the basis for political division and partition. During the 
recent "hostage crisis in Iran" speculation that Iran would be divided 
along these old Kurdistan national-ethnic lines was rampant in both 
the popular press and in folk knowledge. Speculation along these 
lines has resumed since the ouster of Bani Sadr in the summer of 
1981. 
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Given the definition of a dual-system or multi-system nation to 
be one in which two or more regimes have gained legitimacy and 
control over part with at least one making claims over the whole, and 
the above definition of multi-state nation, we can see that both are 
closely related to the problems of division and cleavage. Both 
situations lead to lasting partition and the emergence of new states 
out of the old. Both can lead to peaceful integrations. These outcomes 
depend upon a host of domestic and international factors, among 
which is the legal and international status of the different systems. 
An assessment of the international status of such systems may 
be provided by theoretical concepts developed for the study of divided 
nations and political partition. 11 My purpose here is not to re-develop 
a set of concepts and theoretical propositions; but, rather to present 
enough theory to enable us to say something about the current status 
of the so called multi-system nations or dual-system nations. I 
assume that by knowing what is meant by political cleavages, 
political partition and political division, we can at least assess the 
cases - Germany, Korea, and China/Taiwan - in terms of these 
statuses. 
I have already written that a useful approach to the study of 
divided nations is to develop a universal theory or general theory of 
political partition such that it covers the phenomenon no matter 
where it occurs. Hence, a useful concept of political partition must be 
broad enough to enable the researcher to isolate the phenomenon and 
to differentiate it from other genre of political fragmentation. The 
concept and related theoretical framework must also apply to 
different levels of the political system, the sub-national, the national 
and the international. With these requirements in mind, I offer a few 
definitions and attempt to apply them to an assessment of the 
Republic of China on Taiwan. Political Partition is a legal, political 
and behavioral process as opposed to a decision by which apgroup of 
people advocate disassociation from other groups and from the 
structural relationships within a particular society. This definition of 
partition is very close to the one offered some years earlier by 
Norman J. C. Pounds: 
"Political partition is the division of a state so that it loses its 
identity or even disappears from the political map; or, the 
11. See supra, note 6. 
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creation of two or more systems within a territory which had 
previously been subject to only one system."12 
While I have discussed the process of partition at length in earlier 
writings, what I clearly want to suggest her.e is that partition is a 
phenomenological process through which a people draw apart and 
attempt to succeed in divorcing themselves from the problems and 
concerns of the "host society." This process generally begins with 
political cleavages and culminates in the decision to divide the group 
geographically by political boundaries. This is not an inevitable 
process since cleavages can lead to all sorts of other outcomes. 
However, the meanings of both cleavage and division are different 
from, and exclusive of, political partition.'3 
In system analysis terminology, political partition is accompa-
nied by a disjuncture of both functionally-universal and functionally-
specific relationships. With partition, two or more independent sets of 
relationships, along with the accompanying structures, are estab-
lished. The number of sets of course depend upon the number new 
political systems which have risen from the old system. This 
proposition of disjuncture of relationships provides an operational 
rationale to empirical measurement. 
Political partition is, at the national and international levels, 
also accompanied by leadership demands for autonomy over the life 
fate of the seceding group. Where such demands of autonomy are 
made early in the process, political partition takes on the form of a 
nationalistic movement. Equally important is the fact that the 
demand for autonomy to guide the life fate of the group provides 
much of the political content of the partition process. The legal 
content is the claim for legal autonomy and a disjuncture of the old 
legal system. The establishment of a separate government and set of 
laws and judicial practices, and the search for and obtaining of 
recognition as a member of the community of sovereign states 
provides much of the legal content of political partition. The 
international legal content, in addition to the search for recognition 
as a state, is decided by treaties, trade agreements, contracts to buy 
and sell and obligations resulting from the decisions of foreign, 
domestic and international tribunals and courts of adjudication. 
12. Pounds, "Perspective on Partition," supra, 9, p. 162. 
13. See supra, note 6, pp. 159-74. 
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For the purposes of this paper, division and political division 
remain relatively primitive terms denoting a final decision to bound 
or "differentiate" a group, role structure, process, or territory. Thus, 
all sorts of boundaries are referred to as divisions including 
boundaries internally and externally derived resulting in political 
partition. Divisions may be either horizontal or vertical. Horizontal 
divisions layer society into strata of various types ranging from caste 
and class systems to, say, managerial line systems. Vertical divisions 
cut up the landscape or separate groups into different stratified 
systems such as the division of the federal systems into separate 
states. Political division generally carries a specification of a 
boundary line. The boundary is legal in character. 
Again, what I want to emphasize is that the decision to draw a 
political boundary does not necessarily result in political partition. 
Boundaries, however, can take on meanings and an existence of their 
own in the minds of the populace. In the case of the Kamaroons, the 
original boundary was no more than an arbitrary line drawn for 
colonial trading purposes. The boundary became a cause celebre in 
the search for nationhood and for a national myth upon which to base 
the nation. One of the reasons for this is that boundaries tend to 
demarcate a cessation of interactions of one or more human 
relationships. While political geographers have noted that the only 
function of a boundary is to mark the limits of some type of authority 
or ownership, they become symbols of both rewards and 
deprivations. 14 
Cleavages or Political Cleavages shall remain relatively unde-
fined. In recent political science literature cleavages and cross cutting 
cleavages are the precursors to political instability and mark the 
deterioration or disappearance of political systems. Cleavages, accor-
dingly, denote the existence of factions, parties, and racial, ethnic, 
cultural, class, caste and ideological groups among others. Where 
cleavages are cross-cutting, political analysts believe partition is 
unlikely. Where the cleavages tend to fall along the same issue lines, 
contemporary analysis has it that instability and the potential for 
14. Le Vine, "The Politics of Partition in Africa: The Cameroons and the Myth of 
Unification", 18 J. of INTL. AFFAIRS (No., 2, 1964), pp. 198-210. 
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civil war and division run high. There is a fault with this modern 
analysis, the fault being that cross-cutting cleavages are seen as 
differentiated role structures, where there is a high degree of 
subsystem autonomy. A consequence of both the role differentiation 
and the sub-system autonomy is the creation of high degrees of 
sub-system interdependence. This is the dependence of one group 
upon another which in turn is supposed to avert divisive conflict. 
However, this is just where the fault lies in this type of analysis. The 
most highly militant and ideologically committed groups are willing 
to sacrifice sub-system autonomy and its material benefits in favor of 
dividing and later setting up a new system of differentiated role 
structures.15 The fear of permanent minority group status within a 
society or the stigma of permanent minority group status can give 
rise to demands by minority group members for political partition. In 
fact, an earlier review of the literature indicated that being placed in 
an apparant minority position is one of the primary causes of the 
demands for political separation. Political partition is a method of 
reestablishing majority status. If the minority can separate into an 
autonomous political unit or even into a semi-autonomous political 
unit, the members of the group will ipso facto be the ruling majority. 
This is what I have called the "fear of permanent minority 
status" hypothesis. It is similar to the more familiar "relative 
deprivation" hypothesis which has been used to explain civil 
disorders ranging from riots to revolutions. However it differs in 
some significant ways. First of all minority status does not automati-
cally bring with it relative deprivation. 16 The ruling class of whites in 
South Africa are in a minority position of great wealth and power and 
have selected to defend their wealth, power and position by apartheid 
and division of the Republic of South Africa into "homelands."17 
Second, permanent minority status is not necessarily accompanied by 
15. Thomas A. Reilly and Michael W. Sigall, Political Bargaining And Introduc-
tion To Modern Politics, !San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1976), pp. 170-171. 
16. Ted Curr and Charles Ruttenberg, The Conditions Of Civil Violence; First 
Tests Of A Causal Model, (Princeton: Center of Inti. Studies, Princeton University, 
Research Monograph No. 28, 1967). See also Haa, Types of Asymmetry with Social and 
Political Systems General Systems 1967, p. 12. 
17. Evans, "Partition and South Africa's Future," 18 J. INTL. AFFAIRS, !No. 2., 
1965), p. 251. 
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violence while relative deprivation generally is. Minority group 
members may adopt either cultural or structural assimiliation 
strategies to become part of the host majority. The members of a 
permanent minority may also seek to claim a diaspora relationship 
with ancient or modern, distant or nearby, external groups. Through 
this process, the minority group members claim equality with the 
culture of the host-majority through assertions of being the legiti-
mate carriers of an equally valuable and significant culture. This 
culture is that of the "mother country." When minority group 
members seek attachment to a mother country they are performing 
in a manner similar to what E. E. Schattschneider referred to as 
expanding the conflict. 18 When a minority claims to be related to an 
external mother country and also demands political partition, it may 
find itself in a position of translating the legitimizing role of the 
mother country into an interventionist role of providing logistical, 
tactical and supportive asylum during the secession stage of the 
partition process. 
GREAT POWER POLITICS AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
STATUS OF DIVIDED NATIONS 
The international status' of partitioned and divided nations 
(multi-system nations), according to many observers, rests with the 
politics of the great powers or super-power nations. 19 These observers 
also report that the status of divided nations has varied as the world 
moved from a balance of power system to a bi-polar system. As great 
powers settle their disputes among themselves, according to these 
reporters, they create and destroy nations. Germany and Korea are 
the products of this conflict resolution between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Historically the status of the Benelux nations was 
18. E.K Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People, (New York: Holt Rinehart 
and Winston, 1960) pp. 1-19. 
19. Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950, <Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1967!. See the work of Thomas Hachey, "Terrorism, Guerilla Warfare 
and the Legacy of Partition: Ireland a Case Study of Third World Nations," Divided 
Nations Internet Working Paper, prepared for and delivered at the Annual conference 
of the International Studies Association, St. Louis Mo., 1974. See also John William 
Rooney, "The First Partition Conference 1830-1839," Divided Nations Internet 
Working Paper no. 36; ISA, University Center for International Studies, Pittsburgh. 
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a product of the exigencies of the Concert of Europe which reduced 
the Benelux nations to pawns in the game of international balance of 
power politics. "The partitions of Poland in 1772 and 1795 which saw 
the status of the Poles reduced to a subject people was as much a 
product of external politics as it was of internal politics. The status of 
the Poles was determined by a handful of influential people in 
Russia, Prussia and Austria."20 
It is common parlance in the United States for academics and 
practitioners alike to speak of the status of Korea, Taiwan and Berlin 
as if it is something to be decided by the U.S. Executive. 
In no small way, the politics of national security of great powers 
is coterminous with the politics of economic supremacy and economic 
imperialism in world markets. To gain marginal increases in the 
command of units of world energy, the super-powers are likely, 
according to several observers, to sacrifice divided nations and do so 
under the rubric of national security and assuring world peace. Thus, 
several scholars have been led to suggest that changes in the balance 
of trade or balance of military power will find the great economic 
powers advocating partition, reunification, or amalgamation of lesser 
power nations and related territories. One observer advances evi-
dence for the hypothesis that the larger powers would deliberately set 
about to bankrupt the economies of smaller, divided nations and 
thereby force them to either reunify or to capitulate to demands of 
annexation to larger and more dominant powers.21 
Six different forms of political partition appear in the history of 
great power politics, dating back to the Empire of Alexander the 
Great. There is, speaking of empires, the ancient technique of 
creating satrapies - these are generally partitions intended to give 
significant subordinates of a political regime a vested interest in 
governing a territory and people. Closely related is imperial pyramid-
ing of administrative authority which can occur in both private and 
public empires. This pyramiding describes the governance of the 
20. Pounds, "Perspective on Partition," supra, note 9. See also W. Gordon East and 
J. R. V. Prescott, Our Fragmented World; An Introduction Geography, (London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 19751, p. 126. 
21. Gregory Henderson, "Factors of Hostilization in Division," a paper prepared 
for and delivered at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, 
1973. See also Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow and John Stoessinger (eds.l, 
Divided Nations in A Divided World, New York: David McKay, 19741, pp. 433-54. 
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Roman Empire among others including modern multinational cor-
porations. The technique, as most of us know, grants universal 
citizenship to all peoples (e.g., everyone is a Roman) while they 
simultaneously remain members of rather autonomous local tribu-
tary states or administrative units. Under this system, members of an 
empire owe loyalty to many different masters. Balkanization is a type 
of political partition frequently imposed by external powers upon a 
people and territory. Those who impose these divisions do so by 
rationalizing it in the name of nationalism or national self-
determination of nations. The term is derived from the break up of 
the Balkans prior to and as a consequence of the peace settlements of 
the First World War. Balkanization, in those days, divided people 
along linguistic, cultural and national claims of sovereignty. This 
status of national sovereignty is frequently in need of guarantor 
superpowers. The original balkanization was probably motivated out 
of the desire of the protagonists of the First World War to create 
buffer zones. The creation of buffer zones, an idea much older than 
balkanization, among great powers may well be the second most 
frequent cause of political partition. Colonialism is a familiar form of 
great power political partition. The colonial process divides people 
and territory with almost no regard for the legal status of regimes 
therein. Colonialism as "the scramble for territory" explains most of 
the conflicts resulting in boundaries and boundary disputes in North 
and South America and in Africa. Nationalism and national move-
ments are the most frequent form of political partition in the world 
today. It can be argued that nationalism is a process that both causes 
and overcomes partition and division, which makes an excellent 
subject for still another paper. The final form of partition associated 
with great power politics is in fact a sub-national form of functional 
and territorial decentralization of power and authority. At the 
national level, federalism may be considered such a form of territorial 
decentralization of power and authority, since each federation 
consists of regional units of political authority. Feudalism is not 
considered a form of partition since the above six processes all 
contributed to the age of Feudalism in Europe. 
THE DURABILITY OF POLITICAL PARTITION 
AND POLITICAL BOUNDARIES 
The international status of divided nations is based in part upon 
the durability of boundaries and divisions. The political geographer 
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has long been interested in the durability of political boundaries. 
Gilfillan in 1924 and Boggs in 1940, among others, have traced many 
of the major European boundaries backward to the period roughly 
around 1500 A.D. However, cogent arguments can be made that one 
need look at much older disputes to understand the partitioning of 
nations and the durability of partition. Tracing the German sub-unit 
boundaries and the disputes they resolved or exacerbated, one finds 
that many of them date back to the Carolingian Empire. Similarly, a 
historical look at the North and South American boundaries shows 
them to be measured in centuries. For example the Papal Bulls of 
1481 and 1493 along with the Tordesillas Treaty of 1491 fixed the 
boundaries and settlement of South America until the present time. 
The Partition of North America- the major divisions of Canada, the 
United States and Mexico - aside from border disputes now dates 
back two centuries. The sub-unit partition of the North American 
federations has proven durable and measures several centuries for 
those along the eastern seaboard, states and provinces. 
Note well that insofar as all these historical boundaries repre-
sent partition in the strict sense as I have defined it above, divided 
nations tend to take on a rather durable status. Insofar as these 
boundaries provide a basis for predicting the future status of more 
recent boundaries, the historian, as gambler, would place his bets 
on their durability. 
The underlying motive for this durability is that international 
boundaries constitute walls of partition among people. International 
boundaries become administered and guarded; they become less 
permeable with time; and, they become fixed in the minds of men. 
"The real partition those which are the most stable and least flexible 
are in the minds of men."22 The very existence of boundaries between 
the parts of a former nation-state represents differences among men, 
serving to distinguish competing elites. If these differences are not 
virulent and present-day in character, they are, at least, embedded in 
the immediate history of the partition. Where contemporary divisions 
are drawn along older, inveterate boundaries, the resulting partition 
should be most durable. This durability is based in part on older, 
22. Jean Gottman, "The Political Partitioning of Our World: An Attempt at 
Analysis", as cited in W. A. Douglas Jackson and Marwyn S. Samuels, Politics And 
Geographic Relationships Toward A New Focus, <Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, Inc., 
19711 p. 271. 
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historical divisions, and seems to be a part of the character of the 
status of such "dual system" nations as China/Taiwan and Germany. 
What lies at the foundation of this durability of boundaries and 
ingrained divisions which re-appear historically? If the world is 
marked by movement of people and materials and such movement 
contributes to instability and change, then it always has an 
established order favoring a certain pattern of flow and resisting 
change. Political partition and order is established first; then the 
favored pattern of flow is institutionalized; and, finally, the resist-
ance to re-unify, amalgamate and annex emerges: 
What lies at the foundation of this resistance? [sic] Economic 
vested interests? That would be difficult to demonstrate; no 
actual economic interest can be proved theoretically to be 
developed to its full, ideal optimum. An established order, 
however, normally has a tendency to defend itself, insofar as it is 
a structure within which those at the upper levels are afraid 
change may bring them a different less enjoyable level. Moreov-
er, any social and political structure has some abstract values to 
preserve; those on which it is founded. 23 
Boundary disputes and partitions of the 20th century have 
tended to be very old fights and have resulted from the settlement of 
very old disputes. For example, the politicians and generals who sat 
down to "hastily draw up" the occupation zones of Germany at the 
end of Second World War appear to have either wanted to settle some 
very old scores dating back a thousand years or to have read their 
history well. At least the resulting boundary suggests that much 
older conflicts than those commonly assumed played an important 
role in contemporary decision-making. If the boundary is to provide 
an indication of these war leaders' knowledge of history, then the 
status quo ante bellum which they sought dates back to the Treaty of 
Verdun in 843 A.D. This boundary which now divides East from West 
Germany is one of the oldest in European history. Moreover, it calls 
to my mind that partition and division, rather than national unity, 
has been the common state of affairs for Germany. This observation 
is shared by Professors Gottfried-Karl Kinderman and Jurgen Domes 
23. Ibid. 
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who argued that German national unification is the rare exception to 
the German rule. Equally important is the idea that the study of 
boundaries provides a clue to recall capabilities of the "collectivity". 
There apparently are those among us who would like to rectify some 
very ancient arguments. 24 
Boundary disputes alone suggest that the collectivity keeps in 
mind very ancient struggles and is willing to return to them upon 
occasion. For example, the continuous shifting of the boundaries of 
the Alpes Maritimes suggests that the quarrel of today dates back to 
at least 1630. The Alpes Maritimes dispute suggests that the 
rancorous quarrelling over territory is never dropped. The disputants 
have shifted and reshifted the boundary over the 351 years but 
seldom more than ten miles at the widest. 25 
Still another aspect of the durability of partition is that once a 
boundary- administrative or nationalistic in origins- is drawn, it 
takes on meanings of its own and can serve a multitude of ideological 
purposes. For example, probably few partitions have been more 
arbitrary and capricious than those Germany drew around the 
Kameroons of Africa. No indigenous community was provided 
political expression by these boundaries and in fact no political 
community even existed prior to the establishment of a boundary. 
The boundaries were drawn, as suggested earlier, simply to mark an 
exclusive trading area. Even the name was a mistake of both spelling 
and fact. However, once bounded, once administered, once people of at 
least a "middle class" social standing benefited from the existence of 
the boundary, then a myth of nationhood was successfully fabricated 
to historically legitimize its existence and perpetuation.26 
The status of some of the current dual system nations or divided 
territories is less the result of a political partition than a conquest 
and nationalization of frontiers. In many respects, both Israel (or 
Palestine Eretz Israel) and Taiwan fit this description. In the case of 
Israel, the most elementary reading of history shows that neither 
nationalism nor colonialism had been given much expression among 
the peoples of the areas prior to the First World War. The Ottoman 
24. I owe thanks to both Professors Kinderman and Domes who so eloquently 
made this argument at the meeting for which this paper was originally prepared. 
25. Pounds, Political Geography, supra, note 4, p. 422. 
26. Evans, "South Africa," supra, note 17, pp. 241-52. 
20 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
Empire had incorporated most of the territory and people until the 
end of the war. Prior to the Ottoman Empire modern nationalism was 
no real force in the area. As a result of the peace settlements, the 
area was cast up as mandated territories by the League of Nations. 
The area remained in mandated status until the end of the Second 
World War. Once again Palestine was mandated or entrusted to 
Great Britain. Modern, sovereign statehood for this area of the world 
had to await Israeli expression in 1949. For the case of Taiwan, I will 
present a much longer discussion below. 
APPLICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THEORIES 
TO REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
ON TAIWAN 
In order to understand the status and potential future of Taiwan 
with respect to the government in Peking, it is necessary to 
understand that political boundaries are not part of Chinese political 
tradition and thought. Moreover, China has always been a land-
based and land-directed society. The sea and coastal mountain 
ranges (coastal slope) formed, until most recently, both natural 
boundaries and barriers for China.27 The Chinese of the early empires 
viewed those people living on the seaward side of the coastal slope as 
neither critical to China nor Chinese. The Chinese people were those 
living within the hinterlands of the Hwang-ho and Yangtze-kiang 
river valleys. China's expansion was inland and its trade routes were 
westward, across India and Asia Minor, to Europe. "The Great Wall 
itself is not in fact a linear frontier; it is more the most important 
delimitation of what is in fact a zonal frontier, of which there are also 
other minor delimitations." What could not be included in the 
Empires had to be excluded.28 
This was especially true on the north, vis-a-vis the peoples of the 
steppes. China's southern frontier was one on which the Chinese 
mode of agriculture could expand; that on the north could be 
crossed only by adopting another mode of life. The Chinese state 
was built on the base of irrigated agriculture. In Wittfogel's 
27. This argument is based on the lectures of Professor David N. Sopher, 
Sacramento State College, 1958·1959. 
28. Owen Lattimore as cited in S. Whittimore Boggs. International Boundaries-
A Study Of Boundary Functions And Problems. INew York: Morningside heights. 
Columbia University Press, 1940!, p. 136. 
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terminology, it was an agromanagerial despotism, ruling a 
hydraulic society. Its organization was incapable of the steppes. 
But the ideal of a linear boundary between China and the 
steppes was never fully realized in practice. . . . 29 
China's organization was also unsuitable for both the steppes and the 
sea regions. Moreover, neither could be conquered without drastic 
changes in the Chinese mode of life. 
Even today, Taiwan can be viewed as a frontier area which 
China has never properly incorporated. The longest period of Chinese 
administration was between 1683 and 1895. Before that, except for 
Dutch and Spanish colonial rule, Taiwan was a retreat for Japanese 
pirates, Chinese bandits, refugees and fleeing war lords. As a matter 
of fact, and despite earlier Chinese forays and sporadic emigration 
from Fukien Province, Taiwan had to await Portuguese discovery in 
1517 and Dutch colonization in 1624 before the Chinese government 
became seriously concerned over the population and management of 
the Island. 
Even during the period if Imperial rule, from 1683 to 1895, the 
Island was ruled as a part of Fukien Province. The aborigines were 
either assimilated into the Chinese population or pushed back into 
the Mountains. The Imperial government treated the Island with 
little, if any, attention. From 1884 with the French Blockade and 
1895 with the Japanese rule, the Island passed out of Peking's 
control. The Chinese on Taiwan refused to accept it and declared 
their independence and claimed to be a republic. In 1949, the 
remnants of the Kuomintang under the leadership of Chiang 
Kai-shek retreated to the Island claiming it to be a province of China 
and the Kuomintang to be the legitimate government of China.30 By 
tracing the expansion of the Chinese Empire outward and southward 
and by contrasting the incorporation and development of Canton with 
the awareness and administration of Taiwan, further evidence is 
provided for the claims that Taiwan was never politically incorpo-
rated into China and that it remains a disputed frontier area. Its 
republican government of 1895 was dominated, ignored, and has been 
conveniently long since forgotten. 
29. Jones, "Boundary Concepts in Setting of Place and Time," 49 Annuals Of The 
Association Of American Geographers 243, <19591. 
30. Worldmark Encyclopedia Of The Nations, <New York: Harper and Brothers, 
19601, p. 933. 
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Table 3: The Status of Taiwan and Canton During Historical Periods of Chinese 
Expansion31 
Period Status of Taiwan 
1. Chou Dynasty West-Pre- Unknown 
Ch'in; China limited to Yel-
low River Basin - a ger-
minal hydraulic society. (c. 
1122-771 B.C.) 
2. Chou Dynasty East; Pre- Unknown 
Qin China was not expand-
ing and was divided within. 
(c. 770-256 B.C.) 
3. Ch'in, The Great Wall and Unknown 
unified metric system was 
adopted; expansionist 
period included Han For-
mer (c. 221 B.C. to 9 A.D.) 
4. Han Later was a divided Unknown 
period of the three King-
doms and War Lord com-
petition, (c. 220-280 A.D.l 
5. Tsin, Sui, and Tang War- Unknown 
lord competition. Tibet was 
brought into China (c. 280-
906 A.D.l 
6. Five Dynasties, Song North Unknown 
and Song South, internal 
conflict and division and an 
expanded definition of Chi-
na was incorporated into 
the political tradition. (c. 
907-1279 A.D.) 
Status of Canton 
Undeveloped 
Undeveloped 
Undeveloped as 
part of China 
concept. 
Expansion into 
Canton with 
Han Armies 
reaching Viet 
Nam. 
Arabic settlements 
established by 
Arab Mer-
chants. 
Canton now be-
came a part of 
China proper. 
31. See Yung Wei "The Unification and Division of Multi-System Nations.. ."in 
Chapter III for unity and disunity periodicty tables. 
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7. Yuan expansionist period, Unknown 
Ghengis Kahn and Mongo-
lia brought into China (c. 
1260-1368 A.D.l. 
Marco Polo visited 
Fukien and 
Chuan Chou 
and compared 
it to Alexandi-
a; later stage 
Arabic mer-
chant riots 
were put down 
and Chuan 
Chou was 
closed. 
8. Ming Dynasty ended with Portuguese discovered For- Developed 
Manchurian revolution (c. mosa in 1517 - Dutch 
1368-1644 A.D.). Ruled Pescadores and 
9. Ch'ing (Manchu rule) 
Dynasty (c. 1644-1912 
A.D.> 
10. The Republic of China (c. 
1912 A.D.-> 
11. Mao Tse-tung, People's Re-
public of China (c. 1949-
1976 A.D.) 
Taiwan. 
Bandits, Pirates, Chinese 
and Japanese ruled For-
mosa and Independence 
is declared. 
Japanese ruled Formosa as a 
colony <1895-19451. 
ROC rules Taiwan as a 
Province of the Repub-
lic of China. 
Developed 
ROC Rule Since 
1945 
Mao Tse-tung 
Communist 
Rule. 
A political geographer could argue from this chronology and 
physical location, that the Republic of China is to be in possession of 
a "frontier territory" upon which they have established a viable 
community, which operates a viable sovereign state, but which 
through its founding ideology still claims legitimacy over all of 
China. The Taiwan Straits still form a natural boundary and barrier 
between China proper and Taiwan. No legal national delimiting 
boundaries have yet been established between the two governments 
and their people. 
The recent China/Taiwan debate reveals at least seven primary 
factors against procedural re-unification. First, political partition and 
political division create independent political power structures whose 
perpetuation is of primary importance to the elite members of each 
part. Reunification or reconquest signifies the demise of at least one 
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elite-regime. Second, most divided nations in the world today are 
supported by external nations who are in opposition to each other. 
Third, these competitive relations among the external blocs are 
inversely related to bi-lateral negotiations between the intra-elite 
units. Fourth, the regimes and elites of the parts of a divided nation 
tend to ascribe to each other antithetical political formulas which 
deny reconciliation and compromise. Fifth, the potential for one part 
to lose military power measured in terms of minutes of firepower, 
keeps other parts from seriously negotiating toward some form of 
reconciliation. As Kenneth Boulding pointed out, if one side begins to 
remove itself from the field of conflict, there is little incentive for the 
other to move. Again, in this case, the dominant military power can 
begin to actively remove the other by conquest and retaliation. Sixth, 
the relative disparities of standard of living among members of the 
parts and differences of issue attitudes intensifies the desire for 
continued partition. Seventh, when people begin to act, live and 
think as members of different political states then the members no 
longer find reunification attractive or desirable.32 
On June 14, 1981, Secretary of State Haig was reported to have 
said that the United States wanted to "beef up" its military as well as 
its non-military relations with China while continuing to relate to 
Taiwan on an informal (businesslike) basis. Haig also reported that 
the United States would continue to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan 
in the amount of about 700 million dollars a year. The United States, 
according to the Secretary, would like to find out what kind of 
military hardware China would want through technological ex-
changes. Opposing Soviet imperialism now appears to have taken 
precedence over the countering of international communism in U.S. 
strategy. This conclusion of precedence arises from Haig's claims that 
the Soviet threats to both China and the United States compelled him 
seek to strengthen U.S.-Sino relationships. This is but one of the 
many conclusions that may be drawn from Haig's diplomacy. 
On the other hand, if the United States includes the defeat of 
communism as a critical element in its world strategy, then Taiwan 
and the Republic of China become important. Taiwan has over the 
years proven to be a strong and unwavering friend to the United 
32. Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict And Defense: A General Theory !New York: 
Harper 1962!, pp. 305-28. 
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States and a staunch foe of communism. However, American strategy 
now seems to be one of "having our China and keeping Taiwan, too". 
No matter, the international status of Taiwan and the Republic of 
China on Taiwan is inextricably intertwined in the cold war politics 
of the United States and the Soviet Union and equally intertwined 
in U.S.-Sino politics.33 
What should U.S. policy toward Taiwan be? Most Chinese -
mainlanders, those from Hong Kong, or those from Salinas, Califor-
nia and especially those from Taiwan - would advise the Americans 
to rid themselves of the idea that Taiwan belongs to the United 
States or that it is something to be negotiated away by the U.S. 
government. Second, and perhaps even more important is the advice 
offered by many that the leadership of the United States should place 
the China/Taiwan problem in the context of a U.S. world strategy 
rather than in the narrower U.S.-Sino strategy. United States 
leadership should not hold the mistaken view that any American 
policy toward Taiwan is non-negotiable in terms of U.S.-Peking 
relations. In short, Peking or, more specifically, the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP), cannot afford to take a non-negotiable stance 
with America on Taiwan issues. 
33. I would like to make an observation which is worthy of a longer and more 
detailed analysis. The verdict is now coming in on the trial of communism throughout 
the world. While communism will remain attracti·ve to many parts of the world, 
especially the poor nations emerging from colonial rule, the record of communism is 
not that impressive. Wherever the communist party has gained power and rulership, 
the verdict is that it forms a ruling class rather than a democratic party of the 
proletariat. With the emergence of the ruling class party, the people lose freedom, life 
becomes harsher, feudal practices are established, and people lose all hope. Even those 
who followed the party for its revolutionary promises, which were kept for the top of 
the party in Russia and in China, have lost hope after a generation of sacrifice. This 
past year, Leonid Brezhnev apologized to the Russian people for not making Russia the 
greatest consumer economy in the world, a promise he made 20 years ago. This year 
the Polish workers acknowledged the need for a union and collective bargaining as 
protection against the Polish Communist Party which acts like a ruling class vis-a-vis 
labor. During the past few years, China has stepped away from Mao's 30 some years of 
movement and countermovements that pitted Chinese against Chinese. that brought 
hardship and death in the hundreds of thousands, that set China back for many. many 
years in terms of intellectual and. scientific development. An entire generation of 
scholars was sacrificed in that bloody cultural revolution. Marxism may work well as a 
means of critical evaluation of the shortcomings of capitalism; but. communism and the 
communist parties have offered little in the way of practical working alternatives. 
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In formulating U.S. strategy our leaders must keep in mind that 
the CCP must face the Soviet and Vietnamese borders with or 
without U.S. concessions on Taiwan policies. Moreover, China is 
faced with four-fifths of a billion people tied to the land in a 
subsistence economy and a generation of youth clamouring for a 
chance to work and make a meaningful life. China needs agricultural 
and industrial technological help from the United States. The 
government of China literally has to bring about an industrial-urban 
revolution in a very few years. This has been an ever present and 
unsolved problem of the CCP. The Party needs help if it is to retain 
its legitimacy among the populace. It needs strong support from the 
United States. These needs give the United States a great deal of 
decision-making latitude vis-a-vis Taiwan. The Party in Peking 
knows this, though it hopes the party in Washington D. C. does not. 
Another question arises: What should U.S. world strategy be 
vis-a-vis China and Taiwan? Surprisingly, the answer I obtained 
from talking with mainland Chinese, and the most recent arrivals 
from China and Hong Kong, is that the most important element of 
U.S. world strategy should be "winning the battle against com-
munism; and, especially the Soviet brand of communism." The Soviet 
brand of communism is viewed by both communist and non-
communist Chinese as most aggressive and imperialistic and is 
militarily the most threatening to American and Chinese national 
security interests. 
Many Chinese agree that the United States should continue its 
relations with Peking while at the same time continuing to enhance 
the international status of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Many 
Chinese believe that the Chinese people can have more than one 
government and one country. They argue that the goal of American 
policy should be to help establish Taiwan as a sovereign unit. Why do 
Chinese, many of them citizens and loyal to China, hold these 
seemingly contradictory views? Again, many Chinese throughout the 
world desire to see a strong China. While they would like to see 
China become stronger and stronger, there are few Chinese anywhere 
who would like to be "liberated" by the Chinese Communist Party. 
The Chinese cannot forget that for more than 100 years, they have 
been denied citizenship, safe passage, passports, property ownership, 
and they cannot forget they have been forced into coolie positions, 
suffering under the yoke of servitude, slavery and subjected to 
pogroms in the most recent of times. This suffering, to a great extent, 
has been at the hands of foreigners. The Chinese have longed for a 
stronger "motherland" which could offer them solace and protection. 
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As one Chinese citizen from Canton said, "If China is weak, the 
foreigner will continue to bully [the] Chinese; but, if China is strong, 
the Chinese in Hong Kong and even those in San Francisco will have 
a stronger motherland to prevent this bullying." 
The contradiction of attitudes is also explained by the fact that 
Mao's policy on Vietnam and Deng's war with Vietnam finds the 
overseas Chinese once again forced to flee their homes without 
citizenship or hope, to migrate as refugees and boat people. There 
exists the belief that if China had a strong government, countries like 
Vietnam and Cambodia could not simply set Chinese communities 
adrift upon the ocean. A strong Chinese government, one of great 
international status and repute, could simply say "stop" and such 
practices would cease. As strong as China presented itself during the 
60s and 70s, Mao could not prevent the pogroms that occurred in the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Overseas Chinese will accept a 
strong Motherland despite the ideology of the ruling party. 
American's are currently having a romance with China. The 
United States and Peking have some very profound differences 
regarding Taiwan. In the romantic efforts to woo China, Americans 
should see the place that the Kuomintang and Taiwan play in the 
reforms now going on within China. Since the death of Mao, China 
has been undergoing many wrenching changes. Many of these 
changes and trends have been directed toward the West. In fact, the 
Chinese Communist Party has permitted direct American influence 
to occur within China. This American influence, or even the same 
kind of foreign influence from any country, was unthinkable in 
Maoist terms. 
Taiwan is difficult for the CCP to swallow. The Party is 
embarassed by Taiwan's brilliant economic, cultural and industrial 
successes. Despite the Party's accusations that the Kuomintang is a 
reactionary force, more and more of the informed Chinese are 
becoming aware of the personal successes and individual freedom 
afforded in Taiwan. These Chinese people know that there is much 
more freedom there than the Party has offered; and, consequently 
they push for even more reforms within China. It is now "old hat" to 
speak of"windows" and "showcases" of the West, but the fact remains 
that Taiwan has been and remains a very attractive and influential 
window. 
In my interviews with informed observers, I am told that the 
party will take a military solution to a problem like Taiwan 
whenever it thinks it can do so without retaliation or fear of being 
impugned. These respondents have pointed out that the use of 
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military force is a common Party practice. The fact that Peking is 
willing to agree to settle the Taiwan question in the future and by 
other than military means suggests that the CCP has already 
assessed the costs of a military solution to be prohibitive. Taiwan's 
independence is difficult for the Chinese Communist Party simply 
because, as one respondent said, "Taiwan is a rich, beautific and 
abundant gem. Given our action toward Tibet, we would annex 
Taiwan in a moment and do so simply out of greed." But for now, 
China cannot. 
SOVEREIGNTY OF TAIWAN 
Integration and community development theories provide yet 
another means for assessing and evaluating the international status 
of nations born of political partition and division. I have already 
suggested that the political partition and integration are parallel 
processes and are not mutually exclusive. For example, as a nation 
divides or is divided, integrative processes begin to occur in each of 
the fragmented parts. This process can be seen in the cases of the 
break up of the Malaysian federation when Singapore seceded in 
1965, or in the rare case of the peaceful partition of Norway and 
Sweden in 1905. The integrative process is true of all divisions which 
result in political partition. Kristoff suggests in his discussion of 
boundaries: "The boundaries bind an area and a people which live 
under one sovereign government and law are, at least presumably, 
integrated not only administratively and economically but also by 
means of a state idea or creed."34 
In measuring the level of integration within recently partitioned 
national fragments, we must keep in mind that few states are 
coterminous with nations. For example, the nation of Jews is not 
completely included in the modern state of Israel. The Socialist 
Republic of Armenia does not include all of the Armenian nation. The 
nation of Ireland reaches beyond the borders of that state as does the 
Chinese nation reach beyond the borders of China proper. These are 
only a few examples which illustrate that with respect to populations, 
most states exhibit national heterogeneity, normally with one 
preponderant national group. The elite of the state tend to represent 
the preponderant group. 
Sovereignty or sovereign nation-state status is the product of 
successful integrative and national-community development proces-
34. Ladis Kristof, "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries," In Jackson and 
Samuels, Politics And Geographic Relationships, supra, note 22, pp. 134-144. 
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ses. Moreover, international law is also primarily concerned with 
states that are "sovereign" or independent, regarding them as legal 
personalities whose relationships it seeks to define and regulate. 
While the concept of sovereignty has been subjected to the most 
severe of criticisms by many political scientists, it nonetheless 
remains a basis upon which both the international legalists and 
representatives of divided nations frequently act; therefore, it 
becomes a reality which is not to be denied in evaluating the status of 
divided nations. In this evaluation of status as sovereign or 
non-sovereign, Mendelson argued that "sovereignty is more like a 
spectrum or continuum, with different states lying at different points 
on it."35 Critics have argued that states, being subject to various 
restraints, are not in fact sovereign. East and Prescott cogently state: 
"certainly many states appear to suffer from limitations of sovereign-
ty as do members of the European Economic Community, Czechoslo-
vakia in respect to the Soviet Union pressure, and both Switzerland 
and Austria which are subject to the duty of permanent neutrality. 
(i.e., they have no legal power to make war .... ) Such limitations do 
not however prevent these states from being classified as indepen-
dent, if only because they stand in sharp contrast to those (units or 
systems) which are legally dependent, lacking the right to engage in 
certain political activities, notably in the field of foreign affairs."36 
Sovereignty claims can be settled without annexation or reuni-
fication. I want to introduce the idea of "sovereignty disputes" as a 
form of international conflict. Like boundary disputes, sovereignty 
disputes can be settled with varying levels and qualities of conflict. 
Among these variations one can find amicable negotiation among the 
disputants. The varying levels of conflict are found by contrasting the 
recent detente between East and West Germany and the somewhat 
more rancourous and sporadically violent border conflict that con-
tinues between North and South Korea. These cases are tentatively 
advanced as instances of sovereignty disputes which are being settled 
through negotiation and agreement on the part of both sides to 
recognize the right to disagree while they respect the integrity and 
autonomy of each other. More important is the idea or suggestion 
that "sovereignty disputes" or even the treatment of divided nation 
disputes as "sovereignty disputes" may serve as a first step and a 
fresh approach toward the development of a new integration at the 
international leveta7 
35. W. H. Mendelson, "The Two Germanies.," The Times, 14 November 1972 as 
cited in East and Prescott, Our Fragmented World, supra, note 20, p. 102. 
36. Ibid. 
37. The introduction of new terms, alone, frequently help negotiated resolutions of 
conflict. 
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How do we practically and empirically measure the degree of 
sovereignty? An insightful response to this question is that those 
parties to the dispute have their own measures and have applied 
them successfully to their own dissatisfaction. It is this mutual 
dissatisfaction which produces the sovereignty dispute. Karl Deutsch 
provides a conceptual beginning for the development of objective 
measures of systemic sovereignty. My interpretation of his work 
provides the following criteria: 
1. Sovereignty is a product of the entire community and rests 
there rather than being the invention and possession of some 
individual, faction, or class. 
2. Sovereignty is a reflection of the ability of the polity to learn, 
to change and adopt to a changing world. This I believe is what 
Deutsch means by "self-steering" and "self-control," or autonomy. 
3. Sovereignty is illustrated by the ability of those who man the 
institutions of a political system to close the decision-making 
processes to any further information by which a particular 
decision might possibly be modified. This is the exercise of 
Deutsch's "system will." 
4. Sovereignty is also a product of the power of a system to 
implement and apply decisions so as to obtain membership and 
non-membership compliance with new rules. 
5. Sovereignty is seldom concentrated in a single group and 
when it is, the system is weakened by the inability of it to 
survive the destruction of that group.38 
In a study conducted prior to and during 1978, I attempted to 
apply these criteria of sovereignty to the Republic of China on 
Taiwan by operationally defining these criteria in terms of measures 
of political integration, social mobilization and assimilation. I 
conducted a series of interviews with Chinese-American citizens, 
Chinese from Taiwan, and Chinese from other parts of the world. 
Most of my respondents either studied or worked in academics. I have 
presented this work in another report and will summarize its 
relevant findings as they show the international status of divided 
nations. 
38. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism And Its Alternatives. <New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1969), pp. 127-66. See also The Nerves Of Government, (New York: The Free 
Press 1966), pp. 55, 210-220. 
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The integration process is one through which villages, baronies, 
and countries merge into larger and larger units and eventually 
become nation-states. This is accomplished through six parallel 
processes which are as follows: 
1. Several peoples (of varying origins) or population clusters 
become united through an infra-structure of communication and 
economic activity, and therefore, begin to think of themselves as 
a country. 
2. There is an integration and consolidation of language. 
3. There is an integration of elites as an accepted model of 
reference, or, put another way, there is an elite whose members 
serve as role models for mass behavior. 
4. There is an expansion of a feeling of kinship from kin groups 
to the whole people. 
5. There is the development of a sense of trust, a "we trust each 
other more than we trust some foreigner". 
6. The integration of administrative districts and the making of 
a state. 39 
In the process of becoming a country, two different groups of 
people formed on Taiwan. The first group are those whose ancestors 
migrated to the Island over the past four centuries. The second group 
known as "Mainlanders" are those who followed Chiang Kai-shek in 
1949. The first group will be referred to as Taiwanese and they 
number about 15 million. The Mainlanders, about 2 million, bring 
the total population of the country to about 17 million. The 
Taiwanese see themselves as having an identity separate from China 
proper. Most of my respondents said that they refer to themselves as 
"being from Taiwan", and not as "being from China." When 
Taiwanese respondents were asked to judge the position of the 
Mainlanders of the Island, they generally responded by saying that 
the Mainlander is separate from China. The Mainlanders themselves 
tend to agree that they have a separate identity from China proper. 
These Mainlanders from whom most of the political elite is recruited 
39. Ray E., Johnston, "Taiwan's Misplaced Sovereignty," a paper prepared for and 
delivered at the 1979 annual conference of the International Studies Association, in 
Toronto, Canada. 
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and who form an "upper structure" of society on the Island continue 
to see Taiwan as a part and parcel of China proper. The Kuomin-
tang has contributed to the development of a separate identity, rather 
unwittingly, by its thorough and constant anti-communist propagan-
da and through its continued successful and separate economic 
development. 
Language consolidation was implemented by the adoption of 
"New Peking" as the official governmental language. Despite this 
adoption of an official language, some 80 percent of the population 
still uses local dialects in their daily lives. These local dialects are 
different from the official language in both accent and grammatical 
structure. 
Integration of the elites is still an ongoing process. At the time of 
this writing, two groups of elite members serve as behavior models 
for most of people. The first group is the political elite, drawn 
primarily from the Mainlanders. The second group is an elite of 
professionals, scientists, entrepreneurs and celebrities drawn from 
both the Mainlanders and Taiwanese and serving both groups. 
Most of my respondents felt that this dual elite structure persists 
as one of the important problems of nation building in Taiwan. 
However, these same respondents agreed that no single monolithic 
social structure exists on Taiwan and that useful aspiration models 
do exist in the minds of the mass members of society. 
The next criteria, feelings of kinship occur along class lines and 
class cleavages. Members of both the major groups when traveling 
abroad identify themselves as Taiwan Chinese to the outsider. Some 
draw class distinctions between themselves and the other groups 
reporting that they are either "Mainlanders" from Taiwan or 
"Taiwanese" from Taiwan. However, in general they present a 
common front to the outsider. To the extent that this common front 
suggests that the two groups are beginning to feel or share a common 
identity there are growing feelings of kinship. 
Feelings of trust were measured by asking and doing research on 
preferences of who receives employment, promotion and property and 
who is delegated responsibility in public and private pursuits. Like 
the feelings of kinship the data here are inconclusive. There seems to 
be a growing sense of social trust between members of the two 
primary groups especially in private sphere of workaday life. 
Finally, the government has long ago integrated the administra-
tive districts, the bureaucrats and the police. They have recruited 
local district administrators (at the party level) from both major 
groups of the population. I asked all of the respondents about the rule 
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of law and sense of civility. From their reports, I concluded that there 
appears to be a growing sense of civility among members of society 
and between members of society and the ruling leadership. Most of 
the respondents, despite their background, felt that the rule of law 
and civility were relatively greater on Taiwan than on the mainland. 
This was reported by respondents who had been in both countries for 
extended periods of time. These visits were during the past five or ten 
years. 
Most of the respondents regarded questions of assimilation as 
irrelevant to Taiwan. They argued that the answers would show 
greater levels of mass mobilization and assimilation then the elites 
could in fact draw upon. Westerners who apply western sociological 
techniques would thus obtain a halo effect produced by the measures 
and not actually found in the population. Despite these reservations, 
the respondents answered all questions and seemed to think they 
made sense. Their answers suggest that the entire population is 
capable of mobilization to support the government in cases of (a) 
external threats and (b) actual invasion. When domestic disruptions 
occur, enough of the population remains out of the fray so as to 
permit the government to effectively maintain civil and political 
order. These observations suggest some degree of assimilation has 
occurred. In comparative terms, the people living on Taiwan have a 
feeling of more individual freedom then do their Chinese counter-
parts on the mainland. 
Governmental services have become more and more satisfying. 
The government provides more health care stations, mobile units and 
public transportation each year. There has been an equalization of job 
opportunities and an encouragement of the expansion of the private 
sector. The economy is a "state directed" economy largely influenced 
by private enterprise. 
In the opening paragraphs, I said that most states exhibit a 
national heterogeneity, normally with one preponderant national 
group. I conclude this section by noting that Taiwan, under the KMT, 
has developed the requisite structures and functions of a sovereign 
state. It has a mobilized population, an effective leadership structure 
and an effective administration and military. Its leadership can 
survive generational replacement. Taiwan - at minimum - has all 
the necessary elements of sovereignty if not sovereignty itself. 
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POLITICAL PARTITION: A NEGATION OF 
UNITY OR A NEW UNITY? 
Political division, secession and partition are generally viewed as 
evils to be avoided; while consolidation, amalgamation, integration 
and the "art of getting bigger" are viewed as virtues to be sought. 
Only in the case of nationalism does one find a large body of 
literature favorable to one type of political partition. The hypotheses 
are that political partition demands lead to hostility and hostility in 
turn leads to riots, organized irredentist movements and finally to 
civil war. While consolidation demands or international integration 
demands or unification demands lead to modern, rational, effective 
and efficient governments. Interestingly, no one, to my knowledge, 
has compared the costs in human lives of movements that call for 
political division and movements that call for political amalgamation 
and international integration. If the Nazi experiement is reflective 
of the latter, we know that the human costs of a single world 
government runs into the millions. Those who have an ideological 
stake in the reunification, or even continuation of partition while 
giving lip service to re-unification, are generally the first to attribute 
human costs to division. Among the costs frequently cited are those of 
human lives, break-up of families, the breakdown of cultural and 
ethnic identification and autonomy, the disruption of production and 
distribution of economic goods and services, and increasing amounts 
of bigotry, dogmatism and hostility. 
N.J. G. Pounds has said that the «term 'partition' is a perjorative 
one, carrying with it overtones of outrage or abuse, as if the act which 
it describes were itself contrary to the established order of things. 
The suggestion is always present- overt or implied - that it results 
from a show of force and that in carrying it out either the rights of 
the people or the intentions of the diety have been violated.40 
Measuring hostility in existing divided nations led Gregory 
Henderson to conclude that the price paid for political partition is 
tension, war, duplication and waste of dwindling resources, perhaps 
even civilization itself. However, we would probably need a new set of 
measures to test the costs of "bigness". Recent concern with the 
environment, multinational corporations, and the third world have 
led to some scholarly attempts to focus on these costs. E. F. 
Schumacher's Small is Beautiful is one effort in this direc-
tion.41 We find in his, and others' environmentalist literature, 
40. Pounds, "Perspective of Partition," supra, note 9, p. 161. 
41. E.F. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 
1973), pp. 59-70. 
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that the costs of bigness (without a Hitler on the scene) are ecological 
damage and callousness toward humans, alienation of the individual 
from community and from the family, normlessness, social and 
psychological drift, system anomie, political repression, mass ex-
ploitation, and a high death count that results from all sorts of 
technological accidents. 
The negative view of political partition and division - balka-
nization - is puzzling, since many nation-states in the world today 
are a product of partition. Some, it is true, are products of old empire 
break down and others of empire building. Whichever is the source, 
the nations of today are a product of partitioning and bounding. 
Perhaps this negative view of political partition can be under-
stood by considering man's search for immortality, a search which 
leads him to romanticize about the possibilities of a world wherein 
everyone is the same and there is no conflict. Such utopian views 
generally contain the idea of global security and peace. The desire for 
immortality is reflected in man's long romance with the rights and 
rituals of tribalism, the clan, the family and finally the nation-state. 
Our twentieth century movement for universal world order -
overcoming the conflicts of rampant nationalism - reflects but one 
more level of the founding of a "Golden Age" of peace and 
immortality. The desire is similar to Eric Berne's notion that when 
most of us get on the marital couch we do so in hope of founding a 
new "Nation of Abraham."42 This hope is filled with many paradoxes. 
What one has, his immediate possessions, his family, his language, 
his culture and his race become mystically endowed as symbolic of 
God's Ways. Those individuals who are different are the enemy, the 
"spawn of the devil", "the significant other" who diabolically cheat 
the chosen few of their immortality. Upon this myth nations are built 
and wars are fought. In the desperation of disparate situations, 
people are generally willing to recognize the myth and give it up 
rather than die for it. 
This paradox is again reflected in Snyder's observation that the 
ancient community was based on primitive people's ancient and 
tribal instincts centering on fear and hostility toward the stranger.43 
While making searches for a universal peace in a modern community 
42. Eric Berne Sex in Human Loving, (New York, Simon & Schuster: Pocket 
Books, 1971), p. 35, and passim. 
43. Louis Snyder, "The Historians Meaning of Nationalism, 1954", in Louis 
Snyder Ced.l, The Dynamics of Nationalism, (Princeton, New Jersey: D. van Nostrand & 
Co., 1964), p. 25. 
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- as he did in days of old - mirroring the conditions of nature and 
producing the "natural man", modem man is at the same time driven 
to revere his differences from his fellow. This reverence of differences 
continues to be a primary motive in national political partition from 
the times of ancient theocracies to the modern state. In our efforts to 
explain the re-unification of divided nations, we should remember 
that the Phoenix of the Old State has never risen from the ashes of 
political partition and division; rather, what has always risen has 
been a new unity, a new order both similar and dissimilar to the past. 
COMMENTS 
Hungdah Chiu 
Professor Johnston's statement on the historical development of 
Chinese settlement in Taiwan1 is not based on correct historical facts 
and legal theory. As to the historical facts, I would like to quote a 
recent study on the history of Taiwan by Professor Yu-min Shaw of 
the History Department of the Notre Dame University,2 which 
provides well-documented information on tth subject. 
There are documentary evidences indicating that by 1171, 
P'eng-hu (Pescadores) had become a Chinese military outpost, 
and at least by 1225 it was administratively incorporated into 
the Chinese Empire-placed under the jurisdiction of Tsin-kiang 
County of Ch'uan-chou Prefecture, Fukien Province.3 As for 
Taiwan, no massive settlement began until General Cheng 
Ch'eng-kung (Koxinga, 1624-62) expelled the Dutch from Taiwan 
in 1661. 
From 1662 to 1683 Cheng Ch'eng-kung and his successors 
ruled Taiwan for 21 years. Cheng Ch'eng-kung died only five 
months after his victory over the Dutch, but during his brief rule 
1. See pp. 20-22. 
2. Yu-ming Shaw, "Modern History of Taiwan: An Interpretative Account," in 
Hungdah Chiu, ed., China and the Taiwan Issue, (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 8-15, 
18-19. 
3. For the early history of Taiwan and the Chinese penetration into P'eng-hu, see 
Kuo T'ing-yee, T'ai-wan shih-shih kai-shuo (General history of Taiwan) (Taipei: 
Cheng-chung Book Co., 1965), pp. 1-8. See also Wen-hsiung Hsu, "Chinese Colonization 
of Taiwan," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1975, pp. 15-24; and Fang Hao, 
"Looking at the Chinese Sovereignty over Taiwan and Penghu from Some Historical 
Documents," in Chung-yuan wen-hua yu T'ai-wan <Chinese Culture and Taiwan) 
(Taipei: Taipei Historical Commission, 1971), pp. 355-79. 
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he set up guidelines for the governing of Taiwan that survived 
his demise. After his death his son, Cheng Ching, took over the 
reign. With Ch'en Yung-hua as his chief adviser, the Cheng 
government began to concentrate on the development of Taiwan. 
The administrative policies of the Cheng government and its 
achievements throughout its rule in Taiwan can be summarized 
as follows: First was the recruitment of Chinese migrants to 
Taiwan. . . . with the influx of both settlers andsoldiers, 
Taiwan's population increased to about 100,000 by the end of the 
Cheng rule in 16824 
In September 1683, [the Ching government surrendered to 
the Ch'ing government and Taiwan became part of the Fukien 
Province.] Taiwan came under the rule of the Ch'ing dynasty for 
212 years, until 1895. 
In terms of assessing the administrative efficiency of the 
Ch'ing, its rule of Taiwan can be devided into two periods: from 
1683 to 1870s and from the 1870s to 1895. Before 1874 the Ch'ing 
government carried on a passive attitude toward Taiwan. It tried 
to maintain only a semblance of law and order and made 
minimum effort to develope the island. However, after the 
Japanese invasion of Taiwan in 1874, the Ch'ing govermnent 
realized that only the energetic development of the island would 
forestall further foreign incroachment there. Therefore a series of 
able administrators were sent to Taiwan and many reforms were 
undertaken. . . . 
Taiwan's economic development took an upward swing after 
the mid-nineteenth century, especially in the production of the 
three major export items: sugar, tea and camphor. Between the 
1860s and 1890s, tea production and exportation increased 50 
times, sugar exportation grew 2.5 times, and camphor 5 times. 
This boom in foreign trade was also facilitated by the presence of 
western commercial firms in Taiwan after the 1850s.5 
Technological development was made possible by a succes-
sion of able Ch'ing administrators, such as Shen Pao-chen, Ting 
Jih-ch'ang, and Liu Ming-ch'uan, who came to Taiwan after 
1870. Among them, Liu Ming-ch'uan's contribution was the 
4. Hsu, "Chinese Colonization," p. 97. 
5. Ramon H. Myers, "Taiwan under Ch'ing Imperial Rule: The Traditional 
Economy," Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong 5, no. 2 (1972); 375-77. 
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greatest. They promoted mining and foreign trade, set up 
telegraph lines, improved transportation both inside Taiwan and 
with the mainland, established postal and electricity transmis-
sion systems, built railways, opened up modern schools, and 
engaged in land survey and tax reform. By the 1890s Taiwan had 
become the most modern and progressive province in China. 
Besides material progress, Taiwan by the end of the 
nineteenth century had also achieved a high degree of education-
al advancement. . . . 
Besides traditional-style schools, two modern-style schools 
were also established: a Western Academy (1887) offering 
modern subjects, such as foreign languages, mathematics, phy-
sics, chemistry, in addition to Chinese studies; and a Telegraph 
Academy (1890).6 
In 1894 war broke out between China and Japan over the 
question of Korea, and China was defeated by Japan. In the 
Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed in April 1895, China 
agreed, along with other concessions, to cede Taiwan and 
P'eng-hu to Japan. 
When the news of this imminent cession broke out, it 
triggered a strong wave of protest throughout all of China and 
Taiwan. In a memorial written in blood and submitted to Peking, 
the delegates of the Chinese gentry of Taiwan solemnly declared 
that they would prefer to fight to death than to live under 
Japanese rule. This helped to stimulate K'ang Yu-wei, the noted 
late Ch'ing intellectual leader, to lead the famous May protest 
movement in which more than a thousand Chinese literati 
participated. They lodged a petition with the Ch'ing court 
opposing the cession of Taiwan and demanding reforms. But 
these emotional outbursts couldnot alter the fate of Taiwan. The 
Chinese government, bound by treaty obligations, could not offer 
much help for Taiwan's defense. . . . 
After the failure of all earlier actions and in final despera-
tion, the Chinese patiots in Taiwan decided to try the strategy of 
declaring Taiwan a "republic" under the title of "T'ai-wan 
Min-chu Kuo" (Taiwan Democratic Republic). By declaring 
Taiwan a republic, they hoped to win international sympathy 
and SUJ>pOrt and force Japan to give up Taiwan. To assuage any 
6. Kuo, General history, pp. 178-209. On Taiwan's educational system and its 
various educational institutions, see Wang Ch'i-tsung, "On literary academies and 
learning centers in Ch'ing Taiwan," in Chiang-i hui-pien <A collection of instructional 
materials) (Taipei: Taiwan Historical Study Society, 19771, Chapter 7. 
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suspicions of their loyalty to China, they designated the reign 
name of the new republic as "Yung-Ch'ing" (Forever Ch'ing), and 
in their public announcements they never used the term tu-li 
(independence), but tzu-li (self-sustaining) or tzu-chu (self-
governing). Further evidence of their loyalty to China was that 
T'ang, the president of the republic, offered to continue to serve 
as the acting governor of Taiwan for the Ch'ing government. 
The resistance movement was certainly heroic. But the most 
impressive thing in the whole movement was the outpouring of 
loyalty by the people of Taiwan toward mainland China. Despite 
tensions, this manifestation of loyalty testifies to the basic racial, 
cultural, and political bonds between the Chinese people in 
Taiwan and their compatriots on the mainland. 
Another salient aspect of this movement was that it revealed 
the intensity of modern nationalism among the Chinese people 
on Taiwan. One Western scholar made this succinct comment: 
It is clear that the prolonged defense of Taiwan and the 
establishment of a republic and it vestiges were manifesta-
tions of a rising nationalist spirit among the Chinese. The 
backers of the republic evinced a marked degree of patriot-
ism in their utterances. Furthermore, their resistance effort, 
conducted in the name of the people and on behalf of China, 
certainly was indicative of an outgrowth of modern 
nationalism. 7 
With respect to the international law aspect of the question, I 
think that under any principle of international law, the 212 years of 
control of Taiwan by the Ch'ing dynasty would definitely have 
conferred a valid title to the territory. If not, then the whole territory 
of the United States, which has only existed for 205 years, would be 
of questionable title. 
As to multi-system nation problem, I think Professor Johnston 
missed a major crucial point - it is the Communist life style that 
makes the non-Communist part of a nation unwilling to unite with 
the Communist part. On the question of Taiwan, the people on 
Taiwan are ethnic Chinese and they share same cultural, historical 
and emotional identification with the people on the mainland. The 
reason why they do not want to unite with the mainland now is 
because of their dislike for the Communist system. It has nothing to 
do with the Chinese historical and legal claim to Taiwan. 
7. Harry J. Lamley, "The 1895 Taiwan Republic: A Significant Episode in Modern 
Chinese History," 27 Journal of Asian Studies, 761 fNo. 4, Aug. 19681. 

Chapter 2 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION 
AND MULTI-SYSTEM NATIONS- WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO CHINESE (MAINLAND-TAIWAN) CASE 
Hungdah Chiu 
I. 
In a domestic legal system, the issues of whether a corporation 
has been duly incorporated or its board of directors has been legally 
selected can be easily determined by reference to domestic law. These 
disputes can be authoritatively decided by a domestic court. In the 
international legal system, writers and state practice generally agree 
on the essential qualifications of a state, namely: (1) a permanent 
population; (2) a defined territory; (3) a government; and, (4) a 
capacity to enter into relations with other states.1 However, because 
the international legal system is a decentralized one, there is no 
centralized authority to render an authoritative decision on whether 
an entity does possess these qualifications. As a result, the decision is 
left to the individual states of the international community. Ideally, 
each state should treat this question as a legal one and make its 
decision on objective criteria recognized by international law. But the 
practice of most states shows that this decision on recognizing an 
entity as a state is treated much more as a question of policy, rather 
than of law. 
Whether or not a government can represent a state (by domestic 
analogy, whether a board can represent a corporation) is also a 
complicated question in light of the fact that neither writers nor state 
practice has defined the applicable criteria for such a determination. 
Some consider that the decisive criterion should be whether a 
government has effective control over its population and territory, 
while others would like to introduce additional elements, such as a 
government's popular support within the state or its willingness to 
1. See, e.g., Article 1 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 
Montevideo, December 26, 1933. League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 165, p. 19. 
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honor international obligations, or others. Again, like the question of 
identifying an entity as a state, the determination that a government 
can represent a particular state is left to the decision of the 
individual states of the international community which, as state 
practice shows, generally make their decision primarily on policy 
grounds rather than on legal considerations. 
In view of this, it is clear that the law of recognition is a highly 
politicized part of public international law. This may partially 
explain why the question of recognition of states and governments 
has neither in theory nor in practice been solved satisfactorily. In 
practice, because of the discretionary nature of recognition, a state 
acts perfectly legally in not granting recognition to an entity which 
in fact possesses all the necessary qualifications of statehood or to a 
government which is in fact in effective control of a state's population 
and territory. Needless to say, the lack of congruity between politics 
and law as regards recognition of states and governments has created 
difficulty and inconvenience in international relations. 
Although in law a state can deny the existence of an unrecog-
nized state or government, in reality such a denial is sometimes 
impossible. And, under certain circumstances, domestic courts have 
held that it is even impossible in law not to adjust the rigid rules on 
the legal consequences of non-recognition of a de facto state or 
government. Thus, in the case of Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist 
Federated Soviet Republic (234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (Ct. App. 
1923)), in which an action was brought against the unrecognized 
RSFSR, the court dismissed the case on the ground that "whether or 
not a government exists . . . is a fact, not a theory." In another case 
concerning an East German corporation's right to sue in the United 
States, a New York court observed: 
A foreign government, although not recognized by the political 
ann of the United States Government, may nevertheless have de 
facto existence which is juridically cognizable. . . . The lack of 
jural status for such government or its creature corporation is not 
determinative of whether transactions with it will be denied 
enforcement in American courts .... (Upright v. Mercury 
Business Machines Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 
(1961)). 
In certain cases, a state has found it necessary in practice to deny 
the legal effect of non-recognition of a foreign state or government. 
For example, after the United State de-recognized the Republic of 
China (ROC) on Taiwan on January 1, 1979, it was compelled to 
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enact the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979,2 the effect of which 
was to treat Taiwan as a state and the governing authorities there as 
a government, despite the lact of formal recognition for the ROC. 
With respect to the legal status of Taiwan, the TRA provides: 
Sec. 4 (b) .... 
(1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to 
foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar en-
tities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with 
respect to Taiwan. 
(3) (A) The absence of diplomatic relations and recognition 
with respect to Taiwan shall not abrogate, infringe, modify, deny, 
or otherwise affect in any way rights or obligations (including 
but not limited to those involving contracts, debts, or property 
interests of any kind) under the laws of the United States 
heretofore or hereafter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan. 
(7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in courts in the 
United States, in accordance with the laws of the United States, 
shall not be abrogated, infringed, modified, denied, or otherwise 
affected in any way by the absence of diplomatic relations or 
recognition. 
(8) No requirement, whether expressed or implied, under the 
laws of the United States with respect to maintenance of 
diplomatic relations or recognition shall be applicable with 
respect to Taiwan. 
(c) For all purposes, including actions in any court in the 
United States, the Congress approves the continuation in force of 
all treaties and other international agreements, including 
multilateral conventions, entered into by the United States and 
the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United 
States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and in 
force between them on December 31, 1978, unless and until 
terminated in accordance with law. 
(d) Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for 
supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued 
membership in any international financial institution or any 
other international organization. 
In international political relations, the need to disregard the 
legal consequences of non-recognition is sometimes more compelling. 
2. U.S. Public Law 96-8-April 10, 1979, United States Statute at Large, Vol. 93, p. 
14. 
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For instance, international agreements have frequently been con-
cluded between a state and an unrecognized state or government. As 
Dr. Maijorie Whiteman observed in 1959: 
It is possible for bilateral treaties or agreements entered into not 
to constitute recognition. Thus, during the years 1919 and 1920 a 
number of bilateral treaties or agreements providing for the 
repatriation of prisoners of war and nations were entered into 
with the [unrecognized] Soviet government .... 3 
Official contacts between two countries or governments not 
recognizing each other have also, sometimes, become necessary in 
international relations. For example, between 1955 and 1971, the 
United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) had engaged 
in more than one hundred ambassadorial talks between them despite 
-the fact that they did not recognize each other until January 1, 1979.4 
Similarly, between 1973 and 1978, the United States and the PRC 
maintained official liaison offices in each other's capital, despite the 
absence of mutual recognition. 
II. 
Applicable rules concerning recognition of multi-system nations 
or divided states or their governments, such as Korea, Germany and 
China, are even more complicated. Before further exploration of the 
subject, it is necessary to say a few words on the use of the term -
multi-system nations or divided states. The term "divided states" is 
usually used in international law or by scholars in international 
relations to describe the situation in Germany, Korea and China. 5 
There is, however, one serious problem in using this term. This term 
implies a more permanent legal separation of two parts of a state, 
though none of the so-called divided states has so far accepted de facto 
separation as permanent and all of them have continued to insist that 
unification is still the ultimate national goal. Even in the German 
case, where both parts of Germany - the Federal Republic of 
3. Majorie Whiteman, Digest of International Law, (Vol. 2, Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 52. 
4. See Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United 
States Experience, 1953-1967, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968). 
5. See, e.g., Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations, (4th ed., New York and 
London: Macmillan, 198ll, pp. 67-70. 
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Germany (FRG: West) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR: 
East)- were admitted to the United Nations on September 18, 1973 
and have normalized their relations through the Treaty of December 
21, 1973 on the Basis of Intra-German Relations and accompanying 
documents,& the Constitutional Court of the FRG held that the Treaty 
did not conflict with the FRG Constitution, i.e., Basic Law of the 
FRG, May 8, 1949. The preamble states that the Constitution was 
enacted "on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was 
denied [i.e., East German people]" and the "entire German people is 
called upon to achieve, by true self-determination, the unity and 
freedom of Germany." The Constitutional Court affirms the tenet 
that Germany in its entirety has not ceased to exist as an 
international entity, despite its lack of an active governmental 
organization. It held that the FRG-GDR Treaty merely accepted the 
existence of two parts of Germany with separate statehood, i.e., of 
"two states in Germany," whose relations inter se are governed by the 
rules of international law as well as by special rules flowing from 
their character as parts of Germany.7 For that reason, the FRG 
Constitutional Court expressed the view that the territory of the 
GDR is not foreign territory within the meaning of statutes of the 
FRG and remains eligible for intra-German judicial assistance.8 In 
view of such a serious and difficult problem in using the term 
"divided states," a more neutral term "multi-system nations" will be 
used to describe the situation in Germany, Korea and China. The 
advantage of this term is that it does not explicitly or implicitly 
challenge the national goal of unification of these states.9 Rather, it 
correctly reflects the political, social and economic situations in these 
states - the co-existence of communist and non-communist systems. 
The term "nation" is used here instead of "state" to avoid challenging 
the position of Korea and China as each part of these countries still 
refuses to recognize the other part as a "state," though they all insist 
that both parts are one nation. 
6. International Legal Materials, Vol. 12 (1973l, pp. 16-24. 
7. Hermann Mosler and Rudolf Bernhardt, <editors), Fontes Juris Gentium. 
Series A, Section II, Tomus 7 [Decisions of German Courts relating to Public 
International Law 1971-1975, Vol. 7], <Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag, 
1979l, p. 348, 365, cited in Stefan A. Risenfeld's review in American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 75, No. 1, January 1981, p. 186. 
8. B. Verf G., Judgment of March 27, 1974. 37 B. Verf G. E., Fontes Juris 
Gentium, Vol. 7, p. 380, cited in Risenfeld, supra note 7, at 186. 
9. See Yung Wei, "The Unification and Division of Multi-system Nations: A 
Comparative Analysis of Basic Concepts, Issues. and Approaches," paper delivered at 
Symposium on Functional Integration of Divided Nations, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 
October 6-7. 1980, reprinted in Chapter 3 of this book. pp. 60-61. 
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Generally speaking, international law has not yet developed 
adequate rules to deal with the special case of the recognition of 
multi-system nations and many countries have dealt with this 
question by somewhat arbitrary application of existing rules or by 
political expediency. So far as the recognition question is concerned, 
there are several peculiar characteristics of multi-system nations 
that deserve attention. In the first place, each part of a multi-system 
nation had formerly belonged to a unified country; and while divided 
now, each part still maintains the national goal of unification. 
Second, until very recently each part of almost every multi-system 
nation, with the possible exception of the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR or East Germany), had claimed to be the sole legal 
government of that country in international relations. Thus, the 
representation of a multi-system nation in an international confer-
ence, until very recently, was given to one part only, while the other 
part was totally excluded from participation in that conference. 
Third, under the existing rules of the international law of recogni-
tion, each part of a multi-system nation can be recognized as an 
independent state because it possesses all the necessary attributes of 
a state in international law. However, this has not been the case in 
practice because each part, with the present exception of Germany, 
has declared that it would not be satisfied with such an arrangement. 
On the contrary, each government has insisted on being recognized as 
the sole legal government of both parts of a multi-system nation, 
including that part over which it has no effective control. Moreover, 
each part has used political pressure from its allies to prevent the 
other part from being recognized as a state or to prevent the 
government of the other part from being recognized as the legal 
government even within the territory under the latter's effective 
control. Fourth, despite the avowed goal of national unification, at 
least in the last decade or so, there has been no serious attempt, with 
the exception of Vietnam, by either part of any multi-system nation 
to achieve unity. This is because each part of a divided country has 
been in alliance with or under the de facto protection of a super-power 
-the United States or the Soviet Union- (or, like the case of the 
People's Republic of China, is itself a potential superpower) and any 
attempt to upset the existing division would risk a serious global 
confrontation. Although the 1954 United States-Republic of China 
Mutual Defense Treaty was terminated on Janyary 1, 1979, under 
the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the U.S. has made it "clear that 
the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the 
People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future 
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of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means," considers "any 
effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful 
means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and 
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the 
United States," and maintains "the capacity to resist any resort to 
force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or 
the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."10 It is 
generally agreed that despite the lack of diplomatic relations between 
the United States and the ROC on Taiwan, any PRC attempt to take 
Taiwan by force would invite strong reaction from the United States. 
As a result, the divisions, though challenged by one or both parts of 
each multi-system nation, are rather permanent and are generally 
expected to be so at least in the forseeable future. 
Needless to say, this peculiar legal and political nature of 
multi-system nations has created difficulty and inconvenience in 
international relations for the many countries which have had to 
choose one part to the total exclusion of the other - an unhappy 
choice. Moreover, this choice is, in most cases, the result of political 
pressure or expediency. It does not have any basis in international 
law insofar as that part which is denied recognition is in every aspect 
as qualified as a state in international law as the part that is 
recognized. Since the division of a multi-system nation is, as stated 
before, almost permanent for all practical purposes and since the 
situation is not likely to be changed without resorting to the use of 
force, international law should not allow such an abnormal situation 
to continue without developing new rules to deal with this new 
situation. 
The most objectionable part of the existing practice of recognition 
is the treatment of the decision to render recognition as a political 
act. This almost totally disregards the fact that, in making such a 
decision, a state concurrently fulfills an international duty for the 
international community, namely, identifying whether an entity does 
possess the qualifications of a state or whether a government does, in 
fact, exercise effective control over its territory and population.u 
Under existing practice, one or more states can ignore an entity 
which, by any objective criterion, is a state. Similarly, a government 
which is, in fact, the only effective governing authority over a 
10. Sec. 2(bl of the Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 2. 
11. See generally, H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1947, in which he argued strongly in favor of treating 
recognition as a legal act. 
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territory and its population can also be denied legal capacity in the 
international community. On the other hand, an entity which has 
already lost one or more of the essential qualifications of a state, e.g., 
the loss of its territory for a considerable period of time, can still be 
recognized as a state, in total disregard of realistic conditions (e.g., 
the three Baltic states- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Similarly, a 
government which is no longer in effective control of a part or all of 
its territory for a considerable period of time can still be recognized as 
the legal government of a state (e.g., the former Spanish Republican 
Government). 
It is submitted that a sound principal of recognition is to treat 
recognition as a legal act; furthermore, the exercise of this legal act 
should be strictly in conformity with the reality of the situation. 
Thus, if an entity in fact possesses all the necessary qualifications of 
a state for a considerable period of time, it should be recognized de 
facto and de jure as such. Similarly, in the case of recognition of a 
government, the only relevant criteria should be whether the 
government is in fact the only effective governing authority over a 
territory and its population and whether there is a serious continuous 
challenge to that authority. In both cases, recognition only verifies a 
factual situation and signifies neither approval nor disapproval of the 
recognized state or government, or its policy or territorial or other 
claims. 
If one applies the above-stated principle of recognition to the 
multi-system nations case, then their recognition problem can be 
satisfactorily solved. Each part of a multi-system nation should be 
recognized as an independent state or international entity by third 
countries. In the meantime, the national goal of unification of each 
part of a multi-system nation remains unaffected by the act of 
recognition. The domestic structure of each part of a multi-system 
nation can also remain intact because recognition will have nothing 
to do with the domestic structure or policy of the recognized state. 
Domestically, the government can still claim to be the only legal 
government of both parts of a multi-system nation, but such a claim 
should not prevent a third country from entering into diplomatic or 
other relations with the other part of a multi-system nation. 
III. 
In recent years, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has 
taken an approach toward the German unification problem similar to 
the principle of recognition suggested above. While the FRG domesti-
cally is still bound by its constitution to represent all Germans, it has 
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abandoned its long-held policy of the Hal stein doctrine by recognizing 
the legitimacy of the GDR. A treaty on intra-German relations was 
concluded in 1973, in which both German states agreed to continue to 
work toward unification by peaceful means. 12 Article 3 of the treaty 
contained not only a pledge to settle the differences existing between 
the two parties exclusively by peaceful means but also emphasized 
the inviolability of their common border. On September 18, 1973, 
both German states were admitted to the United Nations; the next 
day, the foreign ministers of both, speaking before the General 
Assembly, renounced, on behalf of their countries, the use of force in 
their relations. On June 20, 1974, the two German states opened 
formal relations with each other. 
In the case of Korea, in recent years the Republic of Korea (ROK, 
i.e., the South) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK, i.e., the North) have also moved to normalize their relations 
and their former rigid claims to represent all Korea in international 
relations. In August 1972, Red Cross officials from the ROK and 
DPRK began a series of meetings in North Korea to negotiate an end 
to the separation of millions of families, and on October 12, 1972, 
both Korean states began political conferences at Panmunjom, with 
the object of improving their mutual relations and reunifying their 
country by peaceful means. Both series of meetings, however, soon 
collapsed. Nevertheless, both the ROK and the DPRK now have 
observer status at the United Nations and both are now members of 
many international organizations. 13 Moreover, in recent international 
conferences convened by the United Nations, both Korean states were 
invited to participate. 
The most difficult case among the multi-system nations is China. 
Because of the disparity of population and territory between the 
Republic of China (ROC, i.e., Taiwan) and the People's Republic of 
China CPRC, i.e., the mainland)- many countries have been subject 
to pressure by the PRC to "derecognize" the ROC. The ROC has been 
expelled from the United Nations and its specialized agencies and 
from almost all international conferences convened by the United 
Nations. At one time the ROC was recognized by 60 or more countries 
of the world, but the countries that now maintain diplomatic 
relations with her number only 23.14 The PRC's present policy is to 
12. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
13. See Von Glahn, supra note 5, pp. 69-70. 
14. See Appendix 1. 
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step up diplomatic pressure on the ROC to make it a non-state and to 
insist on its right to liquidate the ROC by all means, including the 
use of force (See Appendix 2 of this chapter). 
While the ROC is now isolated in international political rela-
tions, it has continued to develop economic, trade and cultural 
relations with more than 140 countries of the world. The ROC is the 
20th largest trading country in the world and its annual foreign trade 
of about 40 billion U.S. dollars is more than that of the PRC. 
However, despite its continued growth in economic development and 
international trade, the ROC is confronted with a great number of 
practical difficulties as a result of its derecognition by many other 
states.15 For example, some countries go so far as to treat ROC 
citizens abroad as stateless persons, in flagrant violation of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which explicitly provides in 
Article 15 that "everyone has the right to a nationality." 
It is submitted that the ROC population of 18 million, while 
small when compared with the PRC's 1 billion, is nevertheless larger 
than more than 100 other countries of the world. By any objective 
criterion, the ROC is a full-fledged subject of international law and 
should be recognized as such so as to comply with the principles of 
international law, justice and human rights. 16 In resolving the 
Chinese case, however, one should also consider political reality as 
well as the legitimate interest of the PRC. It is believed that the 
15. For example, Taiwan's delegate, whether from private enterprises or from the 
ROC government, cannot negotiate directly with the EEC's Textile Commission 
because the EEC does not recognize the ROC as a state in the international 
community. See Hungdah Chiu, "Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People's 
Republic of China," Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, No. 2 
(Spring 1979), p. 406. 
16. Only a few international lawyers discussed T~iwan's international status after 
U.S. derecognition in their works. One recent work considers Taiwan a sui generis 
entity having international status similar to Vatican City. See Louis Henkin, Richard 
Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter and Hans Smit, International Law, Cases and 
Materials, (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1980), pp. 208-209. Similarly, 
Professor Ian Brownlie also put Taiwan in entities sui generis, similar to Vatican City, 
in his discussion on the subject of international law. See his Principles of Public 
International Law, (3rd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 68-79. 
Professor Von Glahn wrote that "from a factual point of view, the Republic of China 
continued, of course, to exist as an independent entity, even though it was recognized 
by only twenty-two members of the family of nations." Von Glahn, supra note 5, at 
68-69. 
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overriding national interest of the PRC is to prevent the emergence of 
an independent Taiwanese Republic which would foreclose its 
ultimate national goal of unification. This is also the national goal of 
the ROC. However, at least in the forseeable future, the PRC could 
not achieve its goal of unification through peaceful means because 
both the government and the people on Taiwan do not want to give 
up their higher standard of living and their substantially more 
democratic political, economic and social system in order to achieve 
unification. Although the PRC has offered to maintain the social and 
economic system on Taiwan after "unification" in exchange for a 
promise by the ROC to relinquish its sovereignty, the people and 
government on Taiwan have very little trust in the PRC. Moreover, 
once the ROC has given up its sovereignty in exchange for the PRC's 
terms for unification, it could not trade, purchase arms or engage in 
any external activities without the approval of the PRC, nor could it 
prevent Peking from sending military forces to Taiwan. There would 
also be no legal restraints to prevent the PRC from reneging on its 
promises to Taiwan at the time of unification. In this connection the 
case of Tibet is a vivid example. 
Under the threat of an armed invasion of Tibet, an agreement 
was concluded between the PRC and Tibet on May 23, 1951Y 
Pursuant to this agreement, the PRC promised, among other things, 
not to "alter the existing political system in Tibet" or to change "the 
established status, functions, and powers of the Dalai Lama," and 
further pledged that all "officials of various ranks shall hold office as 
usual." The agreement also provided that the "Tibetan people have 
the right of exercising national regional autonomy." Despite this 
agreement, the PRC ruthlessly took Tibet by force in 1959, killing 
thousands of Tibetans and driving large numbers of refugees to India. 
The Tibetan government under the Dalai Lama was dissolved. The 
atrocities committed by the PRC in Tibet were condemned by the 
International Commission of Jurists as "genocide" and by the United 
Nations General Assembly as well!8 This example of the PRC's 
17. Text in Jerome Alan Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, People's China and 
International Law,(VoJ. 1, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 
392-393. 
18. See ibid., pp. 393-394 and Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic, A Report to 
the International Commission of Jurists by its Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet, 
Geneva, 1960. 
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inauspicious record vis-a-vis Tibet precludes any peaceful reunifica-
tion with Taiwan. 
If peaceful unification is not possible, the only other alternative 
of the PRC is to take over Taiwan by force. However, such an 
adventure would risk a major confrontation with the United States 
and possible intervention by the Soviet Union. It is believed that, at 
least in the foreseeable future, it is not in the national interest of the 
PRC to do so since it is now badly in need of U.S. support to develop 
its economy and to diminish the alleged Soviet threat. Therefore, it is 
believed that the status quo between Taiwan and the mainland will 
be maintained indefinitely. 
At present, the PRC continues its political campaign to isolate 
the ROC internationally, pursues subversive activities against 
Taiwan, and reiterates its threat of use of force in the hope that it 
may force Taiwan to accept its terms of "unification."19 It is believed 
that such a policy might have an adverse effect. In desperation, the 
ROC might resort to radical measures such as developing a nuclear 
capability, or adopting a "two-China" policy rather than adhering to 
the goal of unification. Such a desperate situation would also provide 
opportunity for Soviet intervention. 
On the other hand, if the PRC adopted a more realistic and 
reasonable policy toward the ROC, it could, in the short run, avoid 
pushing Taiwan toward radical measures and might, in the long run, 
achieve its goal of reunifying Taiwan with the mainland. Since 
politics can never be divorced from reality, the PRC must acknowl-
edge that within the state of one China there are two different 
political, social and economic systems, one on the mainland and the 
other on Taiwan. So far, the ROC system on Taiwan is the more 
successful by far; unless the Chinese people on Taiwan see the clear 
benefit of their continued adherence to the concept of one China, 
there will be a tendency to move away from the goal of unification. 
The present PRC policy of armed threat, international isolation and 
subversive activities can only further alienate the Chinese people in 
Taiwan and make ultimate reunification more difficult. 
In view of the above analysis, it would be in the interest of the 
PRC to stabilize the Taiwan situation within the context of the 
ultimate national goal of unification. To achieve that objective, the 
PRC must tolerate Taiwan's acquisition of appropriate international 
legal status in the community of nations. This is essential since it is 
19. See Appendix 2. 
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the only way for the PRC to prevent Taiwan from moving toward a 
"two-China" policy to seek international status. If Taiwan could, 
within the context of the policy of one China and ultimate unfication 
with the mainland, maintain appropriate international status 
through official or consular relations with other countries and 
through participation in inter-governmental organizations or confer-
ences, the pressure for the people of Taiwan to urge the ROC 
government to a "two-China" policy would be drastically reduced. 
The PRC could tolerate such appropriate international status for 
Taiwan on the express condition that if Taiwan were to declare itself 
an independent republic, the PRC would immediately use force to 
unify Taiwan with the mainland. Other countries could also help to 
stabilize PRC-Taiwan relations by basing the establishment of 
official or consular relations with Taiwan on the condition that 
Taiwan not declare itself an independent republic to provoke a PRC 
attack. 
If the ROC on Taiwan could gain appropriate international 
status vis-a-vis the PRC within the context of one China and if the 
PRC could attain a certain degree of political stability and economic 
development and the people there enjoy considerable political and 
economic freedom, then mutually beneficial relations could gradually 
develop between the mainland and Taiwan, thus making the peaceful 
unification of the two parts of China a more realistic possibility. 
54 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
Appendix 1 
· Countries Maintaining Diplomatic Relations 
with the Republic of China 
Bolivia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Holy See 
Honduras 
Ivory Coast 
Korea, Republic of 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Nauru 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
St. Vincent 
Saudi Arabia 
Swaziland 
South Africa 
Tuvalu 
Tonga 
Uraguay 
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Appendix 2 
A List of Important Chinese Statements on the 
Use of Force Against Taiwan After January 1, 1979 
- the Date of Establishing Diplomatic Relations 
between the U.S. and the PRC 
(1) January 5, 1979- Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping said: 
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"President Carter indicated the wish that the solution of the 
Taiwan question be accomplished through peaceful means. . . . 
We make clear that the solution of this question is China's 
internal affairs .... We cannot commit ourselves to use no other 
than peaceful means to achieve the reunification of the mother-
land. We cannot tie our hands on this matter." 
Beijing Review,* January 12, 1979, p. 17. 
(2) January 29, 1979- Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping said: 
"The way to resolve the question of bringing Taiwan back to the 
embrace of the motherland is China's internal affairs." (The 
phrase "internal affairs" amounts to a code word in Chinese 
parlance signifying that force may be used. Thus, in 1959 when 
Chinese forces massacred thousands of Tibetans in the name of 
unification, the action was characterized as an "internal affair" 
of China.) 
Beijing Review, February 9, 1979, p. 11. 
(3) January 31, 1979 - Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping said in an 
interview: 
"If we are to commit ourselves to not using armed forces at all, 
then that will be equivalent to the tying of our own hands I on the 
question of reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.l" 
Beijing Review, February 16, 1979, p. 20. 
(4) June 20, 1980- An official Xinhua News Agency Commentary 
said: 
"The Chinese Government has declared time and again that the 
settlement of the Taiwan question is China's internal affairs 
which brooks absolutely no foreign interference." 
* Official Chinese government publication published in six languages. 
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Beijing Review, June 30, 1980, p. 25. 
(5) November 1, 1980 - Shijie Zhishi <World Knowledge) - a 
widely circulated magazine in China - wrote: 
"If China resorts to non-peaceful means to settle the Taiwan 
question, it is China's internal affairs and the U.S. has no right 
to intervene." 
Shijie Zhishi, 1980, No. 21, p. 14. 
(6) December 1980 - A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman's 
statement: 
The spokesman stressed that the principled stand of the Chinese 
Government on the Taiwan issue [i.e., that force can be used to 
take over Taiwan] is irreversible. 
Beijing Review, December 29, 1980, p. 7. 
(7) January 12, 1981 - The official Beijing Review's answer to 
readers' enquiries. 
"if we . . . resort to non-peaceful means to solve the [Taiwan 1 
issue, that is entirely China's internal affair which the United 
States has no right to meddle in, let alone claim that it poses 'a 
threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area.'" 
Beijing Review, January 12, 1981, p. 9. 
(8) February 19, 1981 -Professor Wang Tieya of Beijing <Peking) 
University and an adviser to the Chinese Foreign Ministry said: 
"If the Taiwan authorities insist on maintaining a stubborn 
attitude against communism and refusing the offer of peace, and 
if the United States continues to build up the military capability 
of Taiwan, we have no alternative but to resort to nonpeaceful 
means to solve the Taiwan problem. This is also China's internal 
affair, and the United States has no right to interpose." 
Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, People's Republic of 
China, February 24, 1981, p. U3. 
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(9) July 1, 1981 -An article in the first issue of the Guoji wenti 
yanjiu (Studies in International Problems) quarterly attacking 
the Taiwan Relations Act and claimed that "whatever means 
the Chinese use in bringing Taiwan back to the motherland to 
achieve national unification is entirely China's internal affairs. 
" 
Reported in Dagongbao (Impartial Daily, a Hong Kong Com-
munist newspaper), July 6, 1981. 
(10) July 4, 1981 - The People's Daily attacked the Taiwan 
Relations Act as amounting to obstructing Taiwan's unification 
with the mainland and "as a result, China may be forced to 
resort to nonpeaceful methods to settle the Taiwan problem." 
Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), July 4, 1981. 

Chapter 3 
THE UNIFICATION AND DIVISION OF MULTI-SYSTEM 
NATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
BASIC CONCEPTS, ISSUES, AND APPROACHES 
Yung Wei* 
The division of China, Korea, Vietnam and Germany into 
communist and non-communist political systems has been a major 
development since the end of the Second World War. The emergence 
of divided nations is not only a most unfortunate experience for the 
peoples of these nations but also one of the primary destabilizing 
factors in international politics. The Berlin Crisis, the Korean War, 
the Quemoy Crisis and the Vietnam War all involved the divided 
nations and the major powers of the world. What are the prospects for 
reunification of divided nations? How can governments and peoples of 
the divided nations work toward the goal of national unification? 
What kind of concepts and conceptual schemes can we use to best 
analyze the problems relating to divided nations? These are but a few 
of the questions which have been raised frequently by political 
leaders and scholars of the divided states. 1 
The purpose of this paper is to examine critically the basic 
concepts and approaches which have been applied to the study of 
multi-system nations, to compare the similarities and differences of 
various divided nations, to identify the major factors prohibiting or 
conducive to the reunification efforts, and finally, to make some 
projections into the future. A special section is devoted to an analysis 
of the problem of division and unification in the Chinese setting 
which historically has affected political developments in neighboring 
states such as Korea and Vietnam. 
I. 
The comparative study of divided nations has been a late 
development in political science. Critical interdisciplinary study of 
* Originally delivered at Symposium on Functional Integeration of Divided Nations, 
Seoul, Republic of Korea, October 6-7, 1980. 
1. See John H. Herz, "Korea and Germany as Divided Nations: The Systemic 
Impact," Asian Survey, 15 !Nov. 19751, pp. 957-970. 
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divided nations from a social science perspective rather than from a 
policy angle did not emerge until the 1960s.2 Prior to that, the studies 
of the unification of various states into a larger unit were focused on 
Western Europe and the emerging nations. Using concepts such as 
"social communication," "political integration," "security commun-
ity," "overlapping membership," "multiply loyalty," and "nation-
building," scholars like Karl W. Deutsch, Earnest A. Haas and 
Lucian W. Pye have made much contribution to our understanding of 
the process of unification efforts among national and sub-national 
political entities in many parts of the world.3 
Yet a survey of literature on divided nations reveals two basic 
problems. First, there is the lack of a commonly accepted term which 
is neutral and precise enough to be an effective operational concept 
for empirical research on "divided nations." Second, there is a failure 
in differentiating two separate types of division and unification 
processes, i.e., those which involve communist political systems and 
those which do not involve the confrontation between communist and 
non-communist systems. 
As for basic concepts, a host of terms including "the partitioned 
nations," "the divided states," "the divided nations," and "two China's 
(Korea's, Germany's)" has been used. All of these terms designate 
certain features of the "divided nations," yet none is accurate and 
broad enough to reflect and include all the cases. For example, the 
term "partitioned nations" can not be used to refer to countries which 
were divided, not through international intervention or by interna-
tional agreements, but through internal war, such as the case of 
2. The formation of a "Divided Nations Internet" in the Comparative and 
interdisciplinary Studies Section of the International Studies Association in 1969 was a 
pioneering effort toward empirical study of divided systems and peoples. For some 
examples of the results of this intellectual endeavor, see Yung Wei (ed.l, "Political 
Partitioning, Migration, Minorities, and Non-State Nations: Models, Propositions, and 
Intellectual Exchanges," (CISS working paper no. 49, University Center for Interna-
tional Studies, University of Pittsburg, 1975) and Ray E. Johnston (ed. I, The Politics of 
Division, Partition, and Unification (New York: Praeger, 19761. 
3. For a sample of the ideas of these scholars, see Karl W. Deutsch, Political 
Community at the International Level (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 19541; K. 
W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, An Inquiry into the Foundation of 
Nationality (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 19551; Ernst B. Haas, the Uniting of 
Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 19581; Lucian W. Pye, Politics, 
Personality, and Nation-Building (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 19621; 
and Amitai Etzioni, Political Integration (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1965). 
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China. The concept of "divided states" is broader than "partitioned 
nation," yet many of the leaders and scholars of the so-called "divided 
states" are very reluctant to accept the word "state" in the concept 
because it implies a more permanent separation of a nation into two 
or more legal entities under international law. The government of the 
Republic of China (ROC), for instance, has resisted the idea of calling 
today's China a "divided state." Similarly, most of the "divided 
states" resent terms such as "two China's," "two Korea's," and "two 
Germany's." As for "divided nations," it is a term used most often by 
scholars; however, it also has the misleading connotation that there 
are two or more nations in a "divided" state - an idea which is 
detested by most leaders and scholars of divided systems. 
In order to avoid the shortcomings of the above-mentioned 
concepts, I propose that we substitute "multi-system nations" for 
"divided states" and "divided nations." There are several advantages 
in using this new term. First, it clarifies the fact that the reality in a 
so-called "divided nation" is not the separation of one nation into two 
or more nations, but the emergence of more than one political system 
within one nation, either as a result of international arrangement or 
as the product of internal wars. More significantly, the term 
"multi-system nation" reflects faithfully the true nature and cause of 
division, i.e., the confrontation and competition between non-
communist systems and communist systems in various countries. 
In fact, if it had not been for the expansion of communist forces 
with the support of the Soviet Union, all the three multi-system 
nations probably would have been united at the end of the Second 
World War. For in none of three multi-system nations was there 
serious cultural, ethnic, and geographical cleavages which could have 
prevented the restoration of a united China, Korea, and Germany 
after both Nazism and Japanese militarism were crushed. Both 
China and Korea had been united countries with thousands of years 
of history. As for Germany, it also had a history of political 
unification for about one hundred years. It is the emergence of 
communist regimes in these three nations and the failure of the free 
world to act decisively which has led to the continuation of competing 
political systems with different political ideologies, economic systems, 
and life styles. The key issue here then is not the creation of 
conditions for hitherto separate geographical units to develop com-
mon cultural and national identity, but a decision as to by which 
system - the non-communist or the communist - that multi-
systems should be re-unified and restored to their previous state of 
national unification. 
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II. 
Having clarified the concept of "multi-system nations" and the 
nature of their re-unification efforts, we may proceed to compare the 
similarities and differences among the multi-system nations. In 
terms of similarities, all the three multi-system nations historically 
have been composed of people of common background and have 
shared a common culture. The multi-system nations also share 
common features such as ideological cleavage along a communist-
anti-communist line, military alliances or arrangements with oppos-
ing superpowers of the world, and frequent border incidents coupled 
with occasional large scale military confrontations. In addition, all 
the non-communist parts of the multi-system nations have been the 
recipients of refugees who have chosen to leave their homes to escape 
communist rule. The non-communist parts all also have higher living 
standards than the non-communist side.3 Data in Table 1 clearly 
illustrate the case. 
There are, however, different patterns in the relations between 
the different parts of multi-system nations and between multi-system 
nations and other states. The two Germanys have somewhat 
"resolved" their problems, or to put it more accurately, reduced their 
mutual hostilities, which has led to: (1) the exchanges of representa-
tives between Berlin and Bonn; (2) dual recognition of the two 
Germanys by other states; (3) dual representation of both Germanys 
in the diplomatic corp of other states; (4) membership for both East 
and West Germany in the United Nations; and, (5) direct trade and 
tourism between the two systems. 4 
The situation between the ROC and mainland China represents 
the opposite end of the German arrangements. Here we find that 
there is virtually no interaction between two systems. Both political 
systems claim to be the sole legitimate government of China, and 
insist that they oppose the division of China into two legal entities. In 
October 1971, the Republic of China withdrew from the United 
Nations after the "important issue" resolution was defeated in the 
4. See Willy Brandt, "The State of the Nation in Divided Germany," Relay from 
Bonn <New York: Germany Information Center, January 24, 1974!; Berenince Carrol, 
"The Partition of Germany: Cold War Compromise," in Thomas E. Hachey <ed.l, The 
Problem of Partition: Peril to World Peace <Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1972>; 
Lawrence L. Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik <London: Oxford University Press, 1971>; 
and John H. Herz, "Germany," in Gregory Henderson (ed.l, Divided Nations in a 
Divided World (New York: David Mckay, 1974!, pp. 3-42. 
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U.N. General Assembly. Since then, Communist China has been the 
sole delegation representing China in the United Nations. In 
December 1978, the Carter Administration of the United States 
unilaterally recognized mainland China and abrogated the ROC-USA 
Mutual Defense Treaty on January 1, 1980. The government of the 
Republic of China (GRC) strongly protested the United States' action 
and asserted that "it will impair the long term interests of the United 
States and endanger the peace and stability of the Asian-Pacific 
region."5 A "Taiwan Relations Act" was passed by the U.S. Congress 
which led to the creation of two "private" organizations- American 
Institute in Taiwan and The Coordinating Council for North American 
Affairs in Washington D.C. - to conduct practical interactions 
between the two countries. In addition to their admission into the 
U.N. and the recognition by the United States, the Chinese 
Communists also made substantive advances in gaining recognition 
from other countries. But the GRC has been able to retain formal 
recognition by 23 nations. 
The case of the two Koreas falls somewhere in between the two 
Germany's and two China's. Thus far, North and South Korea have 
not formally recognized each other. But a North-South dialogue has 
been maintained intermittently since July 1972. The "detente" 
between the two Koreas has not reduced significantly and hostility 
between the two Korean political systems.6 It did, however, lead to 
dual recognition and dual representation of the two Korean govern-
ments in a number of countries. It is hard to assess which side has 
gained more by opening up dialogue. But the digging of underground 
tunnels into the South by North Koreans definitely reduced the 
mutual trust essential for the success of this type of endeavors. Table 
2 illustrates the different levels and extent of contacts between 
various parts of multi-system nations. 
5. "Foreign Minister Tsiang Yen-si's Remarks at the Opening Session of 
Sino-U.S. Talks, December 28, 1978," (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, 
December 28, 1978). 
6. Numerous studies have been done on the question of reunification of the two 
Korean political systems, particularly by Korean scholars themselves. For a more 
optimistic view, see Hak-joon Kim, "Present and Future of the South-North Talks," 
Korea and World Affairs, 2 (Summer, 1979), pp. 209-222. For a somewhat pessimistic 
analysis, see Yong Soon Yim, "The Prospect of Peaceful Unification of Korea in the 
1980's," Korea and World Affairs, 1 <Spring, 1980l, pp. 187-208; see also Young Whan 
Kihl, "International Integration Theories and Problems of Unifying a Divided Nation: 
The Case of Korea," in R. E. Johnston fed.), op. cit., pp. 55-66; Dong-Hyun Kim, 
"Building a Model of political Systems Integration - Toward Korean Unification," 
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The continuing existence of multi-system nations creates unique 
problems for international law. According to conventional interna-
tional law, there are three types of international personalities: the 
states, the belligerents and the insurgents. Judging by the criteria 
specified in international law, political systems in the divided nations 
fall between "state" and "belligerent." In terms of the qualifications 
of a state, such as a government, a population ruled by that 
government, a territory under effective control by that government 
and the ability of that government to carry out international 
obligation, almost all the systems within the divided nations qualify 
for state status. Yet, confrontation between various parts of multi-
system nations in political, economic and sometimes military arenas, 
plus the impact of East-West bloc politics, have prevented a full 
recognition of all parts of a multi-system nation by other states. 
Other than mutual hostility and cold war situations, another 
element which has prevented multiple recognition and multiple 
representation of the divided nations, or multi-system nations, has 
been the problem of overlapping claims of sovereignty and territorial 
control. By "overlapping claims," it is meant that various systems of 
a divided nation make claims that they represent not only the people 
and the territories which are under their effective control, but also 
the part of a divided state which they do not control. Consequently, 
diplomatic recognition and representation for the divided nation have 
become a "zero-sum game" in which other states are compelled to 
choose one of the political systems of a divided nation as the only 
legitimate government of all the territory of that nation despite the 
fact that it controls only a part of it. 
The German solution almost amounts to the creation of two 
separate states. The Korean situation seems to be moving toward the 
German model. Whereas, before 1971, that is, before mainland 
China's entrance into the United Nations, the ROC had been the 
beneficiary of the "zero-sum game," with the majority of states 
recognizing only the government in Taipei. Since 1971, however, 
Communist China has fully utilized the conventional international 
law to gain diplomatic recognitions at the expense of Taipei.; 
Korea and World Affairs, 1 (Spring, 1979), pp. 67-96; and Joungwon Kim, Divided 
Korea, the Politics of Development (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1975). 
For opinions of Western scholars toward the Korean Unification problems, see 
Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, "the New South-North Dialogue," Korea and World 
Affairs, 2 (Summer, 1979); Everett Klainjans, "Reunification of a Nation," Korea and 
World Affairs, 2 (Winter, 1978), pp. 529-543; and Gregory Henderson, "Korea," in 
Henderson. op. cit., pp. 43-98. 
7. For a more detailed discussion on the legal status of divided nations under 
international law, see Yung Wei, "Divided Nations and International Law: Political 
Reality and Legal Practice," (paper presented to the Annual Convention of the 
International Studies Association, St. Louis, Mo., U.S.A., March 16-20, 1977). 
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The government and the people of The Republic of China fully 
realized the plot of the Chinese Communists in trying to isolate 
Taiwan from the outside world. Every effort is made to strengthen 
existing diplomatic ties as well as to open new ones. Premier Sun 
Yun-suan's visit to Panama, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, 
coupled with increased contacts with European countries represent a 
growing dynamism in the external relations of the ROC. 
III. 
After a comparative analysis of the various multi-system na-
tions, an examination of problems of division and unification of China 
is in order. One of the prerequisites in studying the problem of 
unification and division in the Chinese setting is to take a look at 
China's long history. During more than three thousand years of her 
recorded history, China as a nation has gone through many periods of 
unity and disunity. Dynasties and empires have emerged, prospered, 
degenerated, and disintegrated; yet the Chinese nation has always 
survived. An examination of the history of the dynasties and periods 
of China led to our discovery that there have been almost equal 
periods of unity and disunity, throughout the three thousand years of 
recorded Chinese history. 
As data in Table 3 reveal, of the 3097 years of Chinese history 
covered by our survey, 1963 years, or 63.4 percent of the total years, 
were periods of unity. Whereas 1134 years, 36.6 percent of the total, 
were years of division. Given the fact that there were considerable 
periods of internal wars and uprisings even in the supposedly unified 
dynasties, the actual years of division should approach a parity with 
the years of unification. The implication of this historical fact is that 
most Chinese who have some knowledge of the history of China 
understand that the unification and division of China as a state has 
been a repetitive, and even cyclical process. With this kind of 
understanding, the Chines people who happen to live during a period 
of division do not easily run into despair, for they can patiently wait 
for the eventual unification of the state at some point in the future. 
Other than the cyclical oscillations of unification and division 
throughout Chinese history, another distinct feature of the Chinese 
experience has been the emphasis on cultural assimilation and 
unification. Since ancient times, the Chinese people have always 
been looking at their environment with a distinction between the 
"world of the Chinese" which was in the center, and the "world of 
non-Chinese" which was surrounding regions. Until contacts with 
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Western powers, leaders of China considered the sphere of influence 
of the Chinese civilization- the "T'ien-Hsia (under the sky)," or the 
world. Within this cultural sphere, the Chinese had, at times, rather 
elaborated "international systems" composed by smaller states. As a 
matter of fact, there were such detailed codes of behavior among the 
contending states during the Ch'iin-chiu period (722-481 B.C.) and 
Warring States period (403-211 B.C.) that a multi-states systems was 
actually in existence.8 
To both ancient and modern Chinese people, the existence of 
multiple political systems within the cultural sphere of the Chinese 
civilization does not mean the discontinuity of the "Chung-kuo (the 
Middle Kingdom)." A far more serious threat to the Middle Kingdom 
would be the invasion of foreigners (non-Chinese) with the intention 
of eliminating the Chinese culture. Hence, we may say that the 
Chinese people placed more emphasis on the perpetuation of cultural 
unification than territorial unification. Given different types of 
political systems in China, the Chinese people would probably rate 
and prefer, in descending order: (1) a unified Chinese political 
system; (2) a divided multi-system Chinese nation; (3) a divided 
China with both Chinese and foreign states; (4) a political system 
ruled by foreigners yet maintaining Chinese cultural patterns; and, 
(5) a completely foreign political as well as cultural system in China. 
(In order to illustrate this process of unification and partition along 
its various outcomes, a flow-chart analyses is presented in FiiDJ.re 1.) 
Several tentative conclusions or propositions can be drawn from 
this analysis. First, the Chinese consider cultural unification more 
important than political unification. They generally assumed that 
with a common cultural basis, a multi-system nation will sooner or 
later be reunited again. Second, as a people who are highly conscious 
of their history, the Chinese fully realize the cyclical nature of 
unification and division throughout the history of China. As a result, 
the Chinese generally demonstrate more patience when living during 
a period of division with the conviction that their nation will 
eventually be reunited. Finally, although the Chinese tend to treat 
their territorial domain as the "world," they also are painfully aware 
of the constant threat posed by neighboring foreign systems which 
have invaded China many times in the past. Thus, the preservation 
of the Chinese political system and Chinese culture against foreign 
invaders has preoccupied the Chinese. 9 
8. Richard Walker, The Multi-State System in Ancient China (Hamden, Conn.: 
The Shoe String Press, 1953). 
9. For a more detailed discussion on this subject, see Yung Wei, "The Division 
and Unification of Chinese Political Systems," <CISS working paper no. 35, University 
Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburg, 19751. 
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Having clarified some basic concepts in regard to "unification" 
and "division" in the Chinese context, we can now turn to the more 
concrete questions of unification or division of the ROC and 
Communist China. First of all, it should be pointed out that the 
present division of China into two hostile political systems is the 
result of more than fifty years of fierce struggle between the Chinese 
Nationalists and the Chinese Communists. From an historical 
perspective, we may view the present confrontation as a phenomenon 
comparable to the competition between different elite groups in the 
early part of dynastical change. 
Several basic issues are involved in the prolonged struggle 
between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists. First, there 
is the political issue focusing on the question: "Which is the better 
form of government for the people of China?" The nationalists have 
followed the teaching of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and have adopted a 
constitutional government since 1947. The Chinese Communists, on 
the other hand, have adopted the teaching of Marxism-Leninism and 
adhere to the idea of a "people's dictatorship" as the basis of 
government. Since the fall of the "gang of four," and the start of the 
"Four Modernization" program, the political structure on Mainland 
China has undergone rapid and drastic changes, yet the principle of 
proletarian dictatorship has persisted. At the present, there is no sign 
whatsoever that either side would accept even part of the political 
ideal and political structure of the other side. 
Other than the political issue, there is the issue of the attitude of 
the political leaders toward the traditional social structure of China. 
The GRC basically accepts the social structure of traditional China, 
although it tries to improve, through land reform and a social welfare 
program, the lot of the poor sector of the Chinese population. The 
Communists, on the other hand, view the traditional society of China 
as a class society with the "exploiting class" on one side and the 
"exploited class" on the other. It is the task of the Communists to 
carry on class struggle to suppress and to eliminate the so-called 
"exploiting class," and to elevate the workers and peasants in China 
to the position of a ruling class. In short, while the Chinese 
Nationalists call for a mild social reform, the Communists seek for 
radical social revolution in China. On this, there is very little room 
for compromise between the two opposing political elites. 
A third important issue between the Nationalist and Communist 
political systems is to be found in their attitude toward economic 
activities of the people. The Nationalists recognize and protect 
private ownership, although they do have programs to discourage 
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excessive use of property rights to the extent they may be de-
trimental to the interests of society. The Nationalist leaders also 
recognize and appreciate the role played by the entrepreneur in a 
free-market economy. 
The Communists detest and prohibit private ownership and run 
a tight state-controlled economy in which there is little room reserved 
for the pursuit of profit by private businessmen and industrialists. 
Recently there have been some indications that the Chinese Com-
munists have relaxed somewhat their suppressive hold on the 
economy. It is, however, unlikely that Communist China will go all 
the way towards the so-called "Market Socialism," as practiced by 
Yugoslavia, which is still considered a restricted economy by Western 
standards. 
IV. 
Having examined the issues between the Chinese Nationalists 
and Communists, we may proceed to conduct a probabilistic analysis 
on the endogenous as well as exogenous variables on the future 
relations between the ROC and mainland China. Let us first turn to 
the endogenous variables. As a closed system, mainland China's 
moves toward Taiwan will largely be determined, not by the attitude 
of the people, but by China's political elite. At the present time, the 
leaders of mainland China seem to be temporarily satisfied with a 
peace offensive coupled with psychological warfare against Taiwan. 
But if a power struggle occurs, it is possible that a new leadership 
may try to consolidate its rule by adopting a far more militant 
attitude toward Taiwan. 
Since its recognition by the government of the United States, the 
communist regime on mainland China has become quite aggressive 
in its political propaganda and psychological warfare against the 
ROC. On January 1, 1980, a so-called "letter to compatriots in 
Taiwan" was released by the Chinese Communists in the name of the 
standing committee of the People's Congress. In that letter, the 
Chinese Communists offered to open up trade, postal service and 
tourist service arrangements with the government and people of the 
ROC. These offers were categorically rejected by the GRC. On 
January 11, 1979, Premier Sun Yun-suan issued the statement that 
unless the Chinese Communists abondon Marxism-Lenism and class 
struggle, restore the human rights of the people on mainland China 
and respect private ownership by the people, there was no room 
whatsoever for any dialogue. The Premier warned the people of the 
ROC that "peace talks proposed by the Chinese Communists are only 
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a form of class struggle through which the Communists seek to 
induce us to surrender .... We have learned from history that those 
who place their trust in Communists falsehoods face a tragic end. The 
usurpation of the Chinese mainland and the fall of Vietnam are 
tragedies that are fresh in our memories. "10 
From the statement of Premier Sun, and many similar state-
ments issued by the GRC, it is clear that the government and people 
of the ROC have no inclination to start a dialogue with the Chinese 
Communists. The government of the ROC has ruled out trading with 
mainland China. With the exception of contacts between Chinese 
students both from Taiwan and from Mainland in Western countries 
and occasional rendevous between scholars from both sides at 
international academic meetings, there is no contact between the two 
separate systems. 
The government and people of the ROC are confident that their 
path toward. modernization is more scientific, effective, revolutionary 
and humane than the Chinese Communist approach. As the Chinese 
Communist leaders have already admitted that in "economic mat-
ter[s], we will learn from Taiwan," the people in the ROC reminded 
the communist leaders on mainland China that in politics, they also 
should learn from Taipei. 11 This is followed by the slogan, "learn 
everything from Taipei. National unification will be easy to attain." 
v 
Looking to the foreseeable future, several general projections 
may be made on the question of unification of multi-system nations. 
First, short of a major war, it is unlikely that any of the divided 
nations will be able to reach total national unification in the near 
future. The forceful and brutal annexation of South Vietnam by 
North Vietnam through the so-called "war of national liberation" 
should serve as a painful reminder to the non-communist side of the 
multi-system nations that the communists never rule out the use of 
force as a means of solving "domestic" issues. 
Second, the communist side will continue using "unification" as 
an instrument to expand its influence into the non-communist side, 
10. See "No Deals with Communism," (Statement by Premier Sun Yun-suan on 
January 11, 1979). For similar analysis on Chinese Communist negotiating tactics, see 
Kenneth T. Young. Negotiating with the Chinese Communists (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1968). 
11. See Premier Sun Yun-suan, "Closing Remark at the Second National 
Development Seminar," (Taipei, November, 1979). 
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just as it has used nationalism as a means to carry out its "united 
front" tactics. It always tries to manipulate the sentiment toward 
national unification whenever it sees fit, but will back out from 
substantive steps toward unification whenever it finds conditions 
unfavorable to its interests. Furthermore, Communists in various 
countries constantly talk about national unity but will never hesitate 
in establishing separatist movement and local illegal regimes such as 
the Soviet regimes created by the Chinese communists in some 
remote regions of China while the Nationalist central government 
was engaged in a bitter war of resistance against the Japanese 
during the Second World War. 
Third, the economic gap between the non-communist and com-
munist sides of multi-system nations will be enlarged, making 
unification efforts even more difficult. As a matter of fact, poor living 
conditions and a lack of political and social freedom have been the 
two major reasons which led to millions of people leaving the 
communist part of divided nations. In the final analysis, it is 
essential for the non-communist side to keep a strong economy, to 
develop a solid base for political cohesion and stability and to 
maintain a military force which is strong enough both for self defense 
against communist aggression and for preparing to respond to the 
request for freedom from the compatriots on the communist side. 
More than any other method and process, these are probably the 
three sure ways not only for safeguarding our security but also for 
preserving the opportunity for eventual unification of our mother-
land. 
Table 1 
The Multi-Systems Nations: Comparative Data on Territory, Population, GNP, and Per Capita Income 
Territory Population in 1976 
under Control (in millions) GNP (1976) Per Capita 
Thousands Percent Percent (in billions of Income (1976) 
Sq. Mi. of Total Figure of Total U.S. dollars) (U.S. dollars) 
China 
ROC 14 0.38 16.3 1.9 17.1 1,050 
Mainland 3,700 99.62 835.0 98.1 307.0 370 
Germany 
FRG (West) 96 59.6 61.5 78.7 461.0 7,510 
GDR (East) 42 30.4 16.7 21.3 75 4,520 
Korea 
ROK 38 44.7 35.8 68.8 25.3 700 
North 47 55.3 16.2 31.2 10.8 670 
Source: 1978 World Bank Atlas, (Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 1978). 
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Table 2 
Relations Between Multi-System Nations: A Comparative Paradigm 
China Korea 
(ROC/Mainland China) (ROK!North Korea) 
Stationing of Formal 
Representative In Each 
Other's Capital No No 
Dual Representation In 
The U.N. No No 
Direct Trade And Exchanges 
Of People No No 
Direct Face-to-face 
Negotiation By Government 
Delegates No Yes 
Formal Dual Representation 
In Third Countries No Yes 
Informal Dual Representative 
In Third Countries Yes Yes 
Direct Contacts Of Students 
In Third Countries Yes Yes 
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Table 3 
UNIFICATION AND DIVISION OF CHINA: 
A CHRONOLOGICAL CHART 
Periods (dynasties) of Unity 
Chou Dynasty, West 
(1122-771 (B.C.) 
Ch'in (211-202 B.C.) 
Han, Fonner (202 B.C. - 9 A.D.) 
Tsin, West (280(265)-317) 
Sui (590-618) 
Tang (618-906) 
Sung, North (960-1126) 
Yuan (1260-1368) 
Ming (1368-1644) 
Ch'ing (1644-1912) 
Periods of division 
Chou, East (770-249 B.C.) 
Ch'un-chiu period (722-481 B.C.) 
Warring State period (403-211 B.C.) 
Han, Later (9-220 A.D.) 
Three Kingdoms (220-280 A.D.) 
Tsin, East (317 -420) 
South and North Dynasties (420-590) 
Five Dynasties (907-960) 
Sung, South (1127-1279) 
Republican China, 1912-
Total years of unification: 1963 years. Total years of division: 1134 years. 
Percentage of the total years covered: 63.4% 36.6% 
Data source: Dun Li, The Ageless Chinese, A History, 2nd ed. (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1965), pp. 562-568. 
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MULTI-SYSTEM NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DUTCH PRACTICE 
Ko Swan Sik 
Introduction 
This paper is intended to present a survey of Dutch practice with 
regard to the three multi-system nations constituting the main 
objects of analysis of this Conference. The Dutch are not known to be 
particularly adventurous in unusual situations. Their virtue lies 
more in being cautious and rather conservative. Being a small 
country they would rather follow the lead of bigger Powers than act 
as a vanguard. Being the heirs to a great Calvinist tradition, 
however, they are capable of being radical in following the impera-
tives of their conscience, and of legal rules. Besides they have been, of 
old, the traditional merchants of Western Europe. These may be 
among the reasons why the harvest of my endeavours has been 
rather meager in quantity, sometimes touching for the attachment to 
scruple, but also sometimes the surprising pragmatism appearing 
from it. 
The survey of Dutch practice will be preceded by some remarks 
concerning the general aspects of multi-system nations and the 
specific aspects of the German, Korean and Chinese cases. 
1. The concept of "multi-system nation"1 
The term refers to a territorially defined nation within the 
socio-cultural sense of the word, which is for one reason or another 
not politically united in one state structure, and parts of which are 
under the factual authority of more than one mutually contending 
governmental regimes.2 For all its ethnic and cultural characteristics 
1. See, inter alia, the following literature on "divided States": Luis Martinez-
Aguila, "L'Etat divise", 91 Journal de droit international (Clunet) (1964) 265-284; 
Gilbert Caty, Le statut juridique des Etats divises (Pedone, Paris 1969); J. Crawford, 
The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford, 1979) Chapter 10: "The Divided 
States". 
2. Jochen A. Frowein has devoted a legal analysis of the international status of 
such entities in their relations with States which have not recognized them as a 
separate State or as the legal government of an existing State. See, Das de 
facto-Regime im V6lkerrecht [The de facto regime in international law] (1968) p. 7. 
76 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
the nation in question could normally constitute one state and in 
most cases it actually has in the past. Consequently, the contending 
regimes in some form assert their endeavour to achieve re-
unification. This means that for the parties directly involved the 
current divided situation is not considered to be final. The causes of 
such situations may be internal, such as a civil war, either for 
governmental supremacy or secession; they may also be external, 
such as an international war and the accompanying impact of, or 
pressure by, outside Powers and ideologies. 
In themselves, these elements do not present evidence of a 
special, legally relevant situation, nor the need to create a new legal 
category. Unconstitutional change of government, partition, transfer 
of territory, and other kinds of change in the existence or dimensions 
of a State are familiar phenomena to the law of nations. It is 
submitted that from the international law perspective, the relevant 
distinction lies in the indefinite and prolonged length of time during 
which it has not been possible to reach a settlement which is 
conclusive enough to serve as the basis for future legal relationships 
under general international law. 
2. The variety of multi-system nations 
A comparison of the actual cases of multi-system nations reveals 
a number of differences in the attitude of the contending regimes. For 
a better understanding of the nature of these differences and of their 
legal implications, a categorization like the one drawn up by John H. 
Herz in 19743 appears to be a useful point of departure. In terms of 
recognition between the contending power centers, the following 
three categories may be distinguished: (1) mutual non-recognition, (2) 
unilateral recognition, and (3) mutual recognition. 
In category 1, the "purest" one, each of the power centers claims 
jurisdiction over the whole country, and the factual division is 
consistently seen as a purely intermediate phase in a civil war in 
which the parties struggle for control over the entire country. 
Consequently, the contending regimes will not, and in fact cannot, 
move to the recognition of the opponent since that would imply the 
relinquishment of its claims. 
In the second category, one of the parties does claim jurisdiction 
over the whole country as well as the right of sole representation, but 
the other strives for a legally independent and separate status of the 
3. John H. Herz, "Korea and Germany as divided nations: the systemic impact", 
15 Asian Survey (1975) pp. 957-970. 
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territory under its de facto control. In legal terms this may amount to 
either secession or dismemberment, depending on whether or not the 
party claiming control over the whole country considers itself 
identical to, and the continuation of, the original nation State. While 
the regime aiming at a separate existence is, of course, prepared to 
recognize the other one as an equally separate entity, a similar 
attitude would be self-destructive for the claims of this latter regime. 
Finally, in the third category, both power centers claim a 
separate existence for each within the limits of its actual control. 
Consequently, each will be prepared to recognize the other. But for 
the more distant aim of re-unification, the resulting situation may 
here too be legally defined as dismemberment or secession. In view of 
the professed striving for re-unification, it might be said that the 
phenomenon of multi-system nations could continue to exist political-
ly even when it has already ceased to have legal relevance. The 
developments since the early seventies with regard to the two 
Germanies seem to confirm this in principle. 
Among the three multi-system nations which constitute the 
object of analysis at the present conference China is up till now a 
clear example of the first category. The facts and arguments used in 
the debate are sufficiently known and need not be repeated here. One 
could of course speculate about future developments which are, so far 
as the legal alternatives are concerned, not excitingly new. Briefly 
the two possible developments are: (a) unification, either peaceful or 
by force; and, (b) further and continuing separate development of the 
two parts, either resulting in formal separation or continuing the 
present ambiguous status of Taiwan in international law. Under the 
first alternative one could envisage a constitutional structure allow-
ing for autonomy to some extent. So far as international law is 
concerned, such autonomy goes farthest where the autonomous part 
would have competence to enter international relations. The UN 
membership of the Ukraine and Byelo-Russia offers an example. 
However, since the ideological and economic ties would be absent in 
the Chinese case its feasibility remains remote. With regard to the 
second alternative, since Mr. Clough has analyzed this problem in 
detail in Chapter 7, I will not be repetitive here. 
The Korean case may at least historically be included in the first 
category. Originally, both contending regimes claimed jurisdiction 
over the entire peninsula! While the North based its claim on the 
4. G. Henderson, "Korea", in G. Henderson, R. N. Lebow and J. G. Stoessinger, 
Divided Nations in a Divided World (1954), p. 77. 
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"Joint Conference of Representatives of North and South Korean 
Political Parties and Social Organizations" of April, 1948, and the 
elections of August, 1948, of deputies to the Supreme People's 
Assembly, resulting in the Proclamation of the DPRK in September, 
1948, the South referred to the May, 1948 elections and the relevant 
UN resolutions.5 The all-Korean claims were consequently included 
in the constitutions, particularly Art. 3 of the ROK constitution of 
19486 and Art. 103 of the 1948 DPRK constitution.7 On the 
international level the claim was expressed in some sort of Hallstein 
Doctrine. 
Later developments show that the apprehension for political and 
economic survival, and the efforts to prevail over the ideological 
adversary provided stronger motives for the policies of both the ROK 
and the DPRK than the upholding of the banner of all-Korean 
national unity. Even the long-time objections of the DPRK against 
the idea of simultaneous UN membership of both Korean partial-
States are not sufficient proof of a consistent one-Korea policy on the 
part of the DPRK. Reference could be made, inter alia, to the 
competition between the two Korean regimes in entering into 
diplomatic relations with other States, whether or not combined with 
the suggestion of "cross-recognition", and, especially since the 
general decrease of tension in the early seventies, the simultaneous 
membership of several international organizations, and the idea of a 
peace treaty or non-agression pact between the two power centers. So 
far as the ROK is concerned, the evolution in its policy with regard to 
the intra-Korean question has been characterized as one from 
"legality" to "legitimacy". 8 
It seems that the pursuit of re-unification remains alive but does 
not take first priority among the many concerns of State and society. 
It would be achieved rather as the end-result of a time-consuming 
process that should commence with the consolidation and normaliza-
tion of intra-Korean relations. 
Germany, finally, could well be classed in the second of our three 
categories. Apart from the various theories that German scholarship 
5. Resolutions 112 (II) of 14 Nov. 1947, and 195 (III) of 12 Dec. 1948. 
6. "The territory of the ROK shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its 
accessory islands". 
7. "The Capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the City of 
Seoul". This provision was changed by the constitutional amendment of 1972: 
Pyongyang instead of Seoul is now mentioned as the State Capital. 
8. J. H. Ha and G. M. Luebbert, "A Korean Settlement: the Prospects and 
Problems", 17 Asian Suruey (1977) pp. 735-752. 
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has elaborated on the legal nature of the post-war German situation, 
there is no doubt that the FRG has consistently considered itself to be 
the continuation of and identical to the pre-war German Reich, while 
the GDR has for all practical purposes considered itself a new State 
which is at most a partial successor to a dismembered Reich. 
The FRG initially claimed jurisdiction over all Germany but has 
considerably watered down its views since the introduction of the 
Ostpolitik and the resulting treaties. It has in fact retreated to the 
initial GDR thesis of "two States and one German nation" (GDR 
Constitution of 1968, Art. 1). On the other hand the GDR has now 
taken a step further, and has developed the thesis of two States and 
two German nations, itself embodying the separate, socialist German 
nation ("sozialistischer deutscher National-staat'' - socialist German 
Nation-State).9 
It may be concluded from this survey that while it is not 
impossible to find situations which can fairly neatly be placed into 
one of the three categories, it is much more probable to find mixtures 
and transitional phenomena. 
The basic legal problem involved in the multi-system situation is 
the fact of competing claims to jurisdiction in the first and second 
categories. This jurisdiction may refer to territory or to persons. 
Internationally, the competing claims could raise various questions. 
One of them is the little-analyzed question of the territorial 
applicability of treaties entered into by a government claiming to 
represent a divided State in its entirety. Reference may be made to 
the exchange of notes between Japan and the ROC relating to the 
1952 peace treaty which provided, inter alia, that "the terms of the 
present Treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of China, be 
applicable to all territories which are now or which may hereafter be, 
under the control of its Government". This example may confirm the 
suggestion that, in spite of their inclusive claims, the contending 
regimes will define their policies with a view to the factual control 
over their part of the nation's territory10 and that third States will 
9. Note in this connection the absence of a reference to One German nation and 
reunification in the GDR-USSR Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual 
Assistance of 7 Oct. 1975 which substituted the earlier treaty of 12 June 1964. See Th. 
Schweisfurth, "Die neue vertragliche Bindung der DDR an die Sowjetunion" [The new 
treaty ties between the GDR and the Soviet Union], 30 Europa Archiu (1975), pp. 
753-764. See also B. Meissner, "Der Sowjetische Nationsbegriff und die Frage des 
Fortbestands der deutschen Nation" [The Soviet concept of a nation and the question of 
the continued existence of the German nation], 32 Europa Archiv ( 1977), pp. 315-324, 
who indicates the Soviet interest in a definitive partition in view of the buffer function 
of the GDR. 
10. Cf R.R. Bot, Non-recognition and Treaty Relations (Leiden, 1968), p. 208-209. 
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take due care of the factually limited authority of the regime 
concerned. 
Another question concerns the binding effect of such a treaty on 
the competing government when the latter succeeds in taking over 
power over the whole country: the question is in fact whether and to 
what extent a change of government and constitutional structure 
should result in a clean-slate with regard to treaty obligations. We 
refer to statements made by the Peking Government in this respect11 
and to accession by the PRC to multilateral conventions already 
signed by the ROCY 
In the EEC arrangement with regard to Germany we find an 
example of how an international organization takes account of the 
claim of one of the contending parties in a multi-system nation. 
Reference is made here to the Protocol on German Internal Trade and 
Connected Problems in which it was agreed that "trade between the 
German territories subject to the Basic Law for the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the German territories in which the Basic Law does 
not apply is a part of German internal trade". 
Competing claims to personal jurisdiction are almost unavoid-
able if each of the contending regimes applies a different nationality 
law. In the German case the FRG has continued to apply the old 
German nationality law, and in addition much of its law uses the 
category of "German" in contradistinction to the more limited 
"German national" as a connecting factor. As a consequence most if 
not all GDR Germans are included. Legal conflicts have increased 
potentially with the introduction of a separate GDR nationality law 
in 1967. On the international plane this competition has raised 
questions for third States: the GDR has been trying to include a 
clause in its consular treaties according to which the nationals of the 
sending State will be defined as those who possess the nationality of 
that State under its legislation. This raises the question whether 
such clause would bar FRG representatives from acting on behalf of 
such persons who are "Germans" within the meaning of FRG law and 
who would under that law be entitled to claim FRG protection. 13 Some 
Western European countries have refused the inclusion of the clause, 
11. See infra, text at sect. 4.3. 
12. For example, the accession in 1973 to the 1966 International Load Lines 
Convention instead of ratification of the signature by the Taipei Government in 1966. 
13. This right to diplomatic protection was affirmed by the FRG Constitutional 
Court in its decision of 31 July 1973 (BVerfGE 36,1) on the legal implications of the 
FRG-GDR Treaty "on the basis of relations". 
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like France and Belgium, while the UK does not seem to have 
insurmountable objections to it. (See the UK-GDR Consular Treaty of 
4 May 1976.)14 The Netherlands has not yet concluded a consular 
treaty with the GDR and, consequently, has not yet been confronted 
with the problem. It is suggested that Professor Salmon is right in 
stating that the clause does not imply any partiality and does not 
constitute an obstacle to a simultaneous competence of the FRG. 15 
In the Korean case it is not known to what extent people 
originating from the "other part" of the country are treated in terms 
of nationality law. The ROK Nationality Act of 1948 does not offer 
any indication in this respect by simply referring to [the territory of] 
the Republic of Korea, without further clarification. So far as the 
DPRK is concerned no information at all is available with regard to 
nationality matters in the period up to 1963, in which year a 
Nationality Act was introduced. Article 1 paragraph 1 of this Act is of 
an inter-temporal character and mysteriously refers to persons who 
"held Korean nationality before the establishment of the DPRK" .16 It 
has rightly been suggested that the provision equally qualifies for a 
restricted or an extensive interpretation. If interpreted extensively, it 
would mean that all Koreans would be claimed. It is not known, 
however; in which way the provision is being applied in practice. 
Finally the unclear situation with regard to PRC claims to 
personal jurisdiction is well-known and little improvement appears to 
have been reached by the introduction of the new summary 
Nationality Act of 1980.17 
14. See Jean J.A. Salmon, "L'impact de Ia determination de Ia nationalite 
allemande en RF A sur les conventions consulaires passees avec les Etats tiers" [The 
impact of the determination of German nationality in the FRG on consular treaties 
with third States], 15 Revue Belge de Droit International (1980), pp. 187-201, and also 
D. Blumenwitz, "Die deutsche Staatsangehiirigkeit und die Konsularvertriige der DDR 
mit dritten Staaten" [German nationality and the consular treaties between the GDR 
and third States], Politische Studien No. 221 (May.June 1975), pp. 283-292. Cf, 
however, the U.S. position according to the letter of the Department of State of 23 May 
1962: ". . . the position of the Department of State has been that consuls of the Federal 
Republic are not authorized to act on behalf of German nationals residing in East 
Germany", 57 AJIL (1963), p. 410. Apparently this position was taken to avoid 
unnecessary confrontation with the other bloc. 
15. Loc. cit. in n. 14. 
16. Data from E. Tomson, Das StaatsangehOrigkeitsrecht der ostasiatischen 
Staaten [The nationality law of the East Asian States], 1971 (being vol. 32 of the series 
Sammlung geltender StaatsangehOrigkeitsgesetze, published by the Forschungsstelle fur 
Volkerrecht und ausliindisches offentliches Recht of the University of Hamburg). 
17. Text in Beijing Review, 1980, No. 40 (6 Oct. 1980), pp. 17-18. 
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3. The international law framework: recognition and non-recognition 
Any unconstitutional change relating to the governmental 
authority in a nation State and resulting in more than one 
governmental regime or "power center" claiming authority over the 
whole or part of the country leads to uncertainty with regard to both 
the legal relationships between the power centers themselves and 
those between the State concerned and third States. This twilight 
phase is usually brought to an end by the prevalence of one center 
over the other, or by secession or dismemberment, and by third State 
confirmation by way of recognition. 
The uncertain situation referred to does not normally stretch out 
over a very long time and, despite its annoying and harmful 
implications, is usually sooner or later removed and its consequences 
more or less neatly regulated ex post facto. Besides, when confronted 
with unequivocal facts a third State as a rule cannot withhold 
recognition for too long, unless it can afford to completely avoid 
relations with the entity concerned. Thus, the Netherlands did not 
find it necessary to recognize the Soviet Union until 1942! 
Since the end of the Second World War, however, mostly but not 
exclusively under the impact of the prevailing bipolarity in the world, 
territorial entities which used to constitute single States in the 
immediate or more remote past became factually divided for decades, 
and in some cases there is still no prospect of a final settlement. In 
these cases recognition has been withheld by third States for very 
prolonged periods, either for reasons of bipolar politics and ideology 
or because such recognition is barred by the attitude of the 
contending parties concerned. The Chinese problem is a case in point. 
Moreover, the policy of non-recognition in these post-war cases did 
not coincide with the possibility or intention to avoid relations. 
Since neither the division nor the uncertainty could be lifted, a 
stalemate evolved, in which the contending power centers, as well as 
third States, have tended to accommodate their attitudes and rela-
tionships to the factual situation. This has given rise to questions for 
which the traditional rules and principles of international law have 
not been able to provide a ready answer. These questions concern the 
legal admissibility and the legal nature of relations within the 
context of non-recognition, problems of implicit recognition, the 
avoidance of legal incompatibility, and, finally, the legal significance 
or insignificance of recognition itself. Consequently, it is suggested 
that the prolonged, semi- or quasi-permanent and yet not definitive 
or final character of the multi-system situation raises questions of the 
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applicability of traditional international law doctrines and of the 
need for new ones. 
The question of the admissibility of certain kinds of relations in 
the absence of mutual recognition of the international actors, and the 
question when the relations or behavior in question amount to 
implicit recognition primarily depend on our perception of the scope 
and nature of recognition. The more fundamental the role attributed 
to it, such as in traditional doctrine where practically all relations 
presuppose recognition, the more acts and relations will be considered 
to imply recognition. This appears hardly to be the case any more. 
There is a clear tendency to consider recognition as an expression of 
approval of the appearance of the recognized entity or government on 
the international plane, instead of an affirmation or a constitutive 
element of a legal fact. This means that many useful and practical 
relations may take place without necessarily being preceded by 
recognition.'8 It also means that, as a consequence, the doctrine of 
implicit recognition loses much of its import. 
In 1958 the U.S. Secretary of State, Dulles, made a statement 
distinguishing "recognition that [a State] exists" from "diplomatic 
(or: general) recognition." Referring to the PRC he said: "We 
negotiate with it. We deal with it, wherever that will serve a useful 
purpose. But we do not give it all the surplus advantages which 
would flow from general recognition ... ".'9 The "recognition that it 
exists" is practically the same as an extremely liberal interpretation 
of what is considered possible and admissible without recognition in 
the more traditional sense of the word. 
Frowein's reasoning resembles the above effort to salvage the 
traditional idea of recognition as the basic requirement for all or most 
relations, by introducing intermediate forms of recognition. He 
proposes to demonstrate that according to the constitutive theory of 
recognition it is perfectly possible to accord some status in interna-
tional law to the non-recognized entity. This would amount to a 
"constitutive recognition of a limited legal capacity" which should be 
distinguished from the "constitutive recognition as a State or 
Government".20 Reference may also be made to H. Lauterpacht who 
put it more simply and speaks of "treatment of the unrecognized 
community for some purposes as if it were a subject of international 
law".2' 
18. The eighty pages (524-604) in Volume Two of Whiteman's Digest devoted to 
"Acts short of recognition" bear ample witness of it. 
19. 2 Whiteman p. 606. 
20. Frowein, op. cit., p. 17-18. 
21. H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947) p. 53. 
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The extent of the freedom to enter into transactions in case of 
non-recognition is hardly determined by legal logic or standards of 
justice, but by political expediency, involvement, and preference. For 
example, before the East-West detente of the later sixties and early 
seventies the limits of the permissible scope of action vis-a-vis the 
non-recognized GDR were drawn much more strictly by the Western 
Allies than by the countries of the Third World.22 Reference may also 
be made, first, to the way in which relations between Japan and the 
ROC were maintained after Japan's recognition of the Peking 
Government, particularly to the use of the fa~ade organizations with 
their hardly concealed quasi-governmental character. Second, there 
is the U.S. practice with its Taiwan Relations Act which in an even 
more overt way purports to ensure that the relations with a 
de-recognized entity will differ as little as possible from those with a 
recognized entity. 
The increased significance of the state of non-recognition has 
already led to attempts to distinguish between several sorts of 
non-recognition. B.R. Bot thus differentiates between "legal" or 
"objective" non-recognition, and "subjective" non-recognition. In the 
former case "essential legal criteria" are applied, leading to the 
conclusion that the entity lacks the capacity to enter into official 
international intercourse. In the latter case, however, non-
recognition is the result of subjective preference.23 Dr. Bot of course 
notices that such non-recognition is used by States unsympathetic or 
even hostile toward the unrecognized entity. We now know that this 
is only part of the picture: non-recognition may be applied in spite of 
the full sympathy extended by the non-recognizing State towards the 
non-recognized entity for want of better alternatives under current 
international law, which in principle still adheres to the traditional 
doctrine of recognition. 
The relative significance of recognition and of its implications is 
clearly expressed in the following laconic account: "Should a State for 
political or legal reasons consider the conclusion of an international 
agreement [with a non-recognized entity] not to be in accordance with 
its policy of non-recognition, it would refrain from such conclusion 
and it might find a justification [for such avoidance] in the [fact of] 
non-recognition. If, on the contrary, it considers the conclusion of the 
agreement not to be contrary to its non-recognition policy, it would 
proceed with the conclusion and announce that the conclusion does 
22. See Bot, op. cit. pp. 76-78, and 86-87. 
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not alter its non-recognition"! 24 We cannot but admit the correctness 
of Green Hackworth's thesis that "[p]olitical recognition of a foreign 
State or government is primarily a matter of intention" (emphasis 
added).25 
4. Netherlands practice in respect of multi-system nations 
International relations may refer to an infinite number of 
subjects, but it is evident that the relations between different pairs of 
States or actors need not, and usually do not, concern the same kinds 
of subjects. This applies to the relations between the Netherlands and 
the contending regimes in Germany (before Dutch recognition of the 
GDR), Korea and China. If only because of the geographical position 
of the Netherlands, its relations with the two German regimes have 
been much more numerous and close than those with Korea and 
China. 
We have indicated before that in multi-system situations even 
relations with a recognized government could raise legal problems as 
a result of the claim of such government to jurisdiction over more 
than the part of the country actually under its control. It is, however, 
the relations in the context of non-recognition which usually give rise 
to most questions. 
We shall limit ourselves to reporting the instances in which the 
multi-system situation has had an impact on Netherlands practice (or 
avoidance of practice) of international law, and shall consequently 
refrain from dealing with all the theoretical possibilities of such 
impact. It may be illustrative to precede the survey with a reference 
to an (admittedly very early) case in which the Netherlands acted as 
a non-recognized actor in international relations, and another 
reference to a remarkable case of Dutch practice towards an 
unrecognized entity. The first reference is to the treaty of 1596 
between France and England on the one side and the Republic of the 
United Netherlands on the other, after the Republic had declared its 
independence in 1581 but long before this independence was formally 
recognized. The second reference is to the agreement between the 
Dutch government and the insurgent Franco regime in 1938 on 
mutual representation by agents, notwithstanding the fact that for 
the Netherlands the Republican Government at Valence remained 
the de jure Spanish Government.26 
23. Bot, op. cit. pp. 61-62. 
24. See Frowein, op. cit. p. 94. 
25. 2 Whiteman p. 48. 
26. Bot, op. cit. p. 73. 
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4.1 The Netherlands and the duai-system situation in Germany 
As part of the Western Alliance it was quite natural that the 
Netherlands consistently supported Western views on Germany, and 
followed the stand of the FRG. It consistently refused to recognize the 
GDR until after the normalization of relations between the FRG and 
the GDR. It was only on January 5, 1973 that a joint communique 
was issued by the Dutch and GDR governments, announcing their 
agreement to enter diplomatic relations at the level of ambassador. 27 
There was no express act of recognition, and one can only assume 
that entering into diplomatic relations is sufficient evidence for 
implicit recognition and that recognition was indeed intended by the 
parties.28 
In many respects the Netherlands appears to have maintained a 
very strict view of the non-recognized status of the GDR. This 
strictness found expression, inter alia, in steadfast refusal to call the 
GDR by its official name. Following West German usage, East 
Germany was called "the Soviet Russian Occupation Zone", later to 
be changed into "the so-called German Democratic Republic".29 In 
view of the general tendency to allow more acts and relationships 
without implication of recognition it appears exaggerated to empha-
size abstention from such trivial matters like the use of a name. It 
might be recalled that the United States does not consider such use to 
imply recognition.30 
It is usually held that official, inter-governmental bilateral 
agreements on "political" matters imply recognition. With regard to 
participation in multilateral treaties together with non-recognized 
entities it is said that this does not imply recognition when no 
approval is expressed about the signature, ratification, or accession 
by the unrecognized entity, or, on the contrary, that the implication 
27. Text in Jaarboek van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken [Yearbook of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 1972-1973, Documents p. 91. 
28. Cf. James C. Hsiung's interpretation of China's practice consisting of a 
separation of (a strictly declaratory effect oO recognition and the establishment of 
diplomatic relations, and the downplay of recognition as such: "China's recognition 
practice and its implications in international law", in Jerome A. Cohen (ed.), China's 
Practice of International Law (1972) pp. 14-56, at p. 20 et seq. 
29. The year 1967 was more or less the watershed in Dutch government parlance 
between the use of "so-called GDR" and straight "GDR". Officially, however, it was 
only in 1970 that the Government consented to abolish the adjective or the quotation 
marks. See replies of the Minister for foreign affairs to written questions, 12 Feb. 1970 
and 2 Apr. 1970, Aanh. Hand. II 1969170 Nos. 623 and 895. 
30. 2 Whiteman p. 602. 
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of recognition could only be avoided by way of express reservation.3 ' 
Various intermediate stages of treaty relations between a State and a 
non-recognized entity may be envisaged where opinions differ as to 
their implications with regard to recognition. 
Multilateral treaties 
In the case of multilateral treaties the Netherlands, in most 
cases, made an express statement to the effect that participation 
together with the GDR did not imply recognition. Such express 
reservation was, nevertheless, considered superfluous in certain 
kinds of cases: "Signature of a multilateral treaty, the purpose of 
which requires its world-wide application, does not imply recognition 
of [a non-recognized] regime".32 
When the GDR acceded to the 1949 Red Cross Conventions in 
1956 the relevant issues of the Netherlands Treaty Series [Trac-
tatenblac[J contained the following information (transl.): "On Novem-
ber 30, 1956 the Swiss Federal Council received a letter from Mr. W. 
Pieck in Berlin, directed to the President of the Swiss Federal 
Council, and expressing the wish of the East German authorities to 
accede to the Convention [. . .]. The existence of the so-called 
German Democratic Republic is not recognized by the Netherlands".33 
The Netherlands also made an express reservation when the GDR 
signed at Warsaw (1957) and ratified (1959) the 1955 Hague Protocol 
relating to the modification of the 1929 Warsaw Air Transport 
Convention34 though at the time no information was provided by the 
Tractatenblad.35 Neither was reference made in the Tractatenblad to 
31. See, inter alia, Helmut Alexy, "Die Beteiligung an multilateralen Kon-
ferenzen, VertrAgen und intemationalen Organisationen als Frage der indirekten 
Anerkennung von Staaten" [The participation in multilateral conferences, treaties, 
and international organizations in the light of indirect recognition of States], 26 
Zeitschrift fii,r auslandisches offentliches Recht and Volkerrecht (1966), pp. 495-601. 
32. Explanatory Memorandum to the bill of approval of the Nuclear Testban 
Treaty, Bijl. Hand. II 1963/64-7511 (R385) No. 3. 
33. Tractatenblad (Trb.) 1959 Nos. 10-13 p. 3. The same issues of the Trac-
tatenblad also included information about a similar letter "from Mr. Ho-Chi·Minh at 
Hanoi" with the similar addition that "the existence of the so-called People's Republic 
[sic!] of VietNam is not recognized by the Netherlands", and a similar letter "from Mr. 
Nam ll at Pyongyang'' with the same addition with regard to "the so-called People's 
Republic [sic!] of Korea". 
34. See Alexy, op. cit., at p. 520 n. 122. 
35. It announced the GDR participation nineteen years later, after Dutch 
recognition! See Trb. 1978 No. 31. The same belated information about GDR 
participation in multilateral agreements took place with regard to GDR signature 
(1968) of the Agreement of the Rescue of Astronauts, in Tractatenblad 1981 No. 37. 
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the Netherlands reservation in respect of the "re-application " of the 
Revised Berne Copyright Convention by the GDR (which considered 
itself a successor State to the German Reich) in 1955. In reply to the 
Swiss notification of the East German letter containing its declara-
tion of re-application, the Dutch Government stated, inter alia 
(transl. from original French): "As is known, the Netherlands has not 
recognized the 'German Democratic Republic'. Consequently, the 
Government of the Netherlands can not attach any significance to the 
above-mentioned letter ... ".36 
The next cases in which the Netherlands faced the problem of 
sharing participation in multilateral treaties with the non-recognized 
GDR were the 1963 Nuclear Test-ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space 
Treaty, the 1968 Non-proliferation Treaty, the 1971 Seabed Treaty, 
and the 1972 Bacteriological Weapons Treaty. All these treaties had 
in common the possibility of signing and depositing ratification 
documents at several capitals in the world. In all these cases the GDR 
signature was left out of the list of signatures in the Tractatenblad 
though this carried an "information" in connection with the signature 
by the "East German authorities" to the effect that "The existence of 
the so-called German Democratic Republic is not recognized by the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands".37 At the time of the Dutch signature a 
press communique was issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
stating that "the participation by the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 
the present Treaty may not be interpreted to imply recognition by the 
Kingdom of any non-recognized country or regime which also 
participates in this Treaty, as a State or a Government".38 
Apart from the aspect of recognition there is the question 
whether participation by the unrecognized entity is considered to be 
valid in the sense of being creative of rights and duties. The 
Netherlands has made no clear pronouncement on this matter. In the 
case of the Revised Berne Copyright Convention, it was stated that 
"the Netherlands cannot attach any significance to the above-
mentioned letter". This might imply that no Dutch State organ would 
in any way co-operate to give effect to rights of the GDR or of GDR 
nationals which are derived from the Convention. In connection with 
36. Le droit d'auteur vol. 69 (1956) p. 106. 
37. The intentional nature of this way of publication was confirmed in the 
Memorandum of Reply concerning the bill of approval, Bijl. Hand. II 1963/64-7511 
(R385) No. 6. 
38. See Bijl. Hand. II 1963/64-7511 (R385) Nos. 3 and 6. See for the same 
procedure with regard to signature and ratification of the other treaties by the GDR: 
Trb. 1964 No. 159; Trb. 1967 No. 31 p. 29; Trb. 1969 No. 203 p. 5; Trb. 1970 No. 118 p. 
6 n. 3 and p. 11 n. 1; Trb. 1971 No. 116 p. 11 n. 1; Trb. 1972 No. 142 p. 14 n. 2. 
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the Nuclear Test-ban Treaty, however, the Government expressly 
stated: "The Netherlands accepts that the so-called GDR considers 
itself a party to the Treaty to the extent that this country considers 
itself bound by the universal ban included herein. The acceptance of 
this fact has no further consequences". 39 
Bilateral agreements 
On the bilateral level the Netherlands has quite carefully 
abstained from inter-governmental arrangements with the GDR, 
maybe in an even stricter way than the FRG!0 
The need for developing trade led to the conclusion, on a 
governmental basis, of a payments (clearing) agreement and a trade 
agreement between the Netherlands and the Soviet Military Admi-
nistration in Germany in 1949.4' The trade agreement remained in 
force till 1954 when the first agreement for the regulation of 
Dutch-East German trade was concluded directly between Dutch and 
GDR parties on a formally non-governmental basis. It was concluded 
on September 4, 1954 at Leipzig, the site of the well-known Trade 
Fair, by the Netherlands Chamber of Commerce for Germany and the 
Chamber for Foreign Trade of the GDR.42 The agreement was usually 
called the "Chambers Agreement" after the parties to the 
39. Memorandum of Reply concerning the bill of approval, 29 Apr. 1964, Bijl. 
Hand. II 1963/64-7511 (R385) No.6. Frowein, op. cit. p. 122 n. 142, suggests that the 
Dutch declaration in respect of the Nuclear Testban and other treaties, according to 
which Dutch participation does not imply recognition, could be interpreted to mean, a 
contrario, that the Netherlands considers the participation by the unrecognized entity 
as valid. 
40. Note the 1951 trade agreement between the GDR Ministry for foreign and 
internal German trade and the FRG (semi-governmental?) Office of the Trustee for 
Interzonal Trade. See Guenther Joetze, "The legal nature of the trade agreements 
between West and East Germany", 16 Yearbook of World Affairs (1962), p. 172-196. 
Cf also the inter·governmental trade agreements between the GDR and other 
non-recognizing States, referred to by Frowein, op. cit. p. 101 n. 39, citing Kapsa, 
Zusammenstellung der von der "Deutschen Demokratischen Republik" seit deren 
Grii.ndung abgeschlossenen internationalen Vertriige und Vereinbarungen (4th ed., 
1965), unpublished. 
41. The payments agreement, supplemented by an exchange of letters of April, 
1952, between the Dutch and GDR central banks, basically remained valid at least till 
official relations started in 1973. 
42. This phenomenon of non-governmental trade agreements has already been 
reported by Raymond F. Mikesell and Donald A. Wells, "State Trading in the 
Sino-Soviet Bloc", 24 Law and Contemporary Problems (1959), pp. 435-453 at 440. See 
also the information by Frowein, op. cit. p. 103 et seq. about similar agreements with 
the Federation of British Industries and with an Austrian Chamber. 
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agreement. 43 The agreement was revised several times: December 12, 
1956, December 16, 1958, January 18, 1966 and June 17, 1970. From 
the 1956 Agreement the Dutch side was represented by a specially 
established foundation, the "Netherlands Chamber of Commerce for 
Germany Foundation" which was abolished after Dutch recognition 
of the GDR.44 
With regard to the preparations for the 1956 trade agreement, 
which took place in the Netherlands, it is known that nothing was 
left undone to keep a fa~ade of genuine non-governmental relations. 
Even the site of the negotiations was carefully chosen: the main 
commercial center and official capital of the Netherlands, Amster-
dam, instead of the center of government activities and the actual 
seat of the Government, The Hague. The Government's interest in 
the agreement and share in its shaping was, however, evident. 
During the negotiations regular consultations took place between the 
"delegation" and a team of representatives of various ministries, 
among them the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After the agreement 
was concluded, both the GDR Government and the Dutch ministry of 
economic affairs gave their formal consent to the respective Cham-
bers. 
The contents of the trade agreements, while resembling those of 
normal inter-governmental trade agreements, were adapted to the 
non-governmental status of the parties. Whenever a provision refers 
to the grant of licenses or other discretionary governmental acts the 
agreement determined that "the parties to the agreement will 
endeavour''-instead of the clear commitment to grant-the permits or 
licenses. It occurred that the parties to the agreement also committed 
themselves to certain acts "after consultation with the competent 
authorities". 
Mutual representation 
Although it may be controversial whether consular representa-
tion is or is not compatible with non-recognition, the idea was out of 
the question vis-a-vis the GDR so far as the Netherlands45 was 
43. The same German name "Kammerabkommen" was used for a similar 
non-governmental Austrian-North Korean agreement, see Frowein, op. cit. p. 105. 
These "Chamber Agreements" are comparable to similar agreements between 
Japanese and PRC non-governmental bodies before Japanese recognition of the Peking 
government, see Frowein, op. cit. p. 106. 
44. At the time of the 1970 Agreement the Germans had replaced their Kammer 
with the more official Amt {ilr Aussenwirtschaftsbeziehungen der DDR [Board for the 
external economic relations of the GDR]. 
45. As well as other Western countries. See statement by the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, 12 Feb. 1970, Hand. II 1969/70, p. 2269-2270. 
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concerned. This attitude was more confirmed than strengthened or 
caused by the Hallstein Doctrine. As late as November 1967, the 
Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that "the appointment of 
consular representatives means diplomatic recognition of the GDR".46 
When representation was really needed, the Government would 
invoke the services of a solicitor who would receive instructions from 
the Dutch Consul-General at (West) Berlin.47 
The only real, mutual representation before recognition consisted 
of the representation in the context of the "Chambers Agreement": a 
representative office of the GDR Kammer was established in 
Amsterdam not long after the conclusion of the first 
Kammerabkommen48 , and the representative of the Dutch Chamber 
in Berlin, while living in West Berlin, had an office in East Berlin. 
Though this representative was never formally given consular tasks 
it seems that he was considered the first liaison between the GDR 
and the Dutch side, also in matters other than trade. Cases of Dutch 
nationals in distress were apparently reported to this 
representative.49 
Entry of GDR nationals into the Netherlands 
Before recognition GDR passports were not considered to be valid 
travel documents and could therefore not be furnished with a visa. 
Visas were granted on a "Temporary Travel Document" issued by the 
joint U.S.-British-French "Allied Travel Office" in West-Berlin. It is 
well-known how GDR sportsmen in particular suffered from these 
arrangements. In order to obtain a visa they were requested to state 
expressly that they would refrain from undesirable political activi-
ties, including displaying the flag or other emblems of the GDR, 
acting as GDR representatives, and playing the GDR anthem. 
Dutch courts 
The Dutch courts have had the opportunity in a number of cases 
of pronouncing an opinion on the question of identity and continuity 
46. Statement in Parliament, 21 Nov. 1967, Hand. II 1967/68 B. 92. 
47. Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 7 Feb. 1968, Hand. 111967/68, 
p. 1144-1145. 
48. Vertretung der Kammer fiir Aussenhandel der DDR in den Niederlanden. 
49. The present writer was told of the case of about twenty Dutch riverbarges 
which were stranded in (East-) Berlin as a result of the war. Initially the GDR 
authorities were prepared to allow their departure only on a request to be made by the 
Dutch Government. Later permission was granted through the intermediary of the 
"Foundation" and its representative. 
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of state or state succession. Among the three "divided States" which 
concern us now, only the German case has been the subject of such 
pronouncements. 
In all three relevant cases the court had to determine whether 
and to what extent pre-war treaties were still applicable, and in all 
three of them, the court considered the German Reich to have 
disappeared. One decision, of June 27, 1949, held that "in case of the 
(temporary) dissolution of a state international law does not prescribe 
the transfer of ... [treaty rights and duties] to the state or states 
which have (temporarily) taken over the· sovereignty over the . . . 
territory".50 The second one, taken by the District Court of Rotterdam 
on January 18, 1952, endorsed the position held by the FRG: while 
the German Reich had ceased to exist in 1945 that was not the case 
with the German State. State authority was first exercised by the 
Four Occupation Powers, and so far as the territory under control of 
the three Western Powers was concerned, transferred to the FRG 
which was not a new State but should be considered to be the 
continuation of the German State.51 The third decision, finally, was 
taken by the District Court of Amsterdam on November 25, 1975. It 
had to answer the question whether the Hague Marriage Convention 
of 1905 could be considered to apply to the territory of the GDR. It 
gave a negative answer to the question and considered, inter alia, 
that: "It is generally known that the German Reich ceased to exist in 
its original form as a consequence of the Second World War and was 
split up into several parts. Most of its territory has been divided 
between the present German Federal Republic and the present 
German Democratic Republic ... ".52 
4.2 The Netherlands and the dual-system situation in Korea 
In comparison with the two other "dual-system nations" Korea 
has presented the fewest questions relating to the bilateral foreign 
relations of the Netherlands, either governmental or non-
governmental. 
Following the 1948 UNGA resolution 195(111) of December 12, 
1948, the Netherlands, being part of the Western world, quite 
naturally recognized the ROK.53 From the course of events at the UN 
50. Special Court of Cassation, 27 June 1949, Annual Digest 1949 No. 87. 
51. International Law Reports 1952 No. 13. 
52. 8 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (hereafter: NYILI (19771, p. 254. 
53. Yearbook of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1949-1950, Annex 21. 
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and from the contents of the ROK constitution, particularly its Art. 3, 
one could infer that so far as the Netherlands was concerned the ROK 
was to be considered as the legal embodiment of an all-Korean State. 
It is a rather moot question whether the branding by the UN of North 
Korea as an aggressor within the terms of the UN Charter should be 
considered to imply recognition of it as a State, and whether UN 
Member States would automatically be included in such recognition. 
In any case the non-recognition of the DPRK was expressly stated 
when the DPRK acceded to the 1949 Red Cross Conventions in 1957.54 
A number of treaties have been concluded between the Nether-
lands and the ROK, but none of them includes any reference to the 
actual division of the peninsula. · · 
The Agreement between the Benelux Countries and the ROK of 
April 28, 197055 on the abolition of visas, the Netherlands-ROK 
Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of invest-
ments of October 16, 197466, and the Netherlands-ROK Tax Agree-
ment of October 25, 197857 refer to "nationals", but so far as Koreans 
are concerned there is no indication that the term would include 
persons who do not fulfil the requirements of the Nationality Act of 
the ROK.58 The first two agreements also refer to "territory" and here 
the agreements offer no definition at all. Finally, the third agreement 
refers to "Korea", with the following definition: "The term 'Korea' 
means the Republic of Korea, and when used in a geographical sense, 
means all the territory in which the laws relating to Korean tax are 
in force." 
There have been no bilateral relations between the Netherlands 
and the DPRK, either governmental or non-governmental.S9 
Reference has already been made to participation in multilateral 
treaties. With regard to membership of international organizations 
the DPRK was accepted as a member of UNESCO in 1974 by 
acclamation60 and as a member of WHO in 1973 by secret ballot.61 On 
neither occasion did the Netherlands express its views on the matt~r. 
54. See supra, n. 33. 
55. Trb. 1970 No. 89. 
56. Trb. 1974 No. 220. 
57. Trb. 1979 No. 13. 
58. See supra, p. 81. 
59. Cf the "Chambers Agreement" between Austria and the DPRK, supra n. 43. 
60. Application of 11 June 1974, doc. 18C/102, discussion in Executive Board on 25 
June 1974, doc. 94/Ex/SR 31; resolution of Executive Board, res. 94/Ex/58; and decision 
in the plenary meeting of the General Conference of 17 Oct. 1974, Records of the 
General Conference, 18th sess., 1974, Proceedings, vol. 3, Part 1, p. 31-32. 
61. Resol. WHA 26.28; Off. Records of the WHO No. 210: Twenty-sixth World 
Health Assembly, Part. II pp. 230-245. 
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Finally there is the question of entry into the Netherlands. There 
are no data whether at any time a holder of a DPRK passport has 
ever applied for entry. In such a. case the general criteria for 
permitting aliens to enter the country would apply. The DPRK 
passport would not be considered a valid travel document and, 
consequently, the visa would be granted by way of a separate "visa 
certificate". A residence permit would likewise be issued as a 
separate document instead of by way of a stamp in the passport. 
4.3 The Netherlands and the dual-system situation in China 
An inquiry into the Dutch attitude towards the Chinese multi-
system situation includes the question of Dutch recognition of the 
Peking Government, the Dutch attitude with regard to Chinese 
representation in the UN, and the Dutch treaty and other relations 
with the ROC since the de-recognition of the ROC Government. 
The Netherlands reacted fully in accordance with the declaratory 
theory of recognition when it recognized the (Peking) Central 
People's Government as the de jure government of China as early as 
March 28, 1950. Fully consistent with this recognition, it voted in 
October, 1950, in favor of the Indian draft resolution aimed at 
substituting the Nationalist representation of China in the UN by 
representation by the Peking Government of the Chinese State (then 
called PRC).62 
Being part of the Western Bloc in the bipolarized world at the 
time, however, the Netherlands soon changed its attitude and 
followed the United States in blocking the replacement of Chinese 
representation in the UN by supporting the so-called moratorium 
resolution and subsequently the "important question" resolution. 
Since it had then already recognized the Peking Government as the 
legitimate government of China, it (together with other States in the 
same position, such as the UK) placed itself in a legally dubious 
position. This position was quite different from that of the United 
States, for whom the Taipei Government was still the only recognized 
government of China. Out of (inconceivable) ignorance, or inten-
62. See K. Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law 
(1968), p. 127, who correctly refers to the irrelevance of a State's name as a test of the 
State's identity and continuity. It is remarkable that Belgium, Netherlands' closest 
neighbor in geographical as well as other respects, decided to maintain recognition of 
the ROC Government. It is a moot question whether Benelux consultation had 
preceded this "division of labor". 
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tionally, the legal nature of the question of representation was not 
adequately analyzed and illuminated. Among other things, the 
Government said it could not see how its attitude in the UN could 
possibly upset Dutch-PRC relations.63 Anyhow, the resulting policy 
was ambiguous towards the officially recognized Chinese Govern-
ment, while extremely favorable towards the unrecognized entity in 
Taiwan. The attitude within the UN also had its impact on the 
practice elsewhere. For example, in 1964 the Netherlands had no 
objection to the ROC ambassador in Brussels acting as ambassador to 
the EEC in contrast to France, which had at that time just recognized 
the Peking Government. 54 Nevertheless, when the replacement of the 
Chinese representation at the UN could no longer be avoided in 1971, 
the Netherlands representative at the UN tried simply to forget the 
policy of the last twenty years, and gave the following explanation of 
vote (in favor of replacement): " ... What are the main factors on 
which, after careful consideration, the Netherlands delegation bases 
its position? Evidently a factor of the greatest importance is the 
recognition by the Netherlands, as long ago as March 1950, of the 
Government of the People's Republic of China as the de jure 
Government of China, and the simultaneous withdrawal of its 
recognition of the nationalist regime [. .. ] The objective of the 
Netherlands Government is clear: it wishes to see the People's 
Republic of China occupy the seat of China in all relevant organs of 
the UN and of the UN family . . ."65 
Outside the UN, the Netherlands appears to have kept rather 
strictly to the consequences of the recognition of the Peking 
Government, and, of course, this applied a fortiori after the China 
detente of 1971. When the Government was asked in Parliament in 
early 1972 whether "the Government share the opinion that after the 
Chinese seat in the UN has been occupied by [the] Peking [Govern-
ment], it is desirable to entertain the best possible relations with 
Taiwan", the reply simply referred to the 1950 note of recognition 
and the simultaneous severance of relations with the ROC Govern-
ment ("Taiwan"). It then concluded: "[l]t has been impossible since to 
maintain relations with Taiwan on the government level. So the 
answer to the question is in the negative".66 
63. Memorandum of reply to Parliament, Bijl. Hand. II 1959/60-5700 III No. 
13-14, para. 18. 
64. Bot, op. cit., p. 49-50. 
65. Statement of 20 October 1971, Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication No. 100, 
p. 231. 
66. Reply to written questions, 10 March 1971, 4 NYIL (1973), p. 309. 
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The practice in the field of multilateral treaties is comparable 
though not identical with the practice toward the GDR. During the 
fifties and the sixties that practice reflected the ambivalent policy at 
the UN. "China" or "China (Taiwan)", and even "Republic of China" 
was included in the lists of signatures and ratifications in the 
Tractatenblad and no Dutch declaration or reservation of any kind 
was made at the time of signature, ratification, or accession. This was 
contrary to, for example, the UK and Danish practice of express 
declarations.67 It was also contrary to the express statement of 
non-recognition that was usually made in respect of the GDR. In 1968 
the Government "explained" the inclusion of "China" in the lists of 
signatures, as follows: "This signature is included because Nation-
alist China is a member of the UN", though the Government 
memorandum added: "This information does not imply recognition".68 
When the ROC ratification of the Seabed Treaty (Feb. 22, 1972) 
was published in the Tractatenblad in 1976~9 the Chinese UN seat 
was already occupied by the Peking delegation. The Tractatenblad 
accordingly included the "information" that "China (Taiwan) is not 
recognized by the Kingdom of the Netherlands".7° Finally, in the case 
of the Bacteriological Weapons Convention of 1972 we come full circle 
to the GDR-model: ROC signature was not included in the list in the 
Tractatenblad, and instead the now familiar "information" was given: 
"The present Convention has been signed on 10 April 1972 at 
Washington by a representative of Taiwan [note the different 
terminology]. The existence of the so-called Republic of China is not 
recognized by the Kingdom of the Netherlands".71 
Many other questions might be raised concerning the consequ-
ences of participation of non-recognized entities in multilateral 
treaties, but these have not yet given rise to problems so far as the 
Netherlands is concerned. For example, the participation of the 
Chinese State, as represented by the ROC representative, in a 
67. See 258 UNTS, pp. 308, 320, Trb. 1959 No. 21 p. 38; and 53 AJIL (1959), p. 
898. 
68. Memorandum of reply, 21 Nov. 1968, Bijl. Hand. II 1968/69-9464 No. 7 p. 2. 
69. This late publication resulted from the fact that the Netherlands did not ratify 
the convention until 1976. The same happened with regard to the signature by the 
ROC of the Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and 
flora, see Trb. 1975 No. 23, and with regard to the ROC ratification of the Agreement 
on the rescue of astronauts in 1973, see Trb. 1981 No. 37. 
70. Trb. 1976 No. 25 p. 5. 
71. Trb. 1972 No. 152 p. 24. 
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multilateral treaty might raise questions concerning the territorial 
application of the treaty, while a question might also be raised with 
regard to the responsibility of the Chinese State in case of non-
application of the treaty in those territories which are not under the 
factual control of the treaty-making Government. No data are 
available either on the Dutch views in case of repudiation by the 
PRC Government of a previous "ROC participation" in a multilateral 
treaty, such as the Outer Space Treaty.72 
Although the long period of non-recognition of the ROC Govern-
ment at Taiwan raises expectations of a rich fabric of bilateral non-
or quasi-governmental agreements, no such agreement exists. As 
such agreements usually primarily serve trade interests, the simple 
conclusion is that the volume or meth~ds of trade did not justify the 
effort. 73 The German case has shown that there are no legal 
inhibitions on the Dutch side against the conclusion of such 
agreements. 
Another relevant issue in the multi-system question is, of course, 
that of mutual representation. As I have tried to show elsewhere/• 
the paradoxical experience of the Netherlands (and, presumably, of 
other Western countries as well) was that rather than (non-) relations 
with the unrecognized entity, it was the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with the recognized government which involved most of the 
problems. These were caused, as we know, by the fact that for the 
PRC the recognition of its government by another State does not 
automatically imply its commitment to establish diplomatic 
relations.75 
Vis-a-vis the Nationalist Government of China the existing 
mutual diplomatic representation was broken off simultaneously 
72. Statement of20 Oct. 1972 by the PRC representative in the meeting of the UN 
General Assembly First Committee, reported by Jerome A. Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, 
People's China and International Law, vol. 2 (1974) No. 30-5. 
73. Only since 1970 were the Netherlands separately mentioned in the ROC trade 
statistics. See China Yearbook 1972-1973, p. 269. At present the volume of trade would 
be no reason for the absence of a trade agreement framework. Since 1978 the 
Netherlands has reached the position of the number three trade partner of the ROC in 
Europe. See China Yearbook 1978, p. 343. Cf the agreement of co-operation of 1 May 
1976 between the Belgian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Euro-Asia Trade 
Organization of the Republic of China, which may be compared with the Dutch-
German Chambers Agreement, see China Yearbook 1977, p. 345. 
74. "The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and the Scope of Diplomatic 
Experience with China", in J.A. Cohen (ed.), China's Practice of International Law: 
Some Case Studies, 1972, pp. 57-85. 
75. See supra, n. 28. 
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with the Dutch recognition of the Central Peking Government. No 
Dutch legation needed to be closed since this legation was at the time 
established in Nanking, while the Nationalist Chinese legation at 
The Hague was informed by formal letter that it had lost its official 
status as a result of the recognition of the Peking Government. 76 
Unlike the UK which already had a consulate at Taipei and 
which decided to continue this form of representation, all affairs 
concerning Taiwan were, so far as the Netherlands was concerned, 
henceforth handled by the Dutch Consulate General in Hong Kong. 
There seems to have been an arrangement with Belgium that, if 
necessary, the Belgian representative at Taipei would take care of 
Dutch interests. 77 
No standing representative of any Dutch federation of industries 
or Chamber of Commerce was posted in Taiwan before 1980.78 In that 
year, the Netherlands Centre for Trade Promotion, which is a 
foundation without formal government subsidy, decided to establish 
such representation: the NCH (for: Nederlands Centrum voor Han-
delsbevordering) Taiwan Office. The emergence of a need for .such 
standing representation at such a late point of time seems not to be 
the consequence of a stubborn clutching to international law rules of 
conduct, but simply of the lack of such need being felt in Dutch 
commercial circles. 
The NCH representation seems to be a purely commercial affair 
so far, and there is no reason to suspect that it has been assigned to 
carry out public duties in any way. The representative was previously 
employed by one of the big Dutch industrial firms, and not, as is the 
case in the Japanese and United States fa~;ade organizations, by the 
ministry of foreign affairs or any other State organ. It is not yet 
possible to predict future developments, and we should not foreclose 
the possibility that the representative will, in fact, also act as an 
intermediary between the Taiwanese host society and the Dutch 
Consulate General at Hong Kong. 
76. Text in Yearbook of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1949-1950, p. 300. 
77. See the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Second Chamber, 7 
Feb. 1968, Hand. II 1967/68 p. 1144. See also the Memorandum of reply to Parliament, 
Bijl. Hand. II 1959/60-5700 III No. 13-14 para. 20. At that time the representation of 
Belgium at Taipei consisted of a Consulate General though there was no withdrawal of 
recognition till 1972. See, Revue Belge de Droit International 1972, pp. 357-358. 
78. In 1979 six European countries, viz. France, Greece, Spain, the UK, West 
Germany and Belgium had their (non-governmental) trade or cultural representatives 
in Taipei. See China Yearbook 1979, p. 339; 1980, p. 345. 
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ROC efforts to establish a presence in the Netherlands seem to 
have been more persistent, but information is scarce and difficult to 
obtain. Since the fifties it has been known among interested circles 
that there were persons in the Chinese immigrant community in the 
Netherlands who acted as a liaison with, presumably, the nearest 
official ROC representative body at the time, which was the ROC 
embassy at Brussels. More recently, the ROC seems to have been 
involved in what was called the Sun Yat Sen Center at The Hague.79 
The involvement seems now to be terminated, and the Center itself 
seems to have faded away. In any case the main representation of the 
ROC is now centered in the "Far East Trade Office" at The Hague.80 
There is no doubt that this Office plays a role in the issue of 
visas, though it seems less relevant for us to know whether they are 
entitled to decide on visa applications or whether they act as a liaison 
office. It should not be too difficult to issue documents (e.g., "letters of 
recommendation") which have an informal appearance but which 
have the effect of a visa for all practical purposes. 
It is not known whether the Office is approached by the police in 
cases involving ROC nationals, or whether the Office lends its 
services to ROC nationals in their dealings with the Dutch author-
ities. In view of the strict posture usually taken by these authorities, 
the former seems to be quite improbable. With regard to the latter, it 
is equally quite improbable that the Office, which clearly tries to 
keep a low profile, would present itself to be anything else than a 
commercial organization rendering friendly assistance to fellow 
countrymen. 
Finally, I will offer a brief remark on entry of ROC nationals to 
the Netherlands. As in the North Korean case, a ROC passport, being 
a travel document issued by a non-recognized entity, would not be 
eligible to be "visa'd" by official organs of the Netherlands. Therefore, 
visas are issued by way of separate documents ("visa certificate", 
visum-verklaring). Residence permits would be issued similarly. 
79. See China Yearbook 1974, p. 358. To be distinguished from a weightier 
ROC-sponsored body at Brussels, bearing a similar name. See China Yearbook 
1972-1973, p. 394. 
80. This seems one of the twelve ROC trade and cultural representative organs in 
European countries. See China Yearbook 1979, p. 339. Cf the information in the China 
Yearbooks on the organizations established to maintain commercial and cultural 
relations with non-recognizing nations on a "people to people" basis. 
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4.4 The Dutch-Taiwanese submarines deal and its legal implications 
Relations between the Netherlands and the ROC at Taiwan came 
into the limelight recently in connection with the sale of two 
submarines by the RSV Shipyards to a "customer" in Taiwan. The 
transaction raised several questions concerning the facts of the case, 
the municipal law rules applying to the transaction the compatibility 
of the transaction or, particularly, the involvement of the Dutch 
Government in it, with the non-recognized status of the ROC and the 
obligations of the Netherlands vis-a-vis the Chinese State as 
represented by the recognized Peking Government. 
4.4.1 The facts 
So far as can be ascertained, some time in the latter half of 1980 
the RSV Corporation, which includes the biggest Dutch shipyard, 
succeeded in winning an option for the delivery of two submarines 
and plant for a nuclear power station to a "customer" in Taiwan. This 
"customer" later proved to be the official (Navy) authorities.8 ' Under 
current Dutch law relating to the export of military goods such export 
is subject to Government approval. Being conscious of the sensitive 
aspects involved, the matter was discussed in the full Council of 
Ministers, and consultations were also held with the Standing 
Parliamentary Committees for Foreign Affairs, Trade Policy and 
Economic Affairs. It is known that the Dutch Government also 
consulted the U.S. Government, not by way of a request for advice on 
how to react, but by inquiring about the U.S. attitude towards 
Taiwan in similar situations.82 According to newspaper reports, the 
U.S. Government gave as its opinion that although the transaction 
would certainly raise unfavorable reaction from the PRC, this 
reaction would not be too damaging and the expected worsening of 
relations would not be irreversible. 
The Dutch Government finally decided that the deteriorating 
economic position of RSV and of the Dutch economy as a whole, and 
the tremendous impact of the expected "6,000,000 man-hours, or four 
years employment for 1000 workers" involved in the transaction far 
outweighed the risks of the deterioration of relations with the PRC. It 
81. See the newspaper report about the signing of the final contract in early 
September 1981, by the director of RSV and representatives of the ROC Navy: 
NRC-Handelsblad, 7 Sept. 1981, p. 1. 
82. In view of the Taiwan Relations Act US-Taiwan relations can in fact never be 
similar. 
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considered that against the instant gains resulting from the transac-
tion the prospects of economic co-operation with the PRC offered at 
best distant and uncertain advantages. Consequently, the Govern-
ment held out the possibility of an export license by way of a letter of 
intent. Since the purchase agreement was not yet formally 
concluded,83 and since the submarines are not due to be delivered 
before 1984, no further decision was in fact required, nor applied for. 
As soon as news about the transaction found its way into the 
newspapers the PRC Government started to protest vehemently. It 
demanded that no approval be given to the transaction, and warned 
the Dutch of its serious consequences. After the Dutch Government 
took its decision, in spite of the PRC objections, the latter expressed 
its grave displeasure and disappointment, and announced its inten-
tion to freeze existing and future economic and cultural relations 
unless the Netherlands Government reversed its decision. It also 
expressed its wish to lower the level of the Dutch-Chinese diplomatic 
relations to that of charge d'affaires (en pied). 
When the talks on this latter issue finally started on April 28, 
1981 the Netherlands seems to have tried to avoid the, admittedly 
unusual, formal downgrading of mutual diplomatic representation by 
suggesting that the same goal could be achieved by filling the 
abassadors' posts with a charge d'affaires ad interim, and later, by 
the additional proposal to change the designation of the embassies 
into "diplomatic missions". These efforts did not succeed, the PRC 
Government broke off the negotiations and on May 5, 1981 un-
ilaterally changed the status of its representation at The Hague into 
"Office of Charge d'Affaires" (en pied). 
4.4.2 The municipal law aspects 
The question to be asked is whether and to what extent 
municipal law rules have an impact on transactions between Dutch 
private firms and partners from a non-recognized country, particular-
ly where the sale of weapons is concerned. No rule of Dutch 
municipal law contains any prohibition nor restriction on transac-
tions with non-recognized entities as such. 
The Import and Export Act of July 5, 196284 was, according to its 
preamble, intended to establish "rules relating to the import and 
export of goods, in the interest of the national economy, of the 
internal and external security of the country and of the international 
83. See supra, n. 81. 
84. Staaatsblad <Stb.l [Statute Book], 1962, No. 295. 
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legal order .. ". For that purpose the Act enabled restrictive 
measures to be taken by the Government with regard to the import 
and export of goods, such as a prohibition of import or export without 
express government permission. Under this enabling provision 
several Royal Decrees have been promulgated including, inter alia, 
the Export Decree for Strategic Goods 196385 as amended.86 Annexed 
to this Decree is a list of commodities which require a license for 
export.87 
The license applications are to be referred to the Central Import 
and Export Office of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which consults 
the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs before deciding on an 
application.86 In the process, an extensive report is to be drawn up for 
the assessment of the political implications. This report must deal 
with the nature of the commodities (offensive, defensive, etc.), the 
situation of the receiving country (existing or potential conflicts, 
internal situation, human rights, etc.), the nature of its defense 
requirements (replacement, expansion, possibility of re-export), the 
economic and financial state of the receiving State, precedents with 
regard to policy in respect of the country concerned or other, similar, 
situations, the applicable international arrangements, and the em-
ployment situation in the relevant branch of industry. 89 The report 
will be the subject of inter-Departmental consultations. If these 
consultations lead to a positive result the license will "'e issued by the 
Minister of Economic Affairs. 
The license has a limited validity and may differ depending on 
the kind of commodity involved. Licenses are granted "on the basis of 
the prevailing circumstances".90 The scope of this proviso is not clear; 
it is said that the license could be withdrawn "in case of completely 
changed circumstances".91 This seems not to refer to withdrawal of 
85. Stb. 1963, No. 128. 
86. See, on the system of the Act and the Decree, 8 Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law {NYIL) (1977), pp. 331-333 and 12 NYIL <19811, p. 293 et seq. 
87. See Art. 2 of the Decree. This "list of strategic goods" is being updated 
whenever necessary. See for its latest version: Nederlandse Staatscourant [Official 
Gazette] of 29 August 1980 No. 167. 
88. See Bijl. Hand. II 1974175-13461 No. 1-2, p. 64. See infra on this document. 
89. Letter of 8 Sept. 1980 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Parliament 
concerning the export of military materiel, Bijl. Hand. II 1980/81-16204 No. 3. 
90. Id. p. 2. 
91. Minister for Foreign Affairs' reply to parliamentary questions, 16 May 1980, 
Bijl. Hand. II 1980/81-16204 No. 2 p. 4. The Ministerial letter cited supra, note 89, 
refers to the case covered by Art. 10 of the Import and Export Act as the only one in 
which withdrawal is possible. This article, however, provides for the possibility of 
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licenses after their actual issue, but rather to withdrawal of the 
commitment to grant the license. In the case of the submarines deal 
the Government informed the applicant that "under the present 
circumstances [the Government has] no objections against the 
pursuance of the negotiations with the customer in Taiwan [ ... ]. 
The implementation of the foregoing will include, subject to the 
proviso's referred to, the issue of the required licenses at the 
appropriate times".92 According to the Prime Minister this implies 
that a withdrawal of the commitment is only possible in case of 
subsequent facts or developments which could not be foreseen and 
which, because of their fundamental nature, would necessitate a 
reconsideration or, at least, justify such reconsideration.93 This may 
refer to a situation in which at the relevant time the application of 
the relevant criteria (see infra) would lead to a license being refused. 
It is striking that in a letter of September, 1980, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs deemed it useful to inform Parliament that in case of 
the export of military materiel "importing countries sometimes 
require certainty about the permission for export before any definite 
order is placed. This means, for instance, that in the case of 
ship-building the export license will be issued before the actual 
building is started". 94 
Under the license system, criteria must be laid down which are 
to be applied when deciding on an application. In connection with the 
subject of disarmament, the Government issued an extensive memor-
andum in 1975 which, inter alia, included a chapter on the arms 
trade.95 In it, the Government defined its policy as follows: "The 
Netherlands conducts a selective arms export policy, according to 
which the pursuit of peace prevails over strictly commercial interests. 
[. .. ] Deliveries bound for sensitive and potentially sensitive areas 
will be carefully assessed for their political implications. This applies 
withdrawal of all licenses and exemptions belonging to a certain category if such 
withdrawal is deemed to be necessary "for an important (gewichtig) reason". Besides 
Art. 9 provides for the possibility of withdrawal in case of the license having been 
issued on the basis of wrong or incomplete information being provided by the applicant. 
92. Letter from the Minister of Economic Affairs of 8 Dec. 1980, informing 
Parliament of the Government's decision, and quoting the letter from the Government 
to the RSV Corporation, Bijl. Hand. II 1980/81-16520 No. 1. 
93. Statement by the Prime Minister in Parliament on 29 Jan. 1981, Hand. II 
1980/81 p. 2726. See also the letter from the Prime Minister to Parliament of 20 Feb. 
1981, Bijl. Hand II 1980/81-16520 No. 14. 
94. Loc. cit., supra, n. 87 p. 3. 
95. Nota Ontwapening en Veiligheid [Memorandum on Disarmament and Secur-
ity], Bijl. Hand. II 1974175-13461 Nos. 1-2. 
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particularly to export to those countries which are involved in an 
armed conflict or where there is a danger of the weapons being used 
for the suppression of the country's own population. Besides, particu-
lar attention is paid to the relation between the kind of commodities 
concerned and their destination. When the assessment produces a 
negative result, an export license will be denied. The Netherlands 
strictly abides by the arms embargoes agreed upon within the UN".96 
These criteria are still applicable9\ as was confirmed during the 
parliamentary debates concerning the submarines transaction. These 
debates centered on whether the receiving country, i.e. "Taiwan", 
should be deemed to be involved in an armed conflict and whether it 
should be defined as a "sensitive or potentially sensitive area". 
Remarkably, the prevalence of the pursuit of peace over strictly 
commercial interests, the first criterion mentioned in the policy 
memorandum, was hardly, if at all, referred to in the debates. It 
would indeed be difficult, for the Government as well as for the 
opposition, to minimize the economic advantages in view of the high 
~nd ev.er increasi:pg rate of unemployment in the country and the 
precarious state of the industry concerned. 
Anyway, the questions which were considered relevant concerned 
political, not legal evaluation of factual situations. Rightly or 
wrongly, the questions were answered by the Government in the 
negative so that nothing prevented the issue of a license, or at least 
the promise of such issue at some future time. The non-recognition of 
the area to which the delivery is to take place and consequently its 
multi-system situation, is not an express factor in the law and could 
only play a role in defining the area as sensitive or potentially 
sensitive. 
4.4.3 The international law aspects 
In assessing whether and to what extent the submarines 
transaction is being covered by rules of international law it is 
necessary to state in advance that we are solely concerned here with 
the rights and obligations of the State of the Netherlands under such 
96. Loc. cit. p. 64. 
97. Reference may be made to another major policy memorandum by the Dutch 
Government of May, 1979, on human rights in foreign policy, which refers to these 
criteria: Nota inzake de Rechten van de Mens in het Buitenlands Beleid [Memorandum 
on the place of human rights in foreign policy], BijL Hand. II 1978179-15571 Nos. 1-2 
p. 65, and also to the replies by the Government to questions from Parliament with 
regard to this Memorandum, Biji. Hand. II 1979/80-15571 No. 5, especially paras. 79, 
80, and 85. 
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rules. Since the transaction is entered into by a Dutch private firm 
the State of the Netherlands could be legally involved only by its acts 
or omissions aiming at permitting, facilitating, abstaining from, or 
preventing the transaction or its implementation. In the present case 
we may conveniently concentrate on the statutory power granted to 
the Government to supervice arms transactions by granting or 
withholding the necessary license. 
It may be said that apart from a few UN-sponsored and 
"bloc-sponsored" arms embargoes, international law does not have 
any effective regulation of the arms-trade in the world. Since Taiwan 
does not fall under any of these limited embargoes, and assuming 
that at present there is no disagreement about the arms character of 
a submarine vessel, the nature of submarine vessels does not, in 
itself, constitute a bar to the delivery. Consequently, the remaining 
questions relate to the unrecognized status of the country of 
destination, the fact that the unrecognized entity is one of the 
contending parties in a "mutual non-recognizing" kind of multi-
system nation, and, finally, the specific legal aspects in the particular 
case of the Netherlands vis-a-vis the PRC and the ROC. 
The unrecognized status of the entity as such appears to be 
irrelevant, and to gain relevance only if looked at in relation to the 
recognized counterpart. Under general international law any recogni-
tion of a new international subject is perfectly lawful as soon as the 
entity to be recognized has fulfilled the requirements for its 
eligibility for recognition. Admittedly, opinions may differ about the 
exact nature of the requirements and about their fulfilment, but 
these uncertainties do not alter the validity of the main thesis. The 
recognition is not unlawful vis-a-vis the de-recognized entity though 
it may be considered an "unfriendly act". After recognition, all 
relations with the newly recognized entity are governed by general 
international law, and as a rule no obstacles would prevent the sale 
of arms to that entity. 
It is generally agreed that instead of express recognition certain 
acts may be considered as implicit recognition. Admittedly, there is 
much doubt and controversy about what amounts to such implicit 
recognition, but there is undoubtedly complete freedom for the 
recognizing State to consider its own acts or transactions, such as the 
sale of weapons, to imply recognition. Finally, we now know of the 
possibility that the third State concerned may not consider "diploma-
tic recognition" to be a requirement for most relations with another 
entity. 
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The specific international law aspects of the submarines transac-
tion involves the dual-system situation of the two contending centers 
of Peking and Taipei and consequently, the question of the Nether-
lands attitude to the legal government of China and the status of 
Taiwan. 
We have already referred to the recognition of the Peking 
Government as the de jure government of China in 1950, the 
subsequent support for the exclusion of the recognized entity from the 
UN and the factual acceptance of the participation of the unrecog-
nizied entity in international relations, followed by the effort to wash 
away the traces of twenty years of policy by laconically referring 
to the 1950 recognition in the 1971 statement in the UN. 
The next milestone on the road of Dutch-Chinese relations 
consisted of the Netherlands-PRe joint communique of May 16, 
1972.98 This communique contained, inter alia, the Dutch reaffirma-
tion "that it recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of 
China as the sole legal Government of China". Finally, we also refer 
to a recent statement of January 29, 1981 made by the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs in Parliament in the course of the "submarine 
debates": "In all my conversations with Chinese diplomats and in the 
conversations of the [Dutch] ambassador in Peking it has been 
emphasized that there has not been any change in the policy of the 
Netherlands which start from the assumption of one China only and 
that this [China] is represented by the Government at Peking", and 
"It also means that officially there are no contacts with the regime at 
Taiwan".99 
These expressions appear to put the Dutch position on the matter 
of the de jure government of the Chinese State, however named, 
beyond any doubt. Yet there remains the following, separate 
question: what, in the Dutch view, does China consist of, and, more 
specifically, what is the status of Taiwan? 
There is no need to repeat at length the various arguments put 
forward in supporting the thesis of the "undetermined status" of 
Taiwan. It follows from the foregoing that in the period since the 
support given to the Indian draft-resolution in the UN General 
98. Joint communiqu~s had by then become the standard form of bilateral 
document allowing for agreements and disagreements on various issues to be 
expressed. It allows more freedom in respect of the formulation of the common purposes 
of the parties than a formal treaty, and besides it otTers the opportunity to also record 
existing disagreements. In short, it may be used to catalogue the state of relations 
between the parties without becoming too explicit. 
99. Hand. II 1980/81, p. 2734, and p. 2735, respectively. 
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Assembly in 1950 the Netherlands did not feel any compelling need 
to express quite unequivocally its stand on the legal status of Taiwan, 
and it preferred to join the Western policy of ambiguity. This attitude 
was not legally reprehensible in every respect, since the Netherlands 
had, after all, not granted any official recognition to the entity nor to 
the ruling government at Taiwan. On the other hand there did not 
occur any compelling factual necessity to express itself unambiguous-
ly vis-a-vis the Peking Government.100 During the parliamentary 
debates on the submarines transaction, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs looked back into history and recalled: "Subsequent [to the 
Dutch recognition of the Peking government] the status of Taiwan 
has been rather ambiguous. By the Peace Treaty [of 1951] Taiwan 
was renounced by Japan and occupied by the so-called Republic of 
China. In fact the future status of Taiwan was not yet decided"101 
(emphasis added). 
The 1972 joint communique, finally, contained the following 
sentence on Taiwan: "The Chinese Government reaffirms that 
Taiwan is a province of the People's Republic of China. The 
Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands respects this stand of 
the Chinese Government ... ". As we know this well-known clause, 
with some variations (takes note, acknowledges, fully understands 
and respects, etc.), occurs in all the joint communiques that have 
ushered in recognition of the Peking Government by many Western 
States and Japan, beginning with Canada in October 1970, and 
including the US-PRC Shanghai Communique of February 1972, the 
Japan-PRC Communique of September 1972, and the more recent 
US-PRC recognition communique of December, 1978. 
The wording implies the striking reluctance of all the States 
concerned to endorse expressly the claim of the recognized govern-
ment of China to full jurisdiction over Taiwan. Among the several 
reasons given for that aversion we mention but two: it would imply 
the freedom of' the Peking Government to use force in bringing the 
island under its control, and: it would imply the risk for the 
population of the island of having the whole socio-economic organiza-
tion of their society changed. The unwillingness indicates that the 
States concerned basically prefer not to see Taiwan coming under the 
100. It should be noted that the Dutch position differed legally from that of the 
United States. The latter did recognize the Taipei-based government as the de jure 
Chinese government, and has never gone as far as considering that government to be a 
government in exile. Consequently, the territorial seat of that government has, it is 
submitted, to be considered Chinese territory. 
101. Hand. II 1980/81, p. 2746. 
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complete legal and factual control of the Peking Government. The 
evident alternative, viz., the recognition of Taiwan as an independent 
international subject, however, is difficult to realize, because the 
prevailing international situation requires reasonable relations with 
the PRC Government, and, from a legal point of view, chiefly because 
those holding authority, and consequently acting as spokesmen for 
the entity of Taiwan, have up till now consistently refused to claim 
an existence for the entity separate and independent from the 
Chinese State. 
Despite the reluctance apparent from the wording of the 
Communiques referred to above the question may be asked, whether 
and to what extent the expressions and clauses used do bona fide 
imply a unilateral commitment not to deny, and consequently not to 
oppose, the Chinese position. Or, in other words: do the expressed 
attitudes constitute acquiescence and estoppel to future contrary 
behavior? While we will not go into the question any further, it 
deserves attention from a legal point of view. So far as the 
Netherlands is concerned reference must be made to the quite explicit 
and unambiguous statement made in Parliament by the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs on January 29, 1981: "One cannot say that the 
Netherlands has not recognized the claim of the People's Republic on 
Taiwan. [What has happened is that] the Netherlands has not 
expressed its opinion on the matter before 1972. [ ... ] We recognize 
one China that includes Taiwan the Government of which has its seat 
at Peking. This means that there are no contacts with the authorities 
at Taipei"102 (emphasis added). 
We must finally turn to the question whether the Netherlands 
must be deemed to have committed a wrongful act against China-as-
represented-by-the-Peking-Government. The premise is that the 
Netherlands has committed itself to consider (and treat) the Peking 
Government as the legal government of the Chinese State, and that it 
has equally committed itself vis-a-vis the Peking Government to 
consider (and treat) Taiwan as part of the Chinese State. The 
Government at Peking, however, considers the factual authorities at 
Taiwan (as part of its de jure territory) to be "rebels", and while it 
allows many relations between Taiwan and the outside world it 
raises insurmountable objections against the delivery of arms to the 
"rebels". While one could possibly argue about such objections it is 
submitted that in the absence of a recognized state of belligerency 
there is fairly general agreement about the right of the legal 
102. Hand. II 1980/81, p. 2747. 
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government vis-a-vis the State which has recognized it as such to 
privileged treatment as compared with "insurgents", i.e., factual 
rulers not recognized as legal authorities by the legal government. 103 
But, even if such privilege were not granted, it is inconceivable that 
third States would be entitled to deliver arms to rival authorities who 
are considered as insurgents by the legally recognized government or, 
to grant express permission for such delivery. It is particularly 
difficult to see how one could avoid drawing conclusions as to the 
wrongful character of a sale of submarines to such rival authorities 
having their "stronghold" on an island, or, of an express permission 
for such a sale. 
The wrongfulness may of course be precluded by various 
cricumstances, the most evident among which is the consent of the 
legitimate government.104 The consent may be granted expressly, but 
it may be asked what acts or behavior should be deemed to be 
considered implicit consent. The question is particularly important in 
the case of U.S.-Chinese relations, where the formal recognition of 
the Peking Government as the de jure government was accompanied 
by the most unorthodox piece of legislation ever enacted in relation to 
non-recognition. I refer, of course, to the American Taiwan Relations 
Act with its purpose of practically undoing all but the verbal 
implications of de-recognition of the Taipei Government. This, taken 
togethet with the fact that the Peking Government did not react 
more vigorously than it did, raises the question whether one could 
draw the conclusion that, legally, Peking has apparently grudgingly 
consented or acquiesced to the contents and promulgation of the Act. 
As we know, the Act provides for, inter alia, the supply of weapons 
although in the 1979 US-PRC communique the United States only 
asserted its intention to maintain "cultural, commercial, and other 
unofficial relations" with the people of Taiwan. In the Dutch case, 
however, there are no indications, either on the Dutch side or on the 
Chinese side, which could possibly be interpreted as consent by 
Peking to the sale of submarines to Taiwan. 
Finally, it may be observed that the Taiwan submarines deal 
shows that even States belonging to the traditional Western world of 
103. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, (1947), p. 230 et seq. 
104. For a definition we borrow from Art. 29, para. 1 of the ILC draft articles on 
State responsibility: "The consent validly given by a State to the commission by 
another State of a specified act not in conformity with an obligation of the latter State 
towards the former State precludes the wrongfulness of the act in relation to that State 
to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent". See Yearbook of 
The International Law Commission (1979), Vol. II, Part II, p. 93. 
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international law may find themselves in a position in which 
economic considerations are considered weightier than legal obliga-
tions, and may act accordingly. 
COMMENTS 
Hungdah Chiu 
In Dr. Ko's analysis of the Dutch submarine sale to the Republic 
of China (ROC) on Taiwan, he reached the conclusion that such a sale 
is contrary to international law. With this I could hardly agree. First, 
Dr. Ko applied the traditional international law rules relating to 
insurgents or rebels to the Chinese case, which is hardly appropriate. 
In the Chinese case, the rebels were originally the Chinese Commun-
ists who rebelled against the ROC government and finally gained 
control over the Chinese mainland in 1949. The legal government -
the ROC government- withdrew to Taiwan in the same year. As a 
matter of fact, until1971, more countries in the world recognized the 
ROC government as the legal government in China than recognized 
the People's Republic of China (PRC). The ROC represented China in 
ali international organizations. After 1970, of course, more countries 
have recognized the PRC than the ROC. However, even today 
there are 23 countries which have continued to recognize the ROC 
government. As far as I know, there has never been such a case in the 
traditional rules of international law concerning a legal government 
and insurgents or rebels. In view of this, the Chinese case is a unique 
one and should not be based on rules applying to insurgents or rebels. 
Second, in establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, 
almost all Western countries carefully used words such as "take 
note," "respect" or "acknowledge" in referring to the PRC's claim to 
Taiwan. None of them used the word "recognize," which clearly 
demonstrates that Western countries did not want to legally recog-
nize the PRC's sovereign claim to Taiwan in order to avoid giving the 
PRC a legal excuse to invade Taiwan or interfere with those 
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countries' economic, cultural and other relations with Taiwan. In the 
1972 Dutch joint communique with the PRC on establishing relations 
at the ambassadorial level, the Dutch asserted that they merely 
"respect" the Chinese stand that "Taiwan is a province of the People's 
Republic of China." In this connection, one should only refer to the 
Japanese formula in treating the Taiwan question in the 1972 Joint 
Communique with the PRC on establishing diplomatic relations. 
Japan stated that it only "fully understands and respects" the PRC's 
claim to Taiwan, and the Japanese government sources indicated 
that Taiwan had not yet been returned to China under that wording.1 
The United States also took a similar position. On January 1, 1979 
(released on December 15, 1978) a U.S. Communique on establishing 
diplomatic relations with the PRC only "acknowledges the Chinese 
position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." 
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs Roger Sullivan told the Taiwan press on December 27, 1978, 
that the United States did not recognize the PRC's sovereign claim to 
Taiwan, in the Joint Communique.2 Since the Dutch government does 
not formally recognize the PRC's claim to Taiwan, there seems to be 
no international law rule which prohibits Dutch private companies' 
sales of submarines or any other items to Taiwan. 
Third, in reference to the question of "estoppel" created by such 
wording as "respect," for the PRC claim to Taiwan, the application of 
1. See "Tokyo Still Asserts Status of Taiwan Is Not Detennined,'' The New York 
Times, November 6, 1972, p. 22. See also J. A. Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, People's 
China and International Law, (Vol. 2, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1974), pp. 1612-1613. 
2. (China Times), December 28, 1978, p. 1, Chung-kuo shih-pao cited in Hungdah 
Chiu, editor, China and the Taiwan Issue, (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 184-185. 
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such a principle should be applied equally to the ROC case. For many 
years the Dutch government supported the United Nations General 
Assembly resolution to consider the ROC as the representative of 
China. Under such circumstances, how can the Dutch government 
now deny that there are legal authorities in Taiwan. Moreover, the 
ROC possesses all four of the essential elements of statehood in 
international law, namely: (1) a defined territory;3 (2) a permanent 
population; (3) a government; and (4) the capacity to enter into 
international relations. According to a well-known authority on 
international law, Hackworth, former Legal Adviser to United States 
Department of State and later a Judge of the International Court of 
Justice, "the existence in fact of a new state or a new government is 
not dependent on its recognition by other states."4 In international 
relations, it is not unusual for countries or governments not 
recognizing each other to engage in various relations, including arm 
sales. 
Finally, the human rights aspect of the submarine deal should 
not be overlooked. Inasmuch as the submarines will be used by the 
people of the ROC to defend their fundamental human rights and 
freedom guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations and 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and not for aggressive 
purposes, the sale can also be justified under the principle of 
international protection of human rights. 
3. Whether the ROC's territorial claim includes the Chinese mainland is not 
legally relevant since countries dealing with each other do not have to recognize each 
other's territorial claim. For instance, the Western countries almost unanimously deny 
Soviet Territorial claims to three Baltic states though they continue to deal with the 
Soviet Union. 
4. See his Digest of International Law, (Vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 161. 
Chapter 5 
THE CASE OF GERMANY 
Gottfried-Karl Kindermann 
In the 1,970 years of its recorded history, Germany has had only 
74 years in which it represented a politically unified, integrated state 
system- the period from 1871 to 1945. This period of unification can 
be subdivided into three systemic phases: the first 47 years falling 
under the period of the Second German Empire created by Bismarck 
and lasting from 1871 to 1918; the second fifteen years being the 
period of the Weimar Republic, spanning from 1918 to 1933; and, 
finally, the twelve years of Hitler's Third Reich from 1933 to 1945. In 
the many centuries before this and in the subsequent era starting 
with the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, 
Germany has represented the almost classical type of multi-system 
nation. 
After 1945, the four Allied occupation powers had no unified 
concept about the long-range future of Germany and Germany was 
divided into four occupation zones that were to exist and be 
maintained until an international peace conference was convened to 
divide the boundaries and address the other problems of Germany. As 
in the case of liberated Korea, the outbreak of the east-west conflict 
prevented the occupying powers from ever creating joint decisions 
and joint strategies for the reconstruction of some form of national 
unity in Germany and in Korea. 
With the emergence of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 
and with Russia's simultaneous establishment of a separate commun-
ist state system in former Central Germany, now East Germany, 
Germany had reverted to the structure and pattern of a multi-system 
nation, in which the divided city and former capital of Berlin was 
given a special legal position of its own. Until1974 the constitutional 
documents of both German states implied that they considered the 
existence of this system, representing only a part of Germany, as a 
transitional condition to be overcome in the future. East Germany's 
constitution of 1968 still mentions in its preamble hopes for the 
"entire Germany nation," and condemns the division of Germany 
caused by American and West German capitalism. 
The German constitution defined its own state system as "a 
socialist state of Germany nationality." These references were deleted 
with the 1974 constitutional changes, effected in East Germany 22 
months after the basic treaty of relations between East and West 
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Germany had gone into force. Prior to that, West Germany main-
tained a claim to its exclusive representation of the entire German 
nation, a claim that was based on the idea that legitimacy should 
have a democratic basis. This was backed up by the so-called Halstein 
Doctrine, by which Germany used its economic power and its political 
and cultural influence throughout the world to threaten other 
countries who wanted to recognize simultaneously both German 
systems with serious consequences if they did so. This was done in 
the assumption that the recognition of two German state systems 
tended to deepen the division of Germany and would work against an 
early reunification. Finally, after twelve years of Nazi totalitarian 
rule, West Germany wanted to do nothing in order to recognize the 
new totalitarian regime that had emerged under the auspices of 
Russia on the soil of East Germany, yet another reason for her claim 
to sol~ representation. 
In 1961, the East Germans began to divide the country 
systematically following a manpower and brainpower drain resulting 
from the attraction to freedom in the FRG. East Germany had no 
way out but to seal its western borders against its own people. A new 
strategy evolved by which West Germany traded the recognition of 
East Germany as a state for an opening of the doors to enable annual 
meetings between millions of Germans from both sides. The new 
theory, in tum, was a sociological and psychological position in 
contrast to an otherwise legal position; the experience of joint 
'German-ness' was more important for the maintenance of Germany 
than the maintenance of a legal position of exclusive West German 
representation for all of Germany. 
Article 4 of the Intra-German Treaty on the basis of relations 
cites that neither of the signatories can represent the other interna-
tionally or act in its name. This has opened the way for diplomatic 
double representations of the German states in foreign countries and 
international organizations such as the United Nations. On the 
· matter of citizenship, West Germany has taken the position that East 
Germans are not foreigners because East Germany is recognized as 
another German state. In a similar way, the two Chinese states do 
not regard citizens from the other Chinese system as foreign 
nationals. According to West German law, diplomatic representatives 
in Third countries have the right and the duty to represent and 
protect the interests of those East German citizens who ask them to 
do so, a position which, although denied by East Germany, is 
respected and practiced by many western states. 
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Key elements of the Intra-German East-West Treaty on the basis 
of relations are as follows: a mutual renunciation of force; inviolabil-
ity of the present frontier and territorial respect; a pledge to develop 
good neighborly relations; an agreement to disagree on the nature of 
the national question; a respect for autonomy of each of the two sides; 
the principle that the jurisdiction of each is confined to its own 
borders; and an explicit agreement to develop and promote coopera-
tion in a number of fields, including economics, science, sports, et al. 
A number of commissions have been formed to deal with these 
and have put these clauses into practice on a much larger scale than 
originally envisaged. Included in this was the establishment of 
millions of person-to-person contacts through travelling and com-
munications. For instance, there is an average of 8,000,000 telephone 
calls between both sides, and in addition to this, special laws were 
created to enable the exchange of permanent missions that are not 
embassies, in light of the West German position that East Germany 
is not a foreign country. Treaties between the two Germanys are not 
regarded as treaties between foreign countries. Furthermore, East 
Germany has become a silent beneficiary of all the advantages that 
have accrued to Germany due to its membership in the European 
Common Market. 
The possible application of the German model depends on the 
presence of the will to apply any of it, and in the case of China, the 
history of the two Chinese parties' existence has demonstrated that if 
there was a will, there was a way. Negotiations always started out on 
a party-to-party level, and the constitutional reality shows the 
tremendous power of parties on each of the two sides. 
Trade, for instance, would be one possibility that does not touch 
upon the claims of sole representation. A number of spheres of 
functional cooperation are feasible, such as intra-Chinese functional 
commissions in such areas as humanitarian concerns and postal 
affairs. As opposed to Korea, China has an area - Hong Kong - in 
which families could and do meet. In these areas, East Germany 
cooperates with West Germany. Thus, on issues of trade and 
functional, non-political cooperation, the German model might be 
applicable. 
With respect to a question on how applicable the German model 
might be in the case of China, in light of population and territorial 
differences my use of the term "trade" was as an "initiation of 
non-political functional exchanges." The emphasis would be more 
psychological than in any economic sense. Furthermore, there might 
be a market attraction in that, being Chinese themselves, the 
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Taiwanese might have a better hand in evaluating Chinese needs 
than do foreigners, and can produce many goods more cheaply. While 
population and territory do stand out as factors, Taiwan has very 
often had about the same, if not sometimes a greater, volume of trade 
than the entire PRC. 
COMMENTS 
Jiirgen Domes 
I agree with most of Dr. Kindermann's address. However, two 
points of slight disagreement must be raised. First, the statement 
that the German nation was unified for 74 of its 1,970-year history is 
questioned since the German state arose from a partition of the 
German nation at the Battle of Koniggratz in 1866. The second 
comment is directed at Dr. Kindermann's reference to the fact that 
meetings between millions of Germans from both entities continue as 
people-to-people relations continue to improve. Though meetings do 
occur, they occur for the most part in East Germany, for East 
Germans can go to West Germany only if they are over 60 years of 
age or if they are Communist cadres on missions. 
In examining intra-German relations since World War II, three 
stages can be differentiated. The first is from 1945 to 1955. This stage 
saw both entities officially aimed at reunification. The GDR had not 
developed the theory of an entirely separate entity. In the next stage, 
1955 to 1969/1970, the GDR insisted upon the separate entity 
doctrine in the context of one nation. The FRG, on the other hand, 
considered itself the sole representative of Germany, and definitely 
aimed at German reunification. From 1969/1970 to the present there 
has developed a factual, though not necessarily a de facto, mutual 
recognition of both systems. 
In the next ten to twenty years the status quo will most likely 
prevail between the two Germany's. East Germany will maintain its 
two nation concept, i.e., a capitalist nation versus a proletarian 
nation, while West Germany will perpetuate the concept of two states 
or systems within one nation. Polls of the last two years show that 
65-71 percent of the West German population still aspires towards 
national reunification and 80 percent of the East Germans (insofar as 
their attitudes can be measured accurately) hold to the same 
aspiration. However, 87 percent of the West Germans do not see 
German reunification as being likely in the foreseeable future. 
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Though continuation of the status quo seems most likely, there 
are the less likely prospects of reunification along either the FRG's 
terms or the GDR's terms. However, it has been put forth by the 
FRG, and was stated most notably by Adenauer, that if the GDR 
could change into a pluralist-system state with competitive elections 
and the guarantee of human and civil rights, the FRG would accept 
the GDR as a separate entity. 
Concerning the two multi-system nations which have not settled 
into a status quo, that is, Korea and China, pluralist-system nations 
have more or less accepted the claim to legitimacy of the Communist 
entity of China. At the same time, pluralist-system nations have also 
accepted the claim of the smaller, less economically and politically 
successful part of Germany. This is an indication of the fact that the 
pluralist-system nations have not held their own position in the 
confrontation. 

Chapter 6 
DIVIDED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
THE CASE OF THE TWO KOREAS 
Nam-Yearl Chai 
Introduction 
It seems trite and yet axiomatic to state that in the post-World 
War II era certain norms of international law have been put to severe 
strain. Even a cursory survey of the literature of international law of 
the period reveals that the old-established nations of the East and 
West, including those of Latin America, as well as those of the newly 
independent Asian and Mrican states, have frequently insisted on 
unilateral interpretations/applications of certain norms in their 
pursuit of vital national interests. To illustrate, norms dealing with 
the seaward jurisdiction of coastal states, high seas fishing, diploma-
tic immunities and privileges, expropriation of foreign-owned invest-
ments and diplomatic recognition - to mention a few - were 
susceptible of extremely parochial interpretations by the nations 
invoking them. 
What is perhaps the most vexing of all to the students of 
international law are the divided nations and their use or abuse of 
the norms pertaining to diplomatic recognition. One of the post-World 
War II anomalies of a stubborn character is the tenacity, teetering on 
obstinacy, with which the divided states of the two Koreas, the two 
Germanys, and the two Chinas have exploited the norms of 
recognition in their unilateral claims to legitimacy. 
The objectives of this study are threefold. First, we shall examine 
the genesis of Korea's partition and the place of the Korean 
Provisional Government. Second, we shall highlight the legitimacy 
issue as advocated by the two Koreas as they relate to diplomatic 
recognition. Third, we shall render some assessment of various 
unification proposals from the standpoint of international law. 
Genesis of the Partition1 
The Korean case is quite unlike that of the German or Chinese 
case. Germany was defeated in the war and the victorious allies 
partitioned the country. China's division is of its own making, i.e., a 
1. For information in this section the following selected sources were consulted: 
Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press 1967); Bong-Youn Choy, Korea: A History CRutland, 
Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1971); Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea: The Politics 
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civil war resulted in the creation of the two rival governments. From 
the standpoint of international law, the Korean case is fraught with 
ambiguities, contradictions and irregularities - especially in so far 
as the genesis of the division was concerned. 
Although many claim that Korea was a conquered belligerent 
state after the Japanese surrender, the fact that there had been a 
Korean government in exile since 1919 which, in December 1941, 
declared war on Japan, would present an argument against this 
assertion. However, the existence of this government was ignored by 
the United States. This fact is all the more confusing when one 
considers the case of Austria which was regarded by the Allied Forces 
as non-belligerent, even though it had been annexed to Germany in 
1938 and did not have a claimant government nor a government in 
exile. 
The Korean Provisional Government, which had its base of 
operation in China between 1919 and 1945, functioned with implied 
de facto recognition from the host country, China/ and the French 
government in exile at London.3 Particularly noteworthy is its 
Legislative Assembly which consisted of representatives from all the 
provinces in Korea, including overseas Korean residents in Manchur-
ia, the Maritime Province of Siberia, and the United States and 
Hawaii. 
The mainstay of financial sources came from the taxes levied on 
the Korean residents abroad, supplemented by the sale of Korean 
Provisional Government bonds. With meager financial resources the 
Provisional Government maintained a modest-size resistance army 
that fought the Japanese invaders in China. A fact of considerable 
of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); Se-Jin Kim, 
Korean Unification: Source Materials with an Introduction (Seoul: Research Center for 
Peace and Unification, 1976); Warren Y. Kim, Chae Mi Hanin Osimnonsa [A 
Fifty-Year History of the Koreans in America] (Reedley, California: Charles Ho Kim, 
1959); Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1963); Edward G. Meade, American Military Govern-
ment in Korea (New York: King's Crown Press, 1951); and Robert T. Oliver, Syngman 
Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 (Seoul: Panmun Book Co., Ltd., 
1978). 
2. In April 1942, the Chinese government proposed to extend an official 
recognition to the Korean Provisional Government but due to U.S. opposition "the 
Chinese government withheld recognition." Soon Sung Cho, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
However, note that J. A. Kim recorded that "the KPG received de facto recognition and 
began to receive financial assistance from the Chinese nationalists." Joungwon A. 
Kim, op. cit., p. 42. 
3. Joungwon A. Kim, ibid., p. 31. 
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importance is that at one time a Korean army unit was deployed 
along the Burmese front in compliance with the Allied request to do 
so! 
To be sure, the U.S. government at no time extended diplomatic 
recognition, de facto or de jure. And yet the U.S. War Department 
was on record to have provided some financial assistance and advice 
to the Provisional Government in China with which to train and 
equip a Korean army of about 500 men.5 Besides, in December 1945, 
shortly after the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the 
Koreans in the United States succeeded in having the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice issue a special proclamation affirming the non-
belligerent status of the Korean residents in Hawaii, which was 
under martial law command.6 What was very memorable for the 
Koreans in America was to see their Korean flag fly at the Los 
Angeles Municipal Hall on Flag Day on August 29, 1942.7 By June 
1943, the municipal authorities of Pittsburgh, Chicago, and St. Louis 
pledged to display the Korean flag on the occasions of displaying the 
flags of those other nations actively opposed to the Axis powers.8 
In spite of all these, when the officials of the KPG in China set 
about to transfer the seat of government back to Korea in October 
1945, the American military occupation authorities in Korea refused 
to allow the return of officials of the KPG as officials. Instead, they 
were directed to return to Korea as private repatriates, much like 
overseas refugees. 
One may question the legal basis of such an act on the part of the 
U.S. military government. Admitting, for the sake of argument, that 
the Americans in Korea were the belligerent occupants, their actions 
are subject to the 1907 Hague "Convention Respecting the Law and 
Customs of War on Law" and its annexes. Article 43 calls for the 
occupation authorities to respect the laws in force in the country, 
unless absolutely prevented.9 This presumes the existence of a 
responsible local government which is capable of enforcing local laws 
in the occupied territory. Upon signing an unconditional surrender in 
September 1945, the officials of the Japanese government and its 
4. The request came from the Allied Command on August 13, 1943. Warren Y. 
Kim, op. cit., p. 513. 
5. Joungwon A. Kim, op. cit., p. 31. 
6. Warren Y. Kim, op. cit., p. 414. 
7. Ibid., p. 420. 
8. Ibid., pp. 423-425. 
9. Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory (Minneapolis: The 
University of Minnesota Press, 1957), pp. 94-100. 
122 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
nationals who lived in Korea were repatriated to Japan. It follows, 
then, that the only local entity that is capable of upholding local 
ordinance, excepting the American military occupants, was the 
Korean Provisional Government. This is so especially because upon 
entering Korea in September 1945, the American military author-
ities declined to recognize the Korean People's Republic, then the 
existing elected local government. 
There is an even more compelling reason why the American 
military government should have been inclined to recognize the 
Korean government in exile. In a sense, the American military 
presence in Korea did not constitute a typical belligerent occupant of 
an enemy territory. The U.S. military came to Korea as friendly 
occupation forces with an avowed goal of liberating the country from 
Japanese bondage as mandated under the terms of the Cairo 
Declaration of 1943. That is precisely why the American occupation 
forces were greeted by the Koreans as "liberators." 
This is not to suggest that the U.S. government was in any way 
obligated, under international law, to recognize the KPG. Recogni-
tion or nonrecognition of a foreign government - especially a 
provisional government- is one which falls exclusively within the 
competence and discretionary power of the government concerned. 
What is suggested here is that had the U.S. military government 
decided to accord recognition to the KPG, the decision to do so would 
have been defensible in point of law and policy. 
An apparent justification for the U.S. military government's 
refusal to grant recognition to the KPG including the Korean 
People's Republic was to allow the Koreans to form a provisional 
government which would receive the broadest support of the Korean 
populace under the supervision of the American military authorities. 
However laudable the idea may have been in principle, the political 
exigencies of the day did not lend itself to the realization of the goal. 
In November 1947 - after two years of trials and tribulations 
following the time when the U.S. government "dumped" the Korean 
question in the lap of the United Nations- the Koreans were still 
without a duly constituted provisional government. 
One wonders what the outcome might have been had the U.S. 
military government urged the Koreans to rally behind the Korean 
Provisional Government - then the world's oldest government in 
exile - as the only legitimate government deserving of popular 
support. Admittedly, an endorcement of such nature would not have 
come about from the State Department, if for no other reason than 
the fact that, as far as Stanley Hornback and Alger Hiss were 
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concerned, Syngman Rhee was persona non grata. But it might not 
have occurred to these and other officials at the State Department 
that their disenchantment with Rhee should not have stood in the 
way of making some accommodation with the Korean government in 
exile. 
One can posit, though one could never prove nor disprove, that 
had the Korean Provisional Government been accorded an aura of 
legitimacy, it could have attracted the broadest support possible 
among the Koreans of the north and south. After all, the Korean 
Provisional Government personified the Samil spirit of 1919, the 
indomitable collective will of the Koreans for independence. Had this 
been the case, such a government could have succeeded in galvaniz-
ing a popular will strong enough not to allow the permanent partition 
of the country. This is not to underestimate the determined will of the 
Soviet occupation forces in the north to try to bring the area under its 
sphere of domination. However it may be, the point is that had the 
U.S. government given the KPG any support at all, the American 
government in the 1980s will not share the odium of having been the 
accessory to partitioning Korea at the 38th parallel line, even 
unwittingly and unintentionally. 
It would not be entirely fair to heap blame on the U.S.govern-
ment. It would be just as well for the Koreans to share the blame, too. 
What is very puzzling is that there was a conspicuous absence of a 
vigorous and concerted opposition, on the part of the Koreans, to 
what the military government did, i.e., to dismiss the Korean 
government in exile in such an unceremonious way.10 Why, one might 
ask, didn't Rhee, the Princeton-educated student of international law, 
dare condemn the action of the U.S. military government? It is an 
irony for someone like Kim Koo, not at all schooled in international 
law, to have urged the Koreans, on occasions, especially in utter 
despair, to boycott the military government and rally around the 
defunct Korean Provisional Government. 
Looking back, one cannot help but feel a deep sense of sorrow 
over the opportunity forfeited so casually. With the historical 
hindsight now available, one may say that the partitioning, at least 
in the initial stage, was the result not so much of shrewdly calculated 
10. Also, it is not very clear as to why the Korean Provisional Government was 
downgraded to become a mere political party at one point. If the change was brought 
about at the dictate of the American Military Government, one may wish to clarify the 
legality or illegality of this point from the standpoint of modem usage under jus 
postliminium. 
124 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN &rumEs SERIES 
strategies brilliantly engineered on the part of the Soviet Union and 
United States as of the lack of premeditated plans - that is, through 
clumsy indifference and sheer human inertia. It hurts even more to 
think that the genesis of a human tragedy of enormous magnitude 
could befall upon the Koreans as well as upon the international 
community so casually. 
In the meantime, the world seemed to care little as to what 
happened to the Korean Provisional Government. Until 1965 few 
could explain whether or not the Republic of Korea, founded in 1948, 
was the successor to the erstwhile government in exile. Many 
believed that Korea as an international person had ceased to exist in 
1910 when it was annexed by Japan. However, the terms of Article II 
of the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations provides "that all treaties or 
agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire 
of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void." 11 
From this we now know that Korea's international person remained 
unadulterated throughout - even though the majority of the 
members of the world community had once paid but little attention to 
the Korean Provisional Government which was hung precariously in 
legal limbo between 1919 and 1948. 
Rivalry for Legitimacy: Diplomatic Recognition Games12 
Upon achieving independent statehood in August 1948, South 
Korea declared to the world that it was the sole legitimate 
11. Shigeru Oda, "The Normalization of Relations Between Japan and The 
Republic of Korea," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 61 (January 1967), p. 
40. 
12. For information in this section the following selected sources were consulted: 
C. Y. Choi, "Korea: Security and Strategic Issues," Asian Survey, Vol. 20 (November 
1980); Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1975); James Crawford, The Credtion of States in International Law 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1979); Ingrid Delupis, International Law and the 
Independent State (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 1974); Leon Gordenker, The 
United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 
1959); M. T. Haggard, "North Korea's International Position," Asian Survey, Vol. 5 
(August 1965); A Handbook of Korea (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 
Ministry of Culture and Information, 1979); Gregory Henderson, et al., Divided Nations 
in a Divided World (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1974); J. H. Herz, "Korea and 
Germany as Divided Nations: The Systemic Impact," Asian Survey, Vol. 15 (November 
1975); C. Kim, "Korea's Diplomacy Toward Africa," Orbis, Vol. 11 (Fall 1967); Kim II 
Sung, For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea, revised edition (New York: 
Guardian Associates, Inc., 1976); Se..Jin Kim, op. cit.; Young C. Kim, "North Korea, 
1979: National Unification and Economic Development," Asian Survey, Vol. 20 
(January 1980); Youngnok Kim, "The Conduct of Foreign Affairs," Korean Politics in 
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government which represented the whole of Korea - and North 
Korea did likewise in September 1948. To be sure, it is not at all 
unusual for any political entity, upon entering into the community of 
nations, to proclaim the legitimate character of its own polity. To do 
so is a constitutional question which falls within the competence and 
discretion of the sovereign government concerned. But what is 
unusual, from the standpoint of international law, is for two political 
entities, which emerged as a result of partitioning of what was once 
one and the same political entity, to assert a claim of legitimacy to 
the other half of the political entity. What is even more unusual is for 
each claimant to make acceptance of the legitimate character of its 
state as a precondition for entering into diplomatic relations with 
other members of the world community. This poses an extremely 
vexing international legal question if for no other reason than the 
fact that each claimant is without actual nor even nominal control 
over the other's political domain. 13 
However perplexing and even fictitious such claims of legitimacy 
may appear, both South and North Korea pursued, between 1948 and 
1971, with single-minded determination, the diplomatic recognition 
ploy not even sanctioned under traditional international law. So 
strong and unswerving was South Korea's commitment to upholding 
Transition, Edward R. Wright, ed. (Seattle and London: University of Washington 
Press, 1975); Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Inter-System Detente in Germany and Korea 
(Munche: Tuduv-Verlags-gesellschaft, 1976); Wayne S. Kiyoshaki, North Korea's 
Foreign Relations: The Politics of Accommodation, 1945-75 (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1976); B. C. Koh, "Dilemmas of Korean Reunification," Asian Survey, Vol. 
11 (May 1971); B. C. Koh, "North Korea: A Breakthrough in the Quest for Unity," 
Asian Survey, Vol. 13 (January 1973); B. C. Koh, Inter-Korean Relations: Seoul's 
Perspective," Asian Survey, Vol. 20 (November 1980), B. C. Koh. 
H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge: The University 
Press, 1947); Chong-Sik Lee, "Korea and Troubles in a Divided State," Asian Survey, 
Vol. 5 (January 1965); Robert T. Oliver, op. cit.; Robert A. Scalapino, "The United 
States and Korea: Looking Ahead," The Washington Papers, No. 69 <Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies); Robert 
Simmons, "North Korea: Silver Anniversary," Asian Survey, Vol. 11 (January 1971); 
and South-North Dialogue in Korea (Seoul: International Cultural Society of Korea, 
March 1981). 
13. The rulings coming out of the Eastern Greenland, the Clipperton Island, the 
Palmas Island, and the Minquiers and Ecrehos cases all confirm that as a prerequisite 
of claiming title to sparsely populated or even uninhabited areas the claimant state 
must display its state authority continuously in response to varying degrees of 
competing claims. The two Koreas must not have been unmindful of such legal 
principles. And perhaps their awareness of these legal rulings, in part, might account 
fDr Kim II Sung's often-repeated pledges to "march South," or Rhee's sporadic outbursts 
of "march North." 
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the claim of legitimacy that it went so far as to adopt the so-called 
Korean version of the Hallstein doctrine. Under it South Korea would 
"derecognize" any country which extended diplomatic recognition to 
North Korea while maintaining official relations with the former. In 
1964 and 1965, South Korea severed diplomatic relations with the 
Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) and Mauritania, respectively, for 
their diplomatic "double dealings," as it were. 
Within the first year after the Republic of Korea achieved 
independence, it received diplomatic recognition from as many as 38 
states,!• in contrast to only 10 for the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea during the same period. And throughout the 1950s, South 
Korea was remarkably successful in preventing other members of the 
international community from establishing diplomatic relations with 
North Korea. The only exception is North Vietnam's recognition of 
North Korea in January of 1950. 
By the mid-1960s, however, the situation began to unravel. An 
increasing number of the Third World nations established diplomatic 
relations with North Korea throughout the 1960s and 1970s. And by 
July 1981 South Korea has maintained diplomatic relations with 1i6 
nations, while North Korea has done so with 101. A point of special 
interest is that starting in 1973, when South Korea relaxed the 
Hallstein doctrine, as many as 64 states have established diplomatic 
relations with the two Koreas simultaneouslyY 
Statistics aside, there are two theories concerning diplomatic 
recognition. 16 According to the constitutive theory, a newly emergent 
nation or government acquires international personality only if it is 
recognized by other members of the international community. Under 
the declaratory theory, on the other hand, the mere fact that a state 
exists by performing certain governmental functions is all it needs to 
qualify to be a state; therefore, its status as a state does not depend 
upon recognition emanating from external sources. And yet one must 
hasten to add here that one can invoke either of these two doctrines 
without the fear of being pronounced as heretical or outlandish. 
Quite apparently the foreign policy moves of both Koreas 
between 1948-71 and beyond were dictated by the constitutive theory. 
The fact that the two Koreas attached such an inordinate degree of 
importance to securing diplomatic recognition from other members of 
the world community speaks for itself. Both Koreas could have just as 
14. Gregory Henderson, op. cit., p. 53. 
15. "The Korean Question: Facts and Perspectives," Permanent Observer Mission 
to the United Nations, Republic of Korea, Special Series 4 (July 6, 1981), p. 49. 
16. See James Crawford, op. cit., p. 25. 
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well espoused the declaratory theory; and they both could have 
insisted on its legitimacy independently of external approval or 
disapproval. Given the political exigencies of cold war days, however, 
the two Koreas could have ill afforded to become so irreverent of the 
doctrinal niceties of the constitutive theory. That is, each side could 
not have shirked from extolling its own virtues to the point of making 
the other side look like an international outlaw. 
But what is puzzling is the question as to why so many members 
of the world community had acquiesced in playing the "recognition 
games" with both Koreas, at least until 1973, the troublesome 
legitimacy clause notwithstanding. Is it not fair, then, to insist that 
the international community as a whole, and not just the two Koreas 
nor the two Germanys, for that matter, is to be castigated for having 
perpetuated the dubiously claimed legitimacy which could have been 
characterized as a legal novelty at best, or a legal perversion at 
worst? 
At any rate, throughout the post-independence era, the issue of 
legitimacy served as a lynchpin which held in place practically all of 
South Korea's foreign policy moves. One ramification of this was for 
South Korea to subordinate all of its foreign policy moves to dovetail 
into this all-consuming question of legitimacy without due regard to 
short-term as well as long-term payoffs. Such a stance resulted in a 
rigidity and inflexibility which in tum resulted in the overemphasis 
on style and form rather than on substance. In essence, the tone and 
style of South Korea's foreign policy sounded, as well as looked, more 
like an ali-or-nothing diplomacy, instead of one finely attuned to a 
variety of contingencies and nuances. One may argue that such a 
blunt and boorish diplomacy served well during the cold war days. 
However, one fallout of that was to make South Korea's foreign 
policy quite vulnerable to outside pressures or even blackmail - not 
to mention apparent contradictions in policies themselves. To illus-
trate, between 1953 and 1959, the Japanese government repatriated 
some 100,000 Koreans residing in Japan to North Korea. To the 
Korear. government, this was like being hit where it hurt the most-
the legitimacy issue! The Rhee government sent the Japanese 
government a note of strong protest in a vain attempt to stave off this 
diplomatic, or rather undiplomatic, humiliation of a devastating 
order. 
What must not be overlooked here is the apparent contradiction 
in South Korea's stance. Earlier in 1953, South Korea insisted on the 
freedom of choice principle whereby some 26,000 Communist Chinese 
and North Korean POW's were released prior to the signing of the 
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1953 Armistice Agreement. The Rhee government did just that in 
spite of the fact that Articles 118 and 7 of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention enjoined the belligerent parties to release and repatriate 
POW's without delay and that the POWs' right to repatriation is 
unconditional - not allowing them to waive such a right. 17 
South Korea remained unconvinced when told by Japan that the 
Koreans were repatriated to North Korea with due regard to the 
time-honored principle of freedom of choice as to one's national 
allegiance. So inflexible was the foreign policy stance of South Korea 
that it never occurred to the Rhee government officials to simply 
shrug off the whole episode by telling the Japanese government that 
little mattered whether these Koreans were sent back to North or 
South Korea; and that they would fare better in Korea than they 
would in Japan at the mercy of the Japanese authorities. Such a 
nonchalant attitude would have been in keeping with South Korea's 
often-repeated stance that it, after all, speaks for both parts of Korea. 
The Rhee government, hoisted with its own petard, was not able to 
conceive such a flexible stance - let alone articulate some equivoca-
tion just to blunt hurt feelings. 
All considered, the legitimacy issue has become an academic 
question for both Koreas in law and fact; and that no amount of 
bullying on the part of either government is likely to undo what the 
inexorable reality has wrought upon them. To bicker about the 
legitimacy question further in the 1980's would be like indulging in a 
sterile exercise in futility. This ushers us into the examination of the 
future role of international law in trying to bring the two Koreas 
together. 
Legal Analysis of the Unification Proposals'8 
As a prelude to keeping inter-Korea parleying on the right track, 
the two Koreas would do well to agree to treat the legitimacy issue in 
a practical and sensible way. One approach is for both parties to 
agree on a disclaimer much like the two Germanys did in 1973.19 It is 
to be understood, however, that the net result of the German 
disclaimer is more like a formal acknowledgment of the existence of 
17. Jaro Mayda, "Korean Repatriation Problem and International Law," American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 47 (July 1953), pp. 426-428. 
18. See note 12, supra, for some relevant information contained in this section. 
19. See Document G10, "Treaty on the Basis of Relations between The Federal 
Republic of Germany and The German Democratic Republic," in Gottfried-Karl 
Kindermann, op. cit., pp. 248-250. 
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the two separate states both of which are enjoined from claiming 
legitimacy over the other. The one that the two Koreas might agree 
upon need not be the same in terms of its wording and intent. The 
Korean disclaimer, if agreed upon, should be of a kind which could 
merely dissuade either side from dealing with the legitimacy issue 
openly. It should be a covenant designed for the two parties to agree 
to leave the disagreeable issue to rest. 
The other approach is to reach a tacit understanding, even 
without a formal statement, not to raise the legitimacy issue through 
the exercise of self-restraint. In this way, once the cantankerous issue 
is mothballed, the emotion-charged atmosphere will dissipate, thus 
setting the stage for constructive parleying. Analogously put, the two 
Koreas should do everything possible to keep the bull out of the 
China shop! 
There is some reason for the two Koreas to cheer about. Unlike 
the two Germanys, the two Koreas seem to be in agreement on one 
point: i.e., the one-nation, one-state, two-government notion. In the 
absence of a positive demurral coming from North Korea concerning 
the notion, we can surmise that the legal position often articulated by 
South Korea passes unchallenged by the former. In fact, this notion of 
two governments within one and the same state turns out to be one of 
the welcome fallouts from the legitimacy syndrome in a sense that 
both sides scrupulously refused to acknowledge the existence of the 
other half as a separate state. In the case of the two Germanys, they 
find themselves unable to retreat from the legal position that they 
both have existed as two separate states since 1973. Prior to 1973 
each was entitled to interpret the legitimacy issue in whatever 
manner their legal penchants dictated. 
Of course, both Koreas' adherence to the notion of one nation, one 
state, and two separate governments is not without some attendant 
problems. Within the context of our discussion the notion of two 
governments within one state conceivably suggests a legal situation 
in which two estranged governments - one of them a breakaway, 
insurgent government - exploring the possibility of being reunited. 
If nothing else, South Korea was ahead of North Korea 
chronologically in proclaiming its independent nationhood. Hence, 
the odium of being the breakaway government logically falls upon 
North Korea. The argument becomes even more convincing if South 
Korea should stress the point that it is the successor state to the 
erstwhile Korean Provisional Government which, in turn, succeeded 
the Yi dynasty Korea upon the death of the Emperor in 1919. There 
is also another factor which militates against any attempt on the part 
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of North Korea to turn the table around. That is, it was North Korea 
which committed an armed aggression upon South Korea. To dwell 
on this point further, one can argue that North Korea subsequently 
acquired the status of belligerency. And then, with the signing of the 
1953 Armistice Agreement, North Korea gained some degree of 
legitimacy, hiding behind the protective shield of what was nothing 
more than a temporary demarcation line which became interna-
tionalized. Granted that South Korea is not a party to the Armistice 
Agreement, the United Nations Command under which South Korea 
fought against North Korea having signed the document on behalf of 
the former. 
Ancillary to the one-nation, one-state, two-government notion, 
there is South Korea's proposal that the two Koreas be admitted into 
the United Nations simultaneously. The proposal was in Park Chung 
Hi's speech of June 23, 1973. However, in the interest of preserving 
the notion of one state and two governments, it would seem unwise 
for South Korea to persist on realizing the idea. 
When and if the two Koreas are admitted into the United 
Nations, the Korean situation will resemble that of the post-1973 
German model. Upon the two Koreas' admission into the U.N., the 
legal fiction of one nation, one state, and two governments which 
they have fortuitously or perhaps inadvertently nurtured thus far 
will no longer be preserved unaltered. Moreover, on practically all 
issues deliberated in the U.N. the two Koreas will find each other at 
opposite poles. A sense of incompatibility will inevitably drive them 
toward the road of antagonism. Oneupmanship in self-righteousness 
often reflected in the U.N. rhetoric may very well serve to lower the 
threshhold of mutual enmity without proportionate gains in the end. 
Fortunately, South Korea's attitude toward the admission ques-
tion has never been so dogmatic and inflexible. Park's proposal has a 
built-in escape clause in that South Korea is ready to support the 
idea of two Koreas' entry into the U.N., provided that doing so will 
not prejudice the chances of achieving the goal of reunification. 
In short, the two Koreas' entry into the U.N. is incongruous with 
South Korea's previously held belief in the one-nation, one-state, 
two-government notion. Moreover, North Korea's adamant refusal to 
respond positively to South Korea's proposal is, in a sense, a blessing 
in disguise. 
It should be added that membership in the U.N. does not 
necessarily imply reciprocal acknowledgment of diplomatic relations. 
In fact, the U.N. members interact within the world body without the 
slightest fear that such interactions might in any way be construed 
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as having acknowledged the legitimate status of those with whom 
they must deal. The relations between Israel and the Arab bloc of 
nations are a case in point. But the same logic will not prevail when 
it comes to the question of whether or not two separate political 
entities could be admitted into the U.N. as one state. 
However tenuous it may appear, the two Koreas would do well to 
keep the myth of one state with two governments rather intact. And 
one only needs to remember that nations for centuries have lived 
with such legal fictions as extraterritorial status of embassies and 
floating portions of a state territory in referring to a nation vessel on 
high seas, or the cannonshot distance, etc. 
Related to the above discussion, North Korea's proposal for the 
formation of Koryo Confederation and its subsequent admission into 
the U.N. as a single political unit calls for a careful examination. On 
surface the proposal appears to be in keeping with the notion of one 
nation, one state, and two governments. Upon scrutiny, however, it 
becomes apparent that the proposal, too, has certain shortcomings. 
To begin with, the Koryo Confederation, as envisaged by North 
Korea, is to be a mere coordinating arm of the sovereign and 
independent Koreas.20 As such, the confederal entity is not bestowed 
with attributes having an international personality of its own; the 
two Koreas remain as sovereign and independent states. Hence, the 
confederal unit falls short of satisfying the admission requirement 
under the U.N. Charter, namely, a sovereign and independent state, 
properly speaking. 
The only way to reconcile this disparity is to bestow upon the 
confederal unit all the attributes of sovereignty normally associated 
with a political entity having an international personality. Herein lie 
legal dilemmas. Should South and North Korea decide to create a 
political entity eligible for U.N. membership on their behalf, then, 
such a political entity will no longer be a confederation; it will be a 
federal union or a merger of two states into one. The United Nations 
has welcomed into its fold such federated or merged pplitical units as 
Malaysia, Tanzania and the United Arab Republic (between 1958 
and 1961); however, no confederal unit has ever been admitted into 
the world body. 
20. Even under North Korea's latest proposal, contained in Kim's address to the 
Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party in October 1980, to establish the Democratic 
Confederal Republic of Koryo, both Koreas are to retain regional autonomy. Young C. 
Kim, "North Korea in 1980: The Son Also Rises," Asian Survey, Vol. 21 (January 
1981). 
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Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that South and North 
Korea forged the Koryo Confederation which possessed the necessary 
qualification to be admitted into the U.N. Let us further assume that 
both Koreas did so without forsaking their attributes of sovereignty. 
Then, the net result would show that there were created not one but 
as many as three separate political entities, each with its own 
international personality. To wit, in the name of preserving oneness 
we ended up having three-some political entities or a "political 
troika." To argue otherwise would be like having one's cake and 
eating it, too. Here again, Seoul's negative response to Pyongyang's 
proposal turns out to be a blessing in disguise. 
At the heart of the unification talks lies the vitally important 
question of U.S. troop presence in South Korea - and what to do 
about it. Understandably, both Koreas attach the highest premium 
to the question of presence/withdrawal of these foreign troops 
on/from Korean soil. So critical is the resolution of this issue to the 
satisfaction of both Koreas that any prospect for the success or failure 
of eventually reunifying the peninsula as one seems to be hinged on 
it. 
Admittedly, the decision as to whether or not the troop with-
drawal should ever take place at all is a political decision of the 
highest order. The decision of such nature will be made within the 
context of political dynamics affecting not only South and North 
Koreas but also the United States, the Soviet Union, China and 
Japan. And yet, once the decision is made to effect troop withdrawal, 
how and when to implement such a decision becomes a matter for 
which international law is best suited. Obviously, the parties must 
sign legal instruments to effect the withdrawal; and the documents 
will detail the manner in which the troop withdrawal will be 
implemented. And it is here that international law comes to play a 
vital role. In other words, international law will provide modality and 
procedural safeguards which could facilitate troop withdrawal itself. 
As is the case with many important transnational issues of our 
days, law and politics are inseparably enmeshed. So is this true with 
the question of reunification of Korea in general and the troop 
withdrawal in particular. Conceptually speaking, were it not for the 
belief that there is an equitable and fair way to realize troop 
withdrawal within the framework of normative imperatives it would 
never be possible for both Koreas to even explore the possibilities of 
reaching a political decision to begin with. In the final analysis, 
therefore, it is the conviction shared by both Koreas that it is 
humanly possible for them to have an honest and fair transaction 
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which will nudge them to reach an agreement. But whether or not 
they could even entertain such convictions also depends, to a signif-
icant degree, on the efficacies of normative restraints. In short, South 
Korea will never be disposed to agree to'the U.S. troop withdrawal 
unless it is convinced that the withdrawal could be effected without 
jeopardizing its security requirements. By the same token, North 
Korea will be disinclined to agree on anything unless it shares the 
conviction that South Korea will fulfill its pledge honestly and 
scrupulously. 
In practical terms, one must remember, the presence of the U.S. 
troops in South Korea was never meant to be an end in itself. In as 
much as the troops were stationed in Korea as a means to achieve 
certain objectives, the troop withdrawal issue must be negotiable if 
there are found some other alternatives which could help achieve the 
same objectives. 
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper to do more than 
sketch a number of broad guidelines. One can, for instance, envisage 
a number of steps involved as a preliminary to achieving U.S. troop 
withdrawal. And at each of these stages pertinent procedural 
safeguards provided under international law must be made to work 
efficaciously. First, a legal instrument needs to be signed between the 
two Koreas broadly pledging against any future use of force against 
each other. And such a non-aggression pact must provide specifically 
and unequivocally, for the inviolability of the existing demilitarized 
zone which separates the two sides. Needless to say, the agreement 
must provide for effective sanctions - sanctions that are instant and 
overwhelming - in the event that violations of the terms of the 
agreement occurs either through negligence or treachery. 
To make the sanctions credible, a sufficient number of interna-
tional forces of disengagement and observation with highly sophisti-
cated detection devices and military wherewithal must be positioned 
in and around the DMZ. The proposed International Disengagement 
and Observer Forces in Korea (INTDAOFINK) should consist of no 
smaller than 100,000 troop contingencies drawn exclusively from the 
Third World Nations forces under the leadership of a Swiss military 
personnel. Care must be exercised to include only those Third World 
Nations that are acceptable to both Koreas. 
Once the inviolability of the DMZ is assured to an acceptable 
level, the U.S. troop withdrawal could commence. Upon completion of 
U.S. troop withdrawal part of the contingents of INTDAOFINK 
should set out to monitor and verify troop reduction to a level of 
100,000 troops in both South and North Koreas' armed forces, as was 
proposed repeatedly by North Korea. 
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Ideally, if both Koreas could police inviolability of the DMZ and 
troop reduction level, it would be wonderful. But to expect the work of 
such delicate nature from the two Koreas would be a tall order, 
indeed! Short of realizing this, a third-party assistance must be 
sought. Third-party involvement need not be regarded as an admis-
sion of failure nor abrogation on the part of the two Koreas to try to 
solve Korean problems by the Koreans themselves. The engagement 
of the third party service of impartial and disinterested people and 
nations is not incongruous with North Korea's often-repeated shib-
boleth of Korean problems for the Koreans. One must make a clear 
distinction between being dictated to by the terms of the outside 
forces and taking advantage of third party help. 
It would seem patently unfair and even an affront to human 
intelligence to admit the impossibility of engaging services of a 
disinterested third party. The world is not so depraved as to be 
utterly devoid of acts of integrity either by people or nations under 
certain prescribed conditions. Placing confidence in the third party 
integrity reflects our mutual concern for fellow human beings. Above 
all, it shows the maturity as well as mutuality or commonality of 
interests of mankind, the bedrock upon which the international 
community of today is founded - however fragile it may be. 
A word must be said about cross-recognition. Cross-recognition is 
politically realistic but legally abusive in that the granting of 
recognition is tied to certain conditions that are not ordinarily found 
in the practices of diplomatic recognition. It is reminiscent of a big 
power joint guaranteeship arrangement over a small state. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, for the two Koreas to explore the avenues of 
reuniting the country decimated into two halves is an imperative 
goal which few other national objectives can rival. Rightly, it is a 
chance, a challenge for all Koreans to demonstrate to the world that 
they are capable not only of fastidiously living up to disparate 
national lifestyles imposed upon them by different ideological 
imperatives, but also of burying the hatchet, the handmaiden of 
protracted ideological strife. 
If both Koreas are to indulge in posturing rather than parleying 
in earnest, there is very little that international law could do to put 
them on the right track. If, on the other hand, both of them are 
genuinely determined to put an end to this tragedy-laden divided 
state of affairs once and for all, then international law promises to 
have a definite role to play. 
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International law, in spite of myriad shortcomings, is still one of 
the best man-made institutions designed to provide a facilitative 
framework of equitable nature - except, of course, when the victor's 
justice prevails at certain parleyings. It is the instrument which both 
Koreas are most likely to tum to in their search for an equitable 
means to ensure a symmetrical distribution of payoffs. 
So long as the two Koreas keep making proposals and counter-
proposals and let the dialogues continue in earnest, there is always a 
lingering hope that international law may be called upon to render 
its traditional role as an "honest broker." But when both sides should 
retreat into frozen silence, then the gap becomes insurmountable; 
and even the "ten thousand" volumes of international law books will 
just lay wayward in utter disuse. 
But we need not despair too much, because even in a situation 
like that there still is a role for it to perform. As Maxwell Cohen once 
remarked, "Law is often a useful plaster to cover the cracks in an 
otherwise divisive social order until time helps fuse the parts socially 
more closely together."21 Meanwhile, it is hoped that international 
law will serve precisely the role of plaster holding the divided Koreas 
together until such time as when the twains may not only meet but 
be fused as one. 
21. See Maxwell Cohen, "From Diversity to Unity: International Law in a Bipolar 
World," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (April 30-May 2, 
1959), p. 102. 
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COMMENTS 
Seung Hwan Kim 
There have been both similar and different experiences among 
divided nations. All the divided nations emerged as an outcome of 
Communist expansionism after World War II. These countries have 
grown up on the basis of two different ideological and political 
systems, western democracy and Communism, mainly under the 
influence of the United States and the Soviet Union. Militarily tied 
with the superpowers, each has had relatively large military 
capabilities. And the potential for destabilization has always existed. 
Nevertheless, the Korean case has been somewhat different from the 
other multi-system nations for several reasons. First, the armistice 
agreement of the Korean War in 1953 still remains in force, and 
therefore the Korean peninsula theoretically is in a state of war. In 
this connection, the degree of hostility between the two Koreas has 
been higher than that of any other divided nations, despite their 
increased contacts since the early 1970s. Second, interests of the four 
major powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan) 
converge upon the Korean peninsula. As a result, the strategic 
reality of the two Koreas has been influenced by the evolution of the 
rivalry among these four powers. Third, diplomatically, the Korean 
case is in some respects different from the other two cases of the 
divided nations - Germany and China. In spite of the fact that South 
and North Korea each claims to be the sole legitimate government 
and does not recognize each other, there are dual recognition and 
representation arrangements for the two Korean governments in over 
60 countries. 
During the past decades, one important instrument for the 
maintenance of the balance of pow(lr on the Korean peninsula was 
the existence of military alliances: the U.S.-ROK mutual defense 
treaty of 1954, and the mutual defense treaties of USSR-DPRK and 
PRC-DPRK in 1961. In accordance with the defense treaty, South 
Korea has closely cooperated with the United States to maintain both 
the international status quo and domestic stability on the peninsula. 
In particular, the presence of American ground troops in South Korea 
has played a role of defense and deterrence against the Communist 
invasion. 
From the legal standpoint, North Korea's treaties with the Soviet 
Union and China provided a more solid degree of commitment than 
one finds in the U.S.-ROK treaty. For instance, article 1 of the 
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USSR-DPRK treaty and article II of the PRC-DPRK treaty stipulate 
immediate military and other actions to assist the other party in the 
event of war. In contrast, the ROK-U.S. defense treaty provides that 
mutual defense action would be taken in case of enemy attack in 
accordance with the "constitutional processes" of the two countries. 
This wording could allow the United States to withdraw its military 
commitment to South Korea if the climate in the U.S. Congress so 
dictated. 
Under the auspices of its military alliances with the two 
Communist giants, Pyongyang has attempted to unify the whole 
peninsula by various means. During the second half of the 1960s, for 
instance, North Korea adopted a militant policy against the South, 
dispatching armed saboteurs and infiltrators across the border. In the 
1970s, however, it shifted its policy to a "peace offensive" against the 
South and the United States, accepting the South Korean proposal for 
South-North dialogue. Pyongyang hoped to undermine the U.S. 
commitment to security in Korea, having perceived the weakness of 
the U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty of 1954 and the new U.S. Asian 
policy under the so-called "Nixon Doctrine." 
From the mid-1970s, the North Korean leadership continuously 
made efforts to hold bilateral talks with the United States, arguing 
that South Korea had neither the intention nor capability to discuss 
questions of peace on the peninsula. The American government 
rejected this offer. Instead, Washington proposed the so-called 
"cross-recognition formula" and "three-way talks" including Seoul, 
which Pyongyang catagorically rejected. 
At the same time, while engaging in its "peace offensive," North 
Korea pursued active diplomatic activities to improve its internation-
al recognition and to isolate the South. The first objective was largely 
successful. North Korea became a permanent observer in the United 
Nations in 1973 and also obtained twelve memberships in interna-
tional organizations by 1980. In addition, its diplomatic relations 
with other countries increased to 102 countries by 1981. 
Throughout the 1970s, South and North Korea attempted to 
work for the reduction of tensions and ultimate reunification of the 
Korean peninsula by peaceful means. Their efforts at dialogue, 
however, were unsuccessful mainly as a result of a failure to 
compromise on major issues. The North demanded an excessive first 
step, proposing three major themes: the end of the arms race; the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea; and confederation of the 
two Koreas. South Korea on the other hand desired a "step-by-step" 
approach: a cultural and economic exchange at the first stage, and 
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political negotiation at the next. The position outlined by South 
Korea has been, in effect, a policy of "two Koreas." 
The unification of the two Koreas is not likely to occur in the 
foreseeable future. The two regimes have conflicting objectives, 
literally, "the same bed with different dreams," and neither makes 
major concessions. In addition, the concentration of the interests of 
outside powers upon Korea further complicates Korean unification. 
In the 1980s, the Pyongyang regime will probably continue its 
"peace offensive" against the South and the United States, while 
continuing to strengthen its economy and defenses. Nevertheless, the 
degree of tension and hostility between South and North Korea does 
not seem likely to decline. The North Koreans have continuously 
expanded their defense capability, and now the stockpile of North 
Korean military equipment surpasses that of the South two-to-four 
times. They are probably waiting for the so-called "decisive moment" 
to achieve their strategic objective and to unify the peninsula under 
the Communist flag. Indeed, a time may come when Pyongyang could 
decide to destabilize the situation on the Korean peninsula by 
increasing cross-border activities. 
Under such circumstances, the strengthening of the economic 
and defense capability of the South and strategic cooperation with its 
allies (including the United States and Japan) will serve to neutralize 
Pyongyang's threat and to maintain stability in the region. 
COMMENTS 
Se Jin Kim 
In analyzing the Korean situation and for the purpose of finding 
a solution to the Korean issue, three major factors must be 
considered: the geopolitical environment in Northeast Asia, inter-
Korean relations in historical perspectives and the legal norms and 
political and moral imperatives that each of the divided halves are 
pursuing. Let me draw a balance sheet of positive and negative forces 
impinging upon the inter-Korean relations, and explain how these 
forces are operating in the Korean peninsula. 
On the negative side of international environment on the Korea 
issue, the regional geopolitical balance or the interest that the four 
powers are pursuing in the Korean peninsula, are based on the 
strategic premise of maintaining the existing status quo or perpetuat-
ing divided halves. On the positive side, there is a looming system of 
cooperation among Japan, China, and the United States against the 
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Soviet Union. Possibly, this system of cooperation could induce north 
Korea into this dominant camp. If North Korea could be lured away 
from the Soviet Union, perhaps this could result in some moderating 
influence in North Korea which, in turn, could create an atmosphere 
of accommodation and flexibility between the two Koreas. 
However, so long as Sino-Soviet conflict persists and North 
Korea skillfully exploits the conflict to her advantage, both the Soviet 
Union and the Peoples Republic of China, out of their strategic 
requirements in the region, must remain closely tied politically and 
militarily with North Korea. 
Secondly, inter-Korean relations can be seen from positive and 
negative realities. On the negative side of the Korean reality, unlike 
Professor Kindermann's example of inter-German relationship, not 
even mail is being exchanged between two Koreas. Indeed, the two 
Koreas, having waged a major war less than thirty years ago, still 
have fundamental psychological problems: lingering mutual animos-
ity and distrust, particularly among families who suffered either 
material or human losses. In addition, there are ideological differ-
ences from which stem systemic differences in political and economic 
sectors. Moreover, there are genuine value differences between the 
two halves, reflected in linguistic expressions, i.e. equality, freedom 
and 'democracy'. On the positive side, however, there are some 60 
countries who have recognized both Koreas, and the two Koreas have 
the legal representation in various international agencies and 
organizations. This reality of legal acceptance of two Koreas by the 
international community could compel the two to hold bilateral 
meetings for the establishment of a new modus vivendi. 
There is a positive and negative reality in the internal politics in 
two Koreas. North Korea has been under the reign of Kim 11-sung 
since 1946 making him the longest power-holder today, while, there 
has been a leadership change in the South. President Chun of the 
Republic of Korea is definitely more flexible and open than Kim 
11-sung on the unification issue, as has been manifested by President 
Chun's January 12 and June 5 announcements to meet with Kim to 
discuss inter-Korean issues. However, the ominous sign of dynastic 
succession from Kim 11-sung to his son, Kim Jung-il, is inherently 
problematic. Junior Kim is known to be far more adventurous and 
reckless than his senior, portending a serious political power struggle 
in the post Kim 11-sung era. 
Thirdly, with regard to the issue of political imperatives or legal 
norms, the North Korean basic policy toward the South has been 
predicated on the notion of national "liberation". Regarding this 
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unification policy as its supreme and absolute political imperative, 
the North Korean leadership has been obsessed with unification issue 
totally oblivious of the existing politico-economic realities in the 
Koreas- the argument being that unification will be followed b.y peace 
_and the erasure of any remaining problems thereafter. In the south, 
however, the approach has been one of peace through mutual 
renunciation of force, and with that creation of a peaceful atmos-
phere, unification would become feasible. More technically, North 
Korea has been advocating confederalism for the resolution of the 
Korean issue, while totally disregarding systemic, ideological and 
value differences of two Koreas. North Korea, in fact, has been using 
the unification issue as a political ploy rather than making an 
earnest effort to create some kind workable framework whereby 
unification could be possible. In short, it is a question of a top-down 
system whereby all problems would be solved upon the creation of a 
confederation or federation. South Korea's approach, on the other 
hand, is a 'bottom up' or incremental approach, calling for simple 
issues to be solved first, such as opening channel of communication, 
forming a joint sports teams, starting bilateral trade and the like. 
through these types of contacts, particularly in non-political and 
non-controversial areas, the two Koreas could restore mutual trust 
and confidence with which more serious political interactions could 
be realized. 
In conclusion, given all those regional and local forces militating 
against the resolution of the Korean issue, present status quo is 
likely to last for some years to come. In the meantime, North Korea is 
being urged to accept the South Korean proposals to resume the 
dialogue hitherto stalemated by North Korean obscurantism. 
Chapter 7 
TAIWAN'S INTERNATIONAL STATUS 
Ralph N. Clough 
Taiwan's international status is unique. It differs from that of 
the other divided countries, Germany and Korea. Those states were 
divided by international agreement between outside powers, while 
China was divided by an unfinished civil war. The greatest difference 
from other divided countries, however, lies in the diminutive size of 
Taiwan compared to the rest of China. Each of the smaller parts of 
the divided states has about the same population, around 18 million, 
and each has long operated as an independent state with all the 
attributes normally possessed by independent states. Each is larger 
than two-thirds of the states belonging to the United Nations. But 
East Germany has nearly one-third the population of West Germany 
and North Korea has almost one-half the population of South Korea, 
while Taiwan has less than one-fiftieth the population of the People's 
Republic of China (PRC). 
Among the divided countries, only the PRC has had enough 
political clout to prevent other nations from establishing diplomatic 
relations with both parts of the divided state. West Germany and 
South Korea long ago abandoned their efforts to force others to choose 
between Bonn and East Berlin, Seoul and Pyongyang. Scores of 
countries now have established diplomatic relations with both parts 
of Germany and Korea. But the PRC's enormous size, its importance 
in world affairs, and its control of the vast majority of the Chinese 
people has enabled it to enforce the stipulation that countries 
wanting diplomatic relations with the PRC cannot maintain such 
relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Forced to 
choose, most countries, many reluctantly, have chosen Peking over 
Taipei. 
In terms of formal diplomatic relations, the status of the ROC 
declined greatly after its expulsion from the United Nations in 
October 1971. At that time the number of countries maintaining 
relations with Peking and Taipei was about equal. Less than two 
years later, in February 1973, only 39 countries still maintained 
relations with the ROC, while 85 had relations with Peking. Today 
only 23 countries have diplomatic relations with the ROC compared 
to 122 with the PRC. Following its expulsion from the United 
Nations, the ROC also lost its place in almost all intergovernmental 
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organizations, including (in 1980) the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. Even private organizations in Taiwan have 
been excluded from a large number of non-governmental internation-
al organizations as the result of PRC pressures. 
Despite its loss of diplomatic links with most nations and its 
exclusion from international organizations, Taiwan has prospered 
and has developed unorthodox ways of dealing with the rest of the 
world. 'J'his paper will discuss its techniques for survival, especially 
its relations with its most important partners, the United States and 
Japan since January 1, 1979 when the United States shifted its 
diplomatic relations from Taipei to Peking. Because Taiwan's rela-
tions with the rest of the world depend in large part on the attitudes 
of Taipei and Peking toward each other, the paper will first look at 
the positions and policies adopted by the governments in these two 
capitals. 
The "One-China" Principle 
Peking and Taipei have followed separate and divergent roads 
for over thirty years, but both insist that China is one and that 
Taiwan is a province of China. It is one of the few points that they 
agree on. 
The PRC insists that foreign governments recognize it as the sole 
legitimate government of China and refuses ~iplomatic relations to 
any government that maintains official relations with Taiwan. It 
refuses to participate in any intergovernmental organization to which 
the ROC belongs. Its goal is to incorporate Taiwan again into China 
and it refuses to renounce the possible use of force to accomplish this 
objective. 
The government of the ROC also rejects the "two-China" or 
"one-China, one-Taiwan" concept, holding that it is the authentic 
representative of all the people of China. It preserves the constitution 
and governmental structure transferred to Taiwan from the main-
land in 1949 and, to the extent possible with mortals, maintains in 
office those elected to national government bodies on the mainland 
before 1949. The ruling party in Taiwan, the Kuomintang, continues 
to affirm its commitment to final victory in the unfinished civil war, 
to be accomplished 70 per cent by political means and 30 per cent by 
military means. 
The leaders in Peking and Taipei have compelling reasons for 
maintaining the one-China position. For the PRC Taiwan is a piece of 
terra irredenta, a part of China for centuries; it was wrested away 
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briefly by the Japanese and returned to China by agreement among 
the allied leaders at the end of World War II. Any Chinese leader who 
assented to the permanent separation of Taiwan from China would 
risk being swept away by the powerful force of Chinese nationalism. 
Moreover, the rival government in Taiwan, while comparatively 
small and weak, is a potential political threat to PRC leaders, 
especially since it has been more successful in modernizing than the 
PRC has been. Taiwan, allied with a superpower hostile to China, 
could also be a strategic threat. 
The legitimacy of the national government in Taiwan rests on 
the contention that it is the constitutional successor of the govern-
ment that ruled the mainland before 1949. The justification for the 
dominant role of people from the mainland in that government is that 
it represents all of China; that justification would disappear if the 
government reduced its claim to one of representing only the people 
of Taiwan. There is an additional practical reason for the ROC to 
maintain the one-China position: a declaration of independence from 
China would be highly provocative to the leaders in Peking, 
increasing the risk that they would be impelled to use force to bring 
Taiwan under their control. 
Both the PRC and the ROC regard the offshore islands, the only 
pieces of territory still under ROC control that were in the past 
administratively attached to the mainland rather than Taiwan, as 
vital links between Taiwan and the mainland. They are symbols of 
national unity. Consequently, the PRC has not attempted since 1958 
to interdict resupply of the offshores by the ROC; on the contrary, 
alarmed by rising international support for cutting the link between 
Taiwan and the offshore islands, Foreign Minister Chen Yi told 
foreign diplomats in Peking in December 1958 that the PRC's policy 
was either to liberate all the offshore islands, Penghu and Taiwan 
together, or to preserve the status quo. 1 
While both sides have maintained principled one-China posi-
tions, they have made concessions in practice when compelled to by 
political realities, especially in connection with their relations with 
the United States. For example, the PRC agreed in 1973, as a 
temporary measure, to the establishment of liaison offices in Peking 
and Washington, a form of diplomatic relations, despite the existence 
of full diplomatic relations between Washington and Taipei. As for 
the ROC, the closer the United States came to normalizing relations 
1. M. H. Halperin, The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History (Santa 
Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1966) processed, pp. 475, 483. 
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with the PRC, the more willing the government of the ROC became 
to tolerate the so-called "German solution", in which the United 
States would have full diplomatic relations with both Peking and 
Taipei. The Carter administration's commitment to maintain only 
unofficial relations with Taiwan virtually destroyed hope for such an 
arrangement, but the hope was revived by candidate Reagan's 
statement in August 1980 that he favored official relations with 
Taiwan. 
The year 1979 marked the greatest shift in the relative fortunes 
of the PRC and the ROC since 1950, when the United States 
abandoned its hands-off policy and intervened to prevent a military 
assault on Taiwan. The replacement of the ROC by the PRC in the 
United Nations in 1971 and the U.S. decision to develop relations 
with the PRC were heavy blows. The termination of official U.S. 
relations with the ROC in 1979, the ending of the security treaty, and 
the recognition of the PRC by the United States as the sole legitimate 
government of China were even more damaging. These actions 
appeared to remove the principal obstacles to the incorporation of 
Taiwan into the PRC. 
Despite the blow to the prestige of the ROC caused by the 
American actions, the authorities in Taiwan held out firmly against 
submitting to Peking's control. For a variety of reasons, the PRC was 
not in a position to compel submission. It lacked the military 
capability to assure success in a costly and risky amphibious attack 
across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait. To build such a force would 
divert large amounts of resources critically needed for the urgent 
task of modernizing the country. Moreover, the United States had 
made clear in the Taiwan Relations Act that it would be gravely 
concerned by any attempt to subdue Taiwan by force. The PRC could 
not foresee how and to what extent the United States might 
intervene to frustrate such an attempt. The United States continued 
to supply substantial amounts of weapons for the defense of the 
island. The use of force against Taiwan by the PRC would shatter the 
expanding web of relations with the United States and Japan on 
which it relied heavily for modernization and for political support 
against the Soviet Union. 
Making a virtue of necessity, the PRC adopted a conciliatory 
policy toward Taiwan following the normalization of relations with 
the United States. It promptly announced a halt in the odd-day 
shelling of the offshore islands that had continued since the early 
1960s in the form of shells containing propaganda leaflets. The 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued an 
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appeal to "compatriots in Taiwan" calling for talks between the 
government of the PRC and "the Taiwan authorities" to end the 
military confrontation along the Taiwan Strait. The statement 
offered assurances that reunification would be carried out carefully 
"so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses." It urged the 
early establishment of postal and transportation services and trade 
between Taiwan and the mainland.2 In early January 1979 Deng 
Xiaoping told a group of visiting U.S. senators that an integrated 
Taiwan would be fully autonomous, retaining its existing social and 
economic system and even its armed forces. It would, however, have 
to acknowledge PRC sovereignty over Taiwan and haul down the 
ROC flag. Deng said that force would be used against Taiwan only if 
the Soviet Union interfered there or if the Taiwan authorities refused 
indefinitely to enter into negotiations on reunification.3 
For the past two and one-half years the PRC has maintained the 
basic position toward Taiwan enunciated in January 1979. PRC 
media have issued a steady stream of articles and statements aimed 
at encouraging unification sentiment among the people of Taiwan. 
These describe the growing trade between Taiwan and the mainland 
and the popularity of Taiwan-made TV sets, tape-recorders and 
electric fans among the people of mainland China. They report 
cordial conversations between scientists, writers, and university 
professors from Taiwan and the mainland when they meet abroad 
and the special treatment accorded athletes of Taiwan origin from 
Japan and the United States when they visit the mainland. Mainland 
TV has shown a documentary on life in Taiwan. According to Peking 
radio, special reception centers have been established for fishermen 
from Taiwan forced by need for repairs or approaching typhoons to 
seek shelter in mainland ports. 200 boats and over 1000 fishermen 
were said to have been received in Fujian province alone during 1979 
and 1980.4 The People's Literature Publishing House published a 
selection of fiction by Taiwan authors; the first printing of 100,000 
copies was quickly sold out. The publishing house promised royalties 
to the Taiwan writers and invited them to submit original manu-
scripts for publication. 5 
The Taiwan authorities regard the PRC's conciliatory posture as 
a united front tactic aimed at undermining resistance on Taiwan to a 
2. Beijing Review, No. 1, January 5, 1979, pp. 16-17. 
3. New York Times, January 10, 1979. 
4. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, People's Republic of 
China, January 6, 1981, p. K-1. tHereinafter cited as FBISl. 
5. FBIS, August 14, 1980, p. K-1. 
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takeover by Peking. They continue to reject flatly PRC proposals to 
negotiate, to open direct trade, or to establish postal, shipping, or 
airline connections. The manifesto of the 12th National Congress of 
the Kuomintang in March-April, 1981 reiterated the KMT's unyield-
ing anti-Communist position and declared its determination to unify 
China under Sun Yat-sen's three principles of the people. The 
manifesto warned: "We know that to talk peace with the enemy 
amounts to inviting our own collapse and that to compromise with 
the enemy is the same as destroying ourselves."6 
Despite the firm opposition of the Taiwan authorities to opening 
direct links with the PRC, they have tolerated a growing indirect 
trade between Taiwan and the mainland, which probably exceeded 
$300 million in 1980.7 They also permit scientists and others from 
Taiwan to §it down with their counterparts at international meetings 
and even encourage fraternization between students from Taiwan 
studying abroad and PRC students. The Chinese crew of a German-
registered freighter that docked at Keelung was given a conducted 
tour of Taipei and a table tennis team from the mainland whose 
plane had been diverted because of weatyer conditions to Taoyuan 
airport for a few hours was courteously received. Thus, contact and 
communication between individuals in Taiwan and the PRC is slowly 
increasing, despite the fear of Chinese Communist united front 
operations harbored by the Taiwan authorities. 
The United States continues to be the principal target of the 
foreign policies pursued by Taipei and Peking: the rivalry between 
them in this regard has intensified since the advent of the Reagan 
administration. Taipei, encouraged by Reagan's August 1980 cam-
paign statements, presses hard for a greater degree of "officiality" in 
relations with the United States and seeks more advanced arms for 
its defense. The PRC repeats its view that the Taiwan Relations Act 
conflicts with the joint communique on normalization of relations and 
reminds Americans that it never agreed to arms sales to Taiwan. The 
Reagan administration has responded cautiously to these opposing 
pressures, seeking to develop further relations with the PRC, which it 
regards as very important for geopolitical reasons, while at the same 
time adopting a somewhat more cordial style than the Carter 
administration did in conducting unofficial relations with Taiwan. 
The politically explosive decision on whether to sell high performance 
aircraft to Taiwan has been deferred for the time being. 
6. FBIS, April 9, 1981, p. V-3. 
7. American Institute in Taiwan, Taiwan: Economic Relations in 1980 (undated) 
p. 9. 
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Substantive Relations- 1971-1980 
Taiwan's ability not only to survive in the face of PRC pressures, 
but to prosper, is dramatically demonstrated by the expansion of the 
island's international economic relations since the expulsion of the 
ROC from the United Nations. Two-way trade with the rest of the 
world increased ten-fold, from $3.9 billion in 1971 to $39.5 billion in 
the 1980s.8 Within this total, trade with Taiwan's principal trading 
partner, the United States, jumped from $1.3 billion to $11.6 billion 
and that with Japan from $1 billion to $7.6 billion. All this trade is 
carried on almost entirely without the benefit of diplomatic relations; 
the only significant trading partners with which Taiwan still has 
diplomatic relations are Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and South 
Africa. 
In recent years, especially since the severance of diplomatic 
relations with the United States, the economic decision-makers in 
Taiwan have emphasized trade with Western Europe, partly in order 
to diversify Taiwan's trading pattern, but also in order to raise its 
visibility among Europeans and buildpolitical support over the long 
run. Consequently, trade with Western Europe has increased at a 
faster rate than overall trade, from $400 million in 1971 to $5.3 
billion in 1980. The EEC countries in 1980 became Taiwan's second 
largest export market, surpassing Japan. 
The latest effort to diversify and boost trade occurred in 
November 1979 when the government removed the ban on direct 
trade with five East European states: Yugoslavia, East Germany, 
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Businessmen from Taiwan are 
allowed to visit these countries and East Europeans are admitted to 
Taiwan for trade purposes. Taiwan businessmen have now been to 
Poland, Hungary and East Germany. Taiwan organizations exhibited 
the island's products during 1980 at the Leipzig trade fair and at the 
National Agriculture and Food Show in Budapest. A textile trade 
mission participated in a garment show in Budapest in January 1981 
and a Hungarian textile purchasing mission was scheduled to visit 
Taiwan in March-April 1981. Although diri!ct trade with the Soviet 
Union, Romania, Albania and Bulgaria is still forbidden, trade with 
these destinations through third countries is permitted. Premier Y. S. 
Sun announced that trade with Eastern Europe exceeded $70 million 
in 1980.9 
B. Unless otherwise indicated, statistical data is from the AIT report referred to 
in Note 7, supra, or from: Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1980 (Taipei: Council on 
Economic Planning and Development, 1980>. 
9. Taipei: Sunday Times Chinese Weekly, February 15, 1981, p. 3. 
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Foreign companies and banks continue to regard Taiwan as a 
desirable place to lend and invest. Real economic growth has 
averaged 8 per cent annually since 1971, despite a decline of 2 per 
cent in the recession year 1974 brought on by the spurt in oil prices. 
Taiwan's long-term foreign debt is only $5 billion, its foreign 
exchange reserves about the same amount, and its debt-service ratio 
is 6.3 per cent, extraordinarily low for a developing country. Because 
of Taiwan's established record of economic performance, there was no 
slackening in foreign and overseas Chinese direct investment after 
1971. The amount of approved investment never fell below $100 
million annually. It hit a record high of $329 million in 1979 and 
surged to $466 million in 1980. 
Foreign confidence in Taiwan's economy is perhaps best illus-
trated by the accelerating rush of foreign banks, particularly 
European banks, to open branches in Taiwan. During 1980 alone, 
eight banks, five of them European, 10 opened branches in Taipei. 
American banks there now number thirteen, up from eight in 1976, 
and the total number of foreign banks in Taiwan as of early 1981 was 
23. More are standing in line, awaiting approval. 
Taiwan's banks are also expanding their activities abroad. The 
International Commercial Bank of China, which has had branches or 
offices for some time in Chicago, New York, Tokyo, Osaka, Bangkok, 
Panama and Saudi Arabia, opened a branch in Houston in 1981 and 
is planning to open branches in Europe. The First Commercial Bank, 
which has branches in Guam and Singapore, has announced that it 
will open a branch in London in 1981. The International Commercial 
Bank issued $20 million worth of floating rate certificates in 1980 in 
Europe and the Bank of Communications followed suit with an issue 
of $25 million. The Bank of Taiwan has also announced its intention 
to raise funds in the Eurodollar market. 
Taiwan has had no difficulty in continuing to secure loans from 
abroad. The aggregate amount of all major loans ($1.5 million or 
over) received during the period January through November 1980 
exceeded $1.2 billion. This included loans from the U.S. Export-
Import Bank ($404 million), American private banks ($308 million), 
European banks ($327 million), the Japanese Export-Import Bank 
($19 million) and Japanese firms ($30 million). Although Taiwan 
10. These were: Grindlays Bank Ltd. CUKJ, Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas and 
Societe General (France), European Asian Bank (W. Germany!, and Hollandische 
Bank-Unie (Netherlands). Lloyds International (UK) opened early in 1981. Taiwan: 
Economic Relations in 1980, p. 10; Far Eastern Economic Reuiew, Mar. 27, 1981, pp. 
72-77. 
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depends primarily on domestic capital for its investment needs, 
Taiwan's policy-makers expect that more foreign capital will be 
required in order to expand capital intensive, high technology 
industry. Taiwan has received no new loans from the World Bank or 
the Asian Development Bank since 1971, but its development has not 
suffered from the lack of such loans, as plenty of funds were available 
from other sources. 
A new trend in Taiwan's foreign economic relations is invest-
ment abroad by Taiwan firms, as a means of securing access to raw 
materials or access to foreign markets. For example, Formosa 
Plastics has entered into a joint venture with the Louisiana Chemical 
and Plastics Corporation. The plant, under construction at Point 
Comfort, Texas, will produce petrochemical intermediates, part to be 
shipped to Taiwan, part to be sold elsewhere. Sixty per cent of the 
machinery for the plant is being manufactured in Taiwan. Tatung 
Electric Company has a factory in Long Beach, California producing 
TV sets and electric fans. The Sampo Company has a TV plant under 
construction in Atlanta. The Taiwan Fertilizer Corporation has 
entered into a joint venture to build a $357 million fertilizer plant in 
Saudi Arabia and four Taiwan paper companies are building an 
integrated pulp mill in Australia together with the Australian Paper 
Manufacturers Ltd. 11 
Taiwan is well served by international shipping companies and 
airlines. At least ten airlines and a variety of shipping lines provide 
service to Taiwan. Since early 1980 East European ships have begun 
to make calls in Taiwan, including Polish, Hungarian and Yugoslav 
freighters. Kaohsiung ship breakers bought two East German ships 
for scrap. 
Visitors to Taiwan from abroad more than doubled between 1971 
and 1979, increasing from 540,000 to 1,340,000, despite the dampen-
ing effect of rising air fares on tourist travel throughout East Asia. 
The trend has continued upward, reaching an estimated 1,600,000 in 
1980. 17,000 students from Taiwan were studying at American 
universities, the largest group from any foreign country except Iran. 12 
Construction companies from Taiwan have participated in the 
construction boom in the Middle East. By 1978 some 2000 Chinese 
from Taiwan were in Saudi Arabia building roads, power and water 
systems, fertilizer and sugar plants, and running agricultural 
demonstration projects. Jordan, despite having shifted its diplomatic 
11. New York Times, July 31, 1980; Asian Wall Street Journal, April 13, 1981. 
12. Figure attributed to Institute of International Education, Parade, December 
21, 1980. 
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relations from Taipei to Peking early in 1977, awarded a highway 
construction project to Taiwan's Ret-Ser (retired servicemen) En-
gineering Agency later in the same year. 13 
Washington's termination of the mutual defense treaty with the 
ROC at the end of 1979 caused President Chiang Ching-kuo and his 
associates to doubt whether the United States would continue to 
supply the arms needed for the defense of the island against a 
possible attack by the PRC. Although the United States delivered 
about $800 million in military equipment to Taiwan during calendar 
year 1979 and approved sales of nearly $600 million during fiscal 
year 1980/4 the PRC's public opposition to such sales fed fears that 
the U.S. government might at some future time yield to PRC 
pressures. Consequently, Taipei began to explore the possibility of 
buying arms from other countries. In November 1980 Taiwan's arms 
buyers succeeded in striking a deal with the Netherlands for the 
purchase of two submarines as part of a package arrangement that 
included equipment for a power station. Peking loudly protested the 
deal and declared that relations with the Netherlands would be 
downgraded to the charge d'affaires level if the Dutch went through 
with it. The sale amounted to some $500 million, an attractive offer 
at a time of recession and unemployment in the Dutch shipbuilding 
industry. Consequently, despite vocal opposition in the parliament, 
the Dutch government approved the sale.15 The Dutch ambassador 
left Peking early in March, leaving the mission in the hands of a 
charge. The PRC's strong reaction to the Dutch sale of weapons to 
Taiwan probably was intended as a warning to other countries not to 
follow the Dutch example. 
Unorthodox Substitutes for Diplomatic Relations 
Taiwan's success in expanding relations of all kinds with 
countries throughout the world assured its survival as an indepen-
dent political entity, despite the loss of diplomatic relations with all 
but a handful of nations. To replace lost diplomatic relations, Taiwan 
and its partners devised unorthodox methods of dealing with each 
other, without precedent in international law. The most elaborate of 
these mechanisms was that established by Taiwan and the United 
States, the most important of Taiwan's supporters. 
13. Far Eastern Economic Review, January 6, 1978, p. 49. 
14. Department of State, Review of Relations with Taiwan, Current Policy No. 
190, June 11, 1980, p. 2; figure for FY80 provided by Department of State. 
15. Washington Post, January 17 and February 28, 1981. 
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The relationship between the United States and the Republic of 
China differed from the others in three respects: the United States 
had an obligation to help defend Taiwan; certain treaties and 
agreements between the two governments were important to 
Taiwan's survival; legislation was necessary to permit essential 
relations between the United States and Taiwan to continue on an 
unofficial basis. 
The Taiwan Relations Act, 18 passed by the Congress in March 
1979, dealt with these three matters. The Act declared that any effort 
to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means 
would be considered a threat to peace and security in the Western 
Pacific and of grave concern to the United States. The United States 
would provide Taiwan with defensive arms, the Act stated, and would 
maintain a capacity to resist any form of coercion that would 
jeopardize security or the social and economic system of the people of 
Taiwan. The Act provided that all treaties or agreements between the 
United States and the ROC that existed prior to January 1, 1979 
would continue in force unless expressly terminated. It also stipu-
lated that the laws of the United States would continue to be applied 
to Taiwan in the same manner that they were applied before the 
severance of diplomatic relations. 
The Taiwan Relations Act authorized agencies of the U.S. 
government to conduct relations with Taiwan through the American 
Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a nonprofit corporation incorporated in the 
District of Columbia. The Institute's offices in Washington and Taipei 
are headed by retired senior Foreign Service Officers with long 
experience in Chinese affairs and staffed largely with members of the 
U.S. Foreign Service temporarily separated from government service. 
The government in Taiwan established a counterpart organization, 
the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA), with 
offices in Taipei, Washington, and eight other American cities. It has 
an experienced staff comparable to that of the American Institute in 
Taiwan. An agreement reached in 1980 spells out the privileges and 
immunities accorded to the offices and personnel of the two organiza-
tions to enable them to perform their duties effectively. While 
cumbersome in some respects compared to normal government-to-
government relations, these unofficial offices have effectively carried 
on the diplomatic and consular business that would normally be 
handled by diplomatic missions and consulates. It has been business 
16. For the text of the Taiwan Relations Act, see Hungdah Chiu, ed., China and 
the Taiwan Issue !New York: Praeger, 1979) pp. 266-75. 
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as usual between the United States and Taiwan in substance if not in 
form. 
Next to its relations with the United States, Taiwan's relations 
with Japan are most important. Japan severed diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan in 1972 and negotiated an unofficial arrangement to 
take their place. The Japanese set up an unofficial Interchange 
Association to take care of their interests in Taiwan with an office in 
Tokyo headed by the vice president of the Keidanren (Federation of 
Economic Organizations) and an office in Taipei headed by former 
Japanese ambassador. Both offices were staffed by officials on leave 
from their government agencies, most of them from the Foreign 
Ministry. Taiwan's interests in Japan are looked after by an East 
Asia Relations Association with a head office in Taipei and offices in 
Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, and Fukuoka. Like the Interchange 
Association, it is staffed principally by foreign service personnel 
assigned in a private capacity. While these unofficial offices main-
tained by Japan and Taiwan and their personnel do not receive the 
full range of privileges and immunities accorded foreign diplomats, 
they enjoy sufficiently special treatment to enable them to perform 
effectively the functions of surrogate embassies. This pattern of 
unofficial offices provided the pattern later copied by the United 
States. 
Unlike the United States, Japan had taken no responsibility for 
Taiwan's security. None of the government-to-government agree-
ments between Japan and the Republic. of China was vital to 
Taiwan's survival nor was special legislation required to permit 
substantive relations between Japan and Taiwan to continue with 
little change. Japan has no Taiwan Relations Act; it was able to 
ensure continuation of the relationship through changes in adminis-
trative regulations. 
The shift from formal diplomatic relations to unofficial relations 
resulted in one serious problem between Tokyo and Taipei: the 
suspension of flights by their national airlines between the two 
countries for more than a year in 1974-75. Slighting references by 
Foreign Minister Ohira to the national flag of the Republic of China 
made in announcing the conclusion of an aviation agreement with 
the PRC were regarded by the government in Taiwan as an affront to 
national dignity performed by the Japanese official in response to 
PRC pressures. Taipei immediately ordered all flights between Japan 
and Taiwan by the two airlines suspended. Long drawn-out negotia-
tions between the Interchange Association and the East Asia 
Relations Association eventually brought about resumption of flights 
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by China Airlines and a Japan Air Lines subsidiary, Japan Asia 
Airways. 
Aside from the aviation contretemps, caused by miscalculation 
by politicians and officials of both countries, relations between 
Taiwan and Japan have proceeded smoothly in their new unofficial 
mode. Trade, travel and investment all have grown at a brisk pace.17 
No other country has established a substitute for a diplomatic 
mission in Taiwan as large or elaborate as those maintained by the 
United States and Japan. But 15 countries have unofficial offices in 
Taipei and the number is increasing year by year. (For a current list, 
see Annex.) Such offices promote trade, further cultural exchange, 
and facilitate the issuance of visas to travellers from Taiwan. For 
example, the Taipei offices of the Anglo-Taiwan Trade Committee 
and the Netherlands Council for Trade Promotion concentrate on 
promoting trade, while the Cervantes Association and the German 
Cultural Center concern themselves with cultural exchange. These 
unofficial offices have devised a variety of ways to provide visas to 
applicants in Taiwan. The Japanese Interchange Association receives 
visa applications and three days later provides visas bearing the 
stamp of the Japanese Consulate General in Hong Kong. The Belgian 
Trade Association telexes visa applications to the Ministry of Justice 
in Brussels and usually receives a return telex within two days. On 
arrival in Belgium, the traveller presents a copy of the telex and 
receives his visa. The Greek trade office follows a similar practice.18 
Malaysian Airlines and Thai International Airways provide visas to 
travellers wishing to visit those countries. Experienced officials 
acting in a private capacity often head the unofficial offices in Taipei. 
For example, the Austrian trade office, opened in January 1981, is 
headed by an Austrian trade official formerly stationed in Singapore. 
Taiwan has opened a large number of offices abroad to perform 
the functions formerly handled by diplomatic and consular offices. 
The principal network consists of the overseas offices of the China 
External Trade Development Council (CETDC), a non-profit, private 
organization supported by both business and government. Its 48 
offices go by a variety of names: the Oficina Comercial de Taiwan 
(Buenos Aires), the CETDC Correspondent in Sydney (Sydney, 
Australia), the Far East Trade Service, Inc. (Brussels), the Taiwan 
Trade Service (Duesseldorf). In addition to providing services to 
individual businesses, the CETDC presents exhibits of Taiwan 
17. For a more detailed analysis of Japan-Taiwan relations after 1972, see Ralph N. 
Clough, Island China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978) Chapter 7. 
18. Asian Wall Street Journal (Weekly edition) March 30, 1981, p. 18. 
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products at its exhibition hall in Taipei, organizes overseas trade 
missions, and participates in international trade fairs. 
The Central News Agency (CNA), originally a KMT publicity 
organ but reorganized as a private corporation in 1973, maintains a 
worldwide network of correspondents. Through these overseas offices 
and news exchange agreements with thirteen foreign news agencies 
Taiwan gathers and disseminates information throughout the news 
circulation system of the non-communist world. Efforts by the PRC to 
limit the activites of the CNA have had little success. 
Taiwan also maintains a number of information and cultural 
centers throughout the world, such as the Sun Yat-sen Center in 
Madrid. Through invitations extended by the Pacific Cultural 
Foundation, the Institute of International Relations, and other 
nongovernmental organizations, Taiwan invites large numbers of 
influential persons from many countries to visit the island. Organiza-
tions abroad, such as the Australia-Free China Society or the Friends 
of Free China in the United States strengthen the links between 
Taiwan and friendly countries. The USA-ROC Economic Council, to 
which many leading American companies belong, promotes trade and 
investment between the United States and Taiwan. 
Lack of diplomatic and consular relations with most countries of 
the world does handicap Taiwan in certain ways. Its officials must 
travel on ordinary passports; their travel is sometimes delayed 
because they fail to receive the treatment that would be accorded to 
holders of official or diplomatic passports. They lack the ready access 
to foreign officials that they would receive if officially recognized. 
They have to put up with affronts to national dignity. Agreements on 
aviation rights or quotas on exports to certain countries cannot take 
the usual form of government-to-government agreements, but must 
be negotiated between non-governmental organizations. It is remark-
able how effectively Taiwan has learned to expand the scope of its 
international relations despite these handicaps. 
While the PRC has persistently sought to prevent the ROC from 
maintaining official relations with other countries and tried to 
exclude it from intergovernmental organizations, it has not since 
1979 mounted a campaign to interfere with Taiwan's substantive 
bilateral relations with other countries or with its unofficial mechan-
isms for promoting those relations. It is quick to protest, however, 
any action that seems to raise those mechanisms closer to an official 
status, such as the agreement between the AIT and the CCNAA on 
privileges and immunities. 
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Non-governmental Organizations 
Since the time it was admitted to the United Nations, replacing 
the ROC, the PRC has not only pressed for the exclusion of the ROC 
from intergovernmental organizations, but has also demanded the 
expulsion of private organizations in Taiwan from international 
organizations. It has concentrated particularly on the three pundred 
or more international nongovernmental organizations affilia~ with 
UNESCO. At the eighteenth general conference of UNESCO h1 Paris 
in 1974 the PRC prevailed upon the delegates to pass a resolution 
urging all these organizations to exclude immediately, and break off 
all relations with "bodies or elements linked with Chiang Kai-shek." 
Some organizations complied, but others did not and Peking found it 
necessary to have similar resolutions passed at the subsequent 
biennial UNESCO conferences. The resolution passed by the twen-
tieth general conference in 1978 "noted with satisfaction that certain 
nongovernmental international organizations, in accordance with 
UNESCO's resolutions concerned, have expelled the branches, sec-
tions, or elements having ties with the Chiang clique". However, the 
conference also noted "with preoccupation that the branches, sections, 
or elements having ties with the Chiang clique and usurping the 
name of China or employing all other names are committing illegal 
activities within certain nongovernmental international organiza-
tions maintaining relations with UNESCO." The resolution again 
called on the organizations concerned to expel such Taiwan groups. 
The PRC representative declared, however, that "we are not against 
the participation in various non-governmental international scien-
tific and technical and academic conferences by scientists of Taiwan 
province in the capacity of individuals."19 
The International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) has been 
particularly resistant to PRC pressures to expel the Taiwan member 
organization in order to make a place for one from the PRC. Many 
scientists took the view that since science was a nonpolitical activity, 
any bona fide scientific organization should be entitled to belong, 
wherever it came from. The ICSU in May 1980 adopted a resolution 
agreeing to accept separate organizations from Taiwan and the PRC 
as full members representing Chinese scientists. The PRC declined to 
participate in the September 1980 meeting on the ground that it 
could not regard Taiwan as a full voting member of the 
organization. 20 
19. FBIS, December 1, 1978, p. C·l. 
20. Sunday Times Chinese Weekly, September 21, 1980, p. 3. 
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The PRC has also worked hard to squeeze organizations from 
Taiwan out of international sports bodies. The hardest-fought and 
lengthiest battle was over the Olympic Games. Until the summer of 
1976 teams from Taiwan competed and PRC teams stayed away. At 
the Olympic Games in Montreal in 1976, however, because the 
Canadian Government ruled that the Taiwan team could not compete 
under the name of Republic of China, it withdrew. The struggle 
continued within the International Olympic Committee (IOC), in 
which Taiwan was represented, but the PRC was not. Finally, as the 
result of a postal ballot of all members, the IOC announced in 
November 1979 a decision to recognize the Chinese Olympic Commit-
tee in Peking as the national committee of China. Taiwan would be 
allowed to compete also in the games provided it did so under the 
name "Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee" and used a new flag and 
anthem rather than the flag and anthem of the ROC. After an 
unsuccessful attempt to fight the IOC decision in a Swiss court, the 
Olympic committee in Taiwan agreed in March 1981 to accept its new 
status. The Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee will enjoy all rights 
accorded to other national Olympic committees. With the help of the 
IOC, athletic groups in Taiwan will seek reinstatement in sports 
federations affiliated with the IOC, using the IOC-approved 
nomenclature. The way appears to have been opened for sports teams 
from the PRC and Taiwan to compete against each other in 
international meets. 
Conclusion 
Nearly ten years after the expulsion of the ROC from the United 
Nations and more than two years after the severance of diplomatic 
relations between the United States and the ROC, Taiwan forges 
vigorously ahead as a separate political entity, even though it lacks a 
clearly defined status in international law and a predictable future. 
Over the coming ten to twenty years, three outcomes are conceivable: 
integration, independence, or a continuation of Taiwan's present 
ambiguous status. 
Integration by agreement between the two governments seems 
extremely unlikely, even though both continue to hold to the 
one-China principle and proclaim integration as their long-term 
objective. The authorities in Taiwan and the majority of people in 
Taiwan are fearful of placing the island even nominally under PRC 
sovereignty. They distrust Peking's promises to leave undisturbed the 
social and economic systems and the military forces of Taiwan, 
suspecting that the concession in principle on sovereignty would be 
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followed by a whittling away of Taiwan's freedom of action aimed at 
ultimate absorption of the people of Taiwan in the Communist 
system. Moreover, given Deng Xiaoping's advanced age and the 
history of struggles for power among the leaders in Peking, there is 
no assurance that Deng's successors would abide by any promises he 
might make. Consequently, so long as the China mainland is under a 
Communist system, Peking's proposals for peaceful reunification of 
Taiwan with the mainland probably will attract little support among 
the people of the island. 
Any attempt to subjugate Taiwan by force during the next two 
decades also seems unlikely, unless a radical and improbable 
improvement should occur in relations between Peking and Moscow, 
accompanied by a severe deterioration in Peking's relations with 
Washington. Even in such circumstances- constituting a revival to 
some degree of the 1950s confrontation between the United States 
and the Sino-Soviet bloc - subjugation of Taiwan by force would be 
unlikely, for the strategic importance of the island to the United 
States would be greatly enhanced and the probability of U.S. military 
intervention to prevent its conquest would be high. In the more 
probable circumstance that the United States and the PRC continue 
to have a common interest over the next two decades in opposing 
Soviet expansionism, the two countries will probably succeed in 
continuing to treat the Taiwan problem as a secondary issue between 
them and the PRC will see its interests best served by refraining 
from the use of force against the island. 
Long-term trends seem to be pushing Taiwan more in the 
direction of formal independence from China than integration with it. 
By the time another twenty years have passed, Taiwan will have 
existed as a separate political entity for half a century, possessing all 
the attributes of an independent sovereign nation and more highly 
developed economically than most countries of the world. The gap 
between the standard of living on the China mainland and in Taiwan 
probably will have widened substantially. The older generation of 
those who came from the mainland after 1945 will have passed from 
the scene, including the members of the Legislative Yuan, the 
Control Yuan, and the National Assembly elected on the mainland in 
the 1940s. Natives of Taiwan, together with some mainlanders who 
grew up in Taiwan, will occupy the principal positions of power in the 
government and the domestic political rationale for clinging to the 
one-China principle will have disappeared. The appeal of self-
determination for Taiwan will be strong; people will become more 
and more restive at having to live in diplomatic limbo without a 
recognized and respected position of equality among nations. 
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However, the odds are heavily against the PRC's agreeing to a 
formal declaration of independence by Taiwan. Rulers in Peking 
seem no more likely to go along willingly with Taiwanese independ-
ence than George III was to tolerate the independence of the 
American colonies or Abraham Lincoln was to acquiesce in the 
independence of the Confederacy. The probability is great that they 
would resort to force to prevent it. There is a third choice, neither 
integration nor independence, but the continuance of Taiwan's 
present ambiguous status. The Taiwan authorities have demons-
trated that the island can develop and prosper and expand its 
relations throughout the world without formal recognition as a state 
or government. Taiwan and its partners are steadily refining and 
improving their techniques for dealing with each other in the absence 
of formal diplomatic relations. While this state of affairs is not 
entirely satisfactory to either Peking or Taipei, the government in 
Peking may for a long time prefer it to the costs and risks of resorting 
to force and the government in Taipei may prefer it to running the 
risk of having to fight for its independence. 
The PRC could, of course, drop its conciliatory policy toward 
Taiwan in favor of pressure tactics short of the use of force. It might, 
for example, try to interfere with Taiwan's economic relations with 
its partners. Such tactics, however, have a number of disadvantages. 
The PRC's capacity to pressure Taiwan's trading partners is not 
great; it might lose more than it would gain by such tactics. 
Moreover, the more pressure Peking exerts on Taipei, the more it 
risks pushing the people of Taiwan to abandon the one-China 
principle and opt for independence, having concluded from Peking's 
hard-line posture that they have little to lose. A conciliatory PRC 
policy, on the other hand, would be more likely to encourage 
retention of the one-China principle by Taiwan and allow com-
munication between the two groups of Chinese people to develop. 
The undefined state of peaceful coexistence that now exists 
between the China mainland and Taiwan could continue indefinitely 
if the leaders on both sides accepted the view that it was more in 
their interest than facing the risks and uncertainties of trying to 
change it. Under the umbrella of a one-China principle proclaimed by 
both, Taiwan could go its own way, enjoying most, though not all, of 
the advantages of a separate, fully-recognized sovereign state. 
Scholars versed in international law might chafe at their inability to 
fit Taiwan into a neat pigeonhold, but ambiguity may be preferable 
to attempts to impose order on unruly circumstances when those 
attempts intensify tension and conflict. 
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ANNEX 
Offices Maintained in Taiwan by Countries Which Do Not Have 
Diplomatic Relations with the Republic of China. 
American Institute in Taiwan 
Interchange Association (Japan) 
Anglo-Taiwan Trade Committee 
Asian Exchange Center, Inc. (Philippines) 
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce to Taipei 
Belgian Trade Association 
France-Asia Trade Promotion Association 
Hellenic Organization for Exports in Taiwan (Greece) 
Jordanian Commercial Office 
Netherlands Council for Trade Promotion 
Office of Singapore Trade Representative 
Office of Austrian Trade Representative 
Administrative Office, Thai Airways International 
Cervantes Center (Spain) 
German Cultural Center 

Chapter 8 
DIVIDED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
THE CASE OF TAIWAN 
Aleth Manin 
Introduction 
The title of this symposium is somewhat daring: at first glance, it 
seems rash to examine the relation between divided nations and 
international law, because international law is supposed to consider 
States to the exclusion of anything else. International law is in fact 
based upon a theoretical point of view which considers the State as 
the organized form of a nation. 
The concept of "nation," consequently, is relegated to a secondary 
level in classic international law. It is of interest only in regard to 
relatively minor institutions such as national minority rights or the 
recognition of the nation as opposed to the recognition of the State. 
But at the present time, that is, since the Second World War, 
international law cannot ignore a situation which is faced by several 
peoples in their search for their national identity. It is therefore an 
exercise in realism to examine how the general rules apply to divided 
nations and how such nations themselves apply those rules. 
In short, it is this double question which we will discuss today. 
This discussion may prove to be somewhat fragmentary; first, 
because the legal point of view is but one facet of reality, it cannot 
elucidate the whole. More importantly, it is fragmentary because it 
deals with present realities since we are examining the situation in 
1981. The present status of these nations is still changing. In fact, the 
very essence of divided states lies in the hope of reunification. We 
must therefore endeavor to avoid betraying that hope, while examin-
ing the present situation. 
Introductory Comments on the Chinese Case 
Clearly, the Chinese nation is split by the same ideological 
aflliction as other divided nations. There is a distinction, however. If 
we take Korea and Germany, the two camps that claim to speak in 
the name of the whole are relatively equal in magnitude. However, 
the disproportion between the territory, population and strategic 
importance of the two Chinese camps is startling. This disproportion 
is naturally the starting point for the position taken by third States 
162 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
in their choice of one group or the other. Independently of any other 
justification, it is strategic, economic, social and similar considera-
tions which determine the actions of third States with respect to 
divided nations as well as the significance they attach to their desire 
for reunification. 
The disparity between the two Chinese communities explains in 
large part the current status of Taiwan and the peculiarities of its 
external relations. 
The Status of Taiwan 
Because the international community is dominated by the 
concept of statehood, divided nations concentrate their efforts toward 
entering fully into the world of States. 
It is well known that, strictly speaking, there is no objective legal 
criterion for the existence of a "State" in international law. One 
considers constituent elements only- territory, population, govern-
ment - from which third parties draw, at their sole discretion, all 
consequences with a view to establishing or not establishing State-to-
State relations with the chosen entity by virtue of the act of 
recognition. 
The institution of diplomatic recognition tends to favor - or 
disfavor - divided nations as much as it does any non-divided nation. 
However, it plays a further role in the dynamics peculiar to divided 
nations, placing in the hands of the recognized entity the ability to 
cite that recognition by third States as a legitimization of their claim 
to overall authority. This explains the harshness of the means taken 
to avoid giving support to the claims of "the other," whether those 
means be the well-known Hallstein doctrine in the Federal Republic 
of Germany or the same unqualified intransigence which one sees in 
the two Chinese communities. 
In this general scheme, the status of Taiwan presents two 
notable peculiarities. The first arises from the mere act of counting: 
the number of states which recognize the Republic of China, after 
having diminished to an alarming degree, has stabilized despite the 
fears aroused by the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
the United States and the People's Republic of China. In 1981, 
twenty-three States maintain official relations with the authorities in 
Taipei. 
The second peculiarity results from the historical circumstances 
of the war. Two great powers, the United States and Great Britain, 
had the right under international law to oppose the People's Republic 
of China's claim to the territory of Taiwan. 
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Since 1978, the doctrine of these two has been somewhat 
"neutralized." After President Nixon's 1972 visit to mainland China, 
Great Britain took a further step beyond its act of recognition in 
1950: the British government acknowledged "the position of the 
Chinese government according to which Taiwan is a province of the 
People's Republic of China." 
After long hesitation while it sought in vain for a formula that 
would satisfy its new partner without threatening the security of 
Taiwan, the United States on December 16, 1978, affirmed in tum 
the principle that Taiwan by law formed a part of the People's 
Republic of China. (Among the States historically interested in 
resolving the issue of Taiwan, only Japan has sealed its relations 
with the People's Republic without accepting the principle of the 
unity of China. But Japan was hardly in a position to decide the 
question of Taiwan.) As a result of American recognition, no State 
presently has legal standing to contest the PRC's principle according 
to which Taiwan is a territory of the People's Republic of China. They 
may, however, naturally observe that the People's Republic has not 
taken effective de facto control over Taiwan but these recent events 
are meant to bring change to the juridical status of Taiwan. 
It is indeed rather unusual for a State to be called upon to 
confirm the territorial claims of the State with which it is estab-
lishing diplomatic relations during the process of recognition. The 
Peking authorities insisted on obtaining, particulary from Great 
Britain and the United States, recognition of the principle of the 
unity of China, in order to lend to the process of reunification the 
appearance of internal order. Clearly, no measures of reunification 
are actually being undertaken on this ground. Rather, in this case, 
the law is being used, so to speak, to precede the fact. 
Communist China does not conceal its ambition, in this context, 
which is to grant Taiwan the status of an autonomous region. The 
clear statements of the communist authorities indicate that, if 
reunified with the People's Republic, Taiwan would retain its 
autonomy - that is, in concrete terms, its monetary system, its 
commercial relations, and its armed forces and governmental struc-
tures. All the same, it is noteworthy that on the international scene 
the Peking authorities are acting as if the situation they describe 
already existed. The American government has already discovered 
this to their cost, when Peking protested on several occasions that the 
United States had violated its commitments to consider Taiwan as 
part of China. It is also well known that in the recent confrontation 
between the People's Republic and the Netherlands, the latter was 
accused of failing to respect the view of the People's Republic that 
Taiwan is a province of China. (See, Le Monde, January 16, 1981.) 
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In any case, the legal capacity of Taiwan is already somewhat 
restricted. 
The area in which the activity of the People's Republic has 
already achieved immediate results is naturally security, which is 
even more essential for divided States than for any other national 
group. 
The observations below are governed by the hypothesis that 
reunification of China cannot be achieved by peaceful means. 
The acts of recognition have a clear goal: to deprive Taiwan of 
the right of recourse to the international system of collective security. 
This deprivation operates on two levels. First there is the serious 
question of whether the system of collective security, namely the 
Charter of the United Nations and more specifically the Security 
Council, would intervene and oppose forceful measures taken by the 
People's Republic against Taiwan. Clearly, communist diplomacy has 
sought to undermine in advance any attempt in this direction. Recall 
that in 1971 the UN General Assembly "reestablished" China's rights 
and passed a resolution confirming its claim to represent the Chinese 
nation. Without being overly pessimistic, it is extremely unlikely 
that the General Assembly - or a fortiori, the Security Council, in 
which China has a permanent seat - would intervene in a show of 
force. Moreover, the practice of the United Nations tends to 
demonstrate that without being recognized as a national liberation 
movement, separatist provinces may expect little aid from the world 
organization. 
Secondly, collective security exists also through the system of 
military alliances. Such alliances are obviously precluded between 
Taiwan and those States that have established diplomatic relations 
with the People's Republic. The abrogation of the 1954 mutual 
defense treaty with the United States is the clearest example of this. 
This does not prohibit any State or group of States from manifesting 
political interest in a peaceful resolution to the question, but at this 
point one Is no longer dealing with legal aspects. Rather, one is 
dealing with political aspects. 
The vital issue regarding Taiwan is indisputably that of military 
cooperation. And this is certainly the area where international rules 
are established with the least degree of certainty. Broadly speaking, 
it is prohibited to provide assistance to a separatist movement but it 
is lawful to aid national liberation movements. In the first case, the 
rules traditionally applied to the case of civil war are relied upon, 
while in the second one relies upon the right of national self-
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determination which the instruments of the United Nations purport 
to recognize. 
Recent events tend to prove that neither of the cases applies to 
Taiwan. The People's Republic intentionally maintained the fiction of 
separatism when it acted with respect to the Netherlands, as if 
Taiwan should already be regarded as a separatist province. 
It is therefore logical that, for now, any assistance offered to 
Taiwan must be a function of the balance of power rather than of 
juridical considerations. 
Taiwan's External Relations 
The observations on the status of Taiwan do not give a realistic 
appraisal of the situation. 
In fact, the initiatives of the People's Republic have been largely 
counteracted by the dynamism of Taiwan's diplomacy which, among 
divided nations, shows an intense degree of activity and a great 
ingenuity. The most visible sign of Taiwan's presence on the 
international scene is its pursuit of substantive relations with most of 
the world's population, including that of several communist coun-
tries. 
Is it possible to measure the quality and extent of these 
relations? The most significant communiques issued when recogni-
tion was extended to the People's Republic, namely, those of Japan 
and the United States, clearly referred to "people-to-people" relations 
with Taiwan. Do such relations have specific implications? That 
would presuppose that the word "people" has a precise meaning or 
that the Parties intended such a predetermined meaning inter se. At 
first glance, the word "people" means more through the hopes it 
conveys than because of the rights it restores. The declarations 
recorded in the United Nations and in the conferences of non-aligned 
nations used the word without having given a prior definition, and do 
not provide a basis for determining the status that should, in general, 
be attributed to a "people." 
In truth, one is inclined to the opinion that the Parties directly 
concerned did not consider that they were determining Taiwan's 
external relations on any juridical basis. 
The Sino-American communique is symptomatic of this dilemma. 
If that communique expressly aims at the maintenance of commercial 
and cultural relations, it is because such relations have caused fewer 
problems. On the other hand, in referring to other "non-official 
relations," the communique leaves foreseeable points of disagree-
ment. 
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Actual practice does not provide much clarification. If official 
relations are state to state, there is no precedent which defines the 
specific character of non-official relations. 
This vague notion of unofficial relations is used by Taiwan to fill 
the void caused by the lack of traditional diplomatic missions. The 
creation of ad hoc organizations as opposed to the usual official 
missions is the result of pragmatism. There is therefore no preexis-
tent model; these organizations are entirely creations of circum-
stance. 
To date, three types of organizations exist. The simplest consists 
of setting up, based on parallel and independent acts, national 
organizations which undertake the same activities. This is the 
technique employed by the Europeans. 
The second type arises from concerted action. Two organizations 
created for this purpose conclude a nongovernmental agreement in 
the terms of which they define their modes of activity within the 
territory of the other. This is the aim of the Agreement of December 
26, 1972 between the Interchange Association (ICA), the Japanese 
Association, and its Taiwanese counterpart, the East Asian Relations 
Association (EARA). This Agreement sets up the compositions of the 
parties' respective delegations and the areas in which they may 
exercise their authority. It specifies matters relating to the compe-
tence of the organizations and the means by which they are 
empowered to act. 
The third type is that used by the United States. A private 
organization is charged, by the terms of a statute, to ensure relations 
between the people of Taiwan and the people of the United States. 
This is therefore a unilateral act which, at the same time, determines 
the functional rules and the status within American territory of that 
organization. 
In each case, the organizations created fall within the same 
juridical category; they are associations or corporations under private 
law. 
The peculiarities of their composition are well known. It is more 
profitable to examine their functions. In this regard, one might say 
that, in a very general sense, these organizations function on two 
different levels: they are missions of general interest and they are the 
sole channel for people-to-people relations. 
Do these functions justify the granting of special privileges and 
the use of facilities? Regular and active relations no doubt require a 
minimum of privileged treatment, to ensure the protection of persons 
and of the property of the organizations. The status of special 
missions, as adopted in the United Nations, could provide a solid 
reference for situations which are still unresolved. 
Chapter 9 
RECOGNITION POLICY WITH RESPECT 
TO MULTI-SYSTEM STATES: 
THE CASE OF CHINA 
Morton A. Kaplan 
The General Problem 
The problem of recognition in the cases of the so-called multi-
system states is a complex matter, both legally and politically. I shall 
attempt to address this matter with respect to the Republic of China, 
but it will be useful to consider the case of China from within the 
context of the general problem. 
Although I do not wish to spend much time on legal issues, a few 
preliminary remarks are in order. Neither of the principal contending 
theories of recognition, whether of states or of governments, is 
without its problems. The position taken by Lauterpacht and Kelsen 
that recognition is constitutive obviously overstates the case. Indeed, 
Lauterpacht felt compelled to modify orthodox constitutive theory by 
positing a legal duty to recognize a state or government that met 
certain prescribed factual prerequisites. On the other hand, the 
declaratory or evidentiary theory, according to which statehood or 
governmental authority exists independently of recognition by other 
states, implies a theory of law that in its own way rivals the 
abstractness of Kelsen's pure theory. How can facts determine 
anything in the absence of norms that make the facts relevant to the 
issue? A system of law is neither a self-subsistent entity that is 
divorced from the life and times of the political and social system 
within which it is implemented nor a set of disembodied factual 
conditions that exists abstractly in some timeless realm. 
Legal theory, like philosophy in general, and despite Justice 
Holmes' observation that general principles do not decide particular 
cases, has long been governed by a search for identifiable criteria 
that determine decisions, whether these are the social facts of 
realistic theories or the norms of normative theories. If recognition 
were merely a matter of state discretion, that would unequivocally 
settle the issue. If, on the other hand, the existence of a state or 
government were to be determined purely by a factual set of 
circumstances, then we could tum the problem over to technicians. 
Thus, the matter is somewhat analogous to the snake that is 
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swallowing its own tail. A right cannot flow from facts except as 
prescribed by some legal system. Conversely, all legal systems refer 
to certain factual conditions, and these may differ with the legal 
systems and the conditions of the societies in which those systems are 
implemented. 
Recognition in "Balance of Power Systems". 
During the period of the "balance of power" international system, 
the standards of recognition tended to conform with the general needs 
of that system, because one of the primary requirements of that 
system was maintaining flexibility of alignment. Inasmuch as the 
independence of states was essential to that end, states attempted 
to maintain standards that preserved this independence and that, 
therefore, would not interfere with domestic arrangements. 
States continued to deal with an existing government until that 
government had lost effective control of the situation regardless of 
political affinities or disaffections. A new state or government that 
was in control of its territory and population might not be recognized 
immediately. The primary purpose of withholding recognition from a 
new state or government, however, was to bring pressure on the new 
state or government to recognize its obligations under the system of 
international law. Before recognition, a new state or government 
gained some status and rights under international law, but not the 
privileges that were accorded under the comity of nations. Even 
belligerent parties that did not meet the standards for recognition 
and that controlled both some territory and population acquired de 
facto some rights and duties under international law because of the 
general need for order in the system. 
Any other position would have resembled intervention and would 
have invoked the counter-interventionary activities of other states 
regardless of their positions. Of course, at times these norms were 
violated, as are the norms of any system of law, domestic or 
international. Additionally, there were areas of so little importance 
that for all practical purposes they fell outside the system. The 
system of norms worked by and large because the social and political 
international system provided the major states with incentives to 
maintain it. 
Recognition in a Loose Bipolar System 
World War II constituted a watershed in the development of 
international law. There was a system change and it affected the 
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character of the international system and of the norms that were 
enforceable. A loose bipolar system arose and the constraint that 
supported the norms against intervention were greatly weakened. 
Similar changes affected recognition policy. Recognition became less 
a matter of enforcing conformity with the system of norms and with 
specific obligations than of affecting the bipolar competition and the 
contest over the rules of the game. Thus, the evidentiary criteria that 
determined recognition began to lose their relatively neutral charac-
ter and to gain partisan gloss. 
One can note important differences from the "balance of power" 
situation. Even if the United States opposes Soviet military interven-
tion in Poland, the interventionary character of Soviet pressure is 
resisted primarily by the strength of political opposition within 
Poland itself rather than by the strength of opposition from either the 
international political system or international law. 
No firmly-established norm of international law that is generally 
recognized prohibits Soviet intervention, numerous General Assem-
bly dicta to the contrary notwithstanding. Some day, further 
modifications in the world political framework may move the system 
back to the general norm of non-intervention. But those conditions do 
not yet exist. 
There were also other types of system changes. The old colonial 
system collapsed and very large numbers of new nations came on the 
scene that dwarfed in numbers the states that had participated in the 
previous "balance of power" system. The character of the political 
contests for rule in these new nations, their fear of "neo-colonialism", 
and their desire to expropriate the property of the old colonial nations 
under justifying slogans, produced a contest over the principles 
governing nationalization and quickly became confused with contests 
involving intervention and recognition. 
World War II had still another aftermath that affects the system 
of law. A new state such as Israel and multi-system old states such as 
Germany, China, Korea and (until 1975) Vietnam, became elements 
of the post-war settlement. Although these divisions were created by 
incipient bipolarity, and, except in the case of China, were sustained 
by it, they are also reinforced by different ideologies and power 
structures. 
Despite the self-conscious effort of the framers of the Charter of 
the United Nations to divorce itself, unlike the League of Nations, 
from the post-war settlement and lack of success in implementing the 
provisions of the Charter against the use of force, such a settlement is 
part of the framework of post-World War II international law. 
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Precarious though that framework may be in certain respects, the 
territorial settlements and the new norms have strong material 
interdependencies. Their material reinforcement also minimizes the 
risk of a third world war. Thus, there are strong incentives in the 
system for the major states to maintain the framework of law. 
The question is not whether the durability of the post-war 
settlement has been tested at times - for surely it has - but 
whether the system has the strength, and the major nations within it 
the incentive, to maintain the system and its norms against 
challenges. And, within limits and with exceptions, including the 
tragic case of Vietnam, it has and they do. 
The loose bipolar system has changed from its equilibrium 
position, but not so much that a consonant normative structure is 
threatened. Although bipolarity continues to exist today primarily in 
its military, and to some extent in economic, form, and although the 
system continues to evolve in other respects, the loose bipolar 
framework is sufficiently valid in important respects to reinforce 
many of its normative features. Whereas, in its equilibrium state, 
national recognition was designed to reinforce bloc cohesion and to 
minimize the legitimacy of the disfavored government in multi-
system states, this position is no longer tenable and should be 
modified, as I shall argue below. But first, we must discuss briefly the 
history of recognition with respect to China. 
This normative system of which I am speaking was not 
self-consciously put together by legal craftsmen who understood what 
they were doing. Moreover, the boundaries and implications of the 
system are murkier than they need have been because practitioners 
- from intellectual confusion, political constraints, or the pursuit of 
immediate objectives - failed to reach decisions that would have 
been functional within the system. 
For instance, the fact that the United States preferred for many 
years to recognize the Republic of China as the official China entitled 
to a Security Council seat in the United Nations confused two 
different fora. Whereas, in a "balance of power" system, the 
recognition decisions of individual states and of the League of 
Nations ought in principle to have been the same, except perhaps in 
some few exceptional situations, the same result need not follow in a 
loose bipolar system. The purposes of recognition in the two different 
fora and the legal criteria that determine them might very well -
and, in the instant case, should - differ. For many years it could 
have been argued that United States recognition policy was appropri-
ate from a bloc standpoint in a loose bipolar system. It did not follow 
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from this that the decisions taken in the United Nations were 
appropriate from the standpoint of a universal organization. The 
U.N. is not a participant in the bipolar competition and one of its 
main equilibrating functions in the system is to mediate bloc quarrels 
from a neutral standpoint. Although one might have argued that 
neither China was the appropriate successor to the seat held by 
China in the Security Council, for many years the Republic of China 
held that seat while its claim was factually indefensible. Although I 
would argue that the Republic of China acquired by occupation the 
province of Taiwan, it no longer had control of the people, or 
substantial support in the territory, of that which constituted the 
bulk of the state of China. However, the terms under which this 
contest was fought so confused the issue that the subsequent 
membership of the Republic of China in the General Assembly was 
unfairly and improperly prejudiced. 
How the Norms of Bipolarity Should have Developed 
Let us return now to one of our starting points. The framework of 
international law in the current era has among its major functions 
that of maintaining the postwar settlement, the norms appropriate to 
it and the avoidance of at least major war. Thus, the legal norms of 
this system tend to be, and should be, consonant with these aims. An 
integral part of this postwar settlement involves both the new states 
such as Israel and multi-system states such as China, Germany, 
Korea and, previously, Vietnam. 
What norms are appropriate in such a situation? The General 
Assembly of the United Nations immediately following the first free 
election in Korea in 1948 took a major - but as it turned out, 
abortive - step toward the recognition of this new international 
order. It recognized the government headed by Syngman Rhee in 
1948 as a freely-elected government and as the only such government 
in Korea. This implicitly invoked a new and appropriate standard of 
international law: the existence of a single state that could be 
coterminous with more than a single legitimate government. This 
was appropriate policy for the universal organization in a loose 
bipolar system and is becoming appropriate also for national policy in 
the system. 
In fact, much of current practice recognizes what, from the 
standpoint of classical international law, can only be considered an 
anomaly. Although both Koreas recognize only one state and oppose 
the permanent existence of separate governments, each government 
functions independently and is recognized by a large number of 
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countries. Although the German Democratic Republic recently has 
came close to the position of insisting upon two states, the Federal 
Republic blurs the issue by mandating the existence of only one 
nation and by recognizing that it has at least residual responsibility 
for all Germans in foreign lands. Both the Republic of China and the 
People's Republic of China recognize the existence of only one 
Chinese state, and each is recognized by a number of nations. 
Both Germanies are represented in the United Nations. Neither 
Korea is represented because North Korea refuses to acknowledge 
the validity of separate representation and because the Soviet Union 
would veto an independent South Korean entry. There is little doubt, 
however, that a very large majority could be mustered for South 
Korean entry. The Republic of China was expelled from the General 
Assembly when the People's Republic was admitted. But I would 
argue that this is the consequence of the absurdly clumsy, if not 
deliberately counterproductive, way in which the United States 
argued the issue. 
The Case of the Republic of China 
It would be unrealistic to deny that the specific history of events 
has had some impact upon the legal structure of the system. 
However, that impact may not be entirely preclusive. To date, in the 
United States, the China issue has been made an appendage of 
current, and often misguided, policy. The condemnation of the 
People's Republic of China as an aggressor in Korea, when it had an 
inherent right to protect its own security, undermined both relations 
with the People's Republic and the stature of the United Nations by 
forcing the United Nations into a compromise armistice with a nation 
that it had labelled as an aggressor. Rather than allowing the 
People's Republic into the United Nations while the United States 
had a firm majority in that organization, thus permitting the People's 
Republic to play its legitimate role in that organization, the United 
States in effect supported the implicit Soviet objective of keeping 
Communist China out of the United Nations. Later, when the depth 
of the split between China and the Soviet Union was recognized and 
when President Nixon was able to move toward initiating formal 
relations with China, the United States overestimated China's 
military and economic potential and acted in disregard of normative 
considerations appropriate to the circumstances. As this policy was 
conducted further by the Carter administration, in its effort inadvis-
ably to play the China card against the Soviet Union, the United 
States bargained away the position of its ally, the Republic of China, 
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as it previously had that of Vietnam, without anything substantial to 
show for the venture in terms of immediate gains, long term 
interests, or normative values. 
The very least the United States should have done was to resist 
normalization until a decent modus vivendi had been arranged 
between the People's Republic and the Republic of China. Had it not 
been for Congressional passage of the Taiwan Relations Act, the right 
of the United States to engage in commerce with the Republic of 
China, to supply it with weapons, and so forth, except on terms 
acceptable to the People's Republic, could have been challenged at 
some future date on the basis of the agreement between the two 
governments. Even though the United States did not formally 
acknowledge the right of the People's Republic to control Taiwan, it 
did "not challenge" that control; therefore, unnecessary damage was 
done to the legal position of the Republic of China. 
A General Recommendation for Normative Policy 
Although each one of the multi-system states is significantly 
different in one or more respects, the United States eventually should 
move toward a relatively principled position with respect to multi-
system states. The first aspect of this position should be to recognize 
that each government in the divided state legitimately exercises the 
sovereignty of the state within its area of competence. It, therefore, is 
entitled to security with respect to its physical arrangements, its 
commerce, its social life, its political arrangements and all the other 
requisites of organized activity. The use of force to change this status 
quo is forbidden by the U.N. Charter. But it should be understood 
that these divisions are not permanent and that someday they will be 
overcome voluntarily. In the meantime, the state entity includes the 
territory and populations of the contending governments. 
The second step should be to distinguish between that govern-
ment within the state that comes closer to being the successor 
government and that which does not. In the case of China, the vast 
breadth of the People's Republic clearly establishes the fact that if 
any government in China is entitled to the permanent seat in the 
Security Council, it is. 
Although the issues are not as overwhelmingly clear in the cases 
of Germany and Korea, both the Republic of Korea and the Federal 
Republic have larger populations, more territory, and more secure 
and voluntary support from their respective populations. They also 
have shown more willingness to accept their responsibilities under 
international law than their rival governments. For instance, the 
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Federal Republic has paid reparations for the criminal activities of 
the Nazi regime while the German Democratic Republic, which 
inherits many of the repressive features of the old Nazi regime, has 
not shown the slightest sense of international obligation in this 
respect. 
To the extent then that there are differences in legitimacy and 
inasmuch these differences should affect elections to the Security 
Council, only the Republic of Korea and the Federal Republic of 
Germany should be considered for those positions. In an organization 
which includes among its members the Ukraine, the Byelorussian 
Republic, and such states as Oman, it seems reprehensible that the 
Republic of China is not a member of the General Assembly and of 
other appropriate international organizations. I would argue strongly 
that it is entitled to that status under international law. It is an 
international entity that exercises sovereign powers, even though 
both Chinas regard their anomalous condition as impermanent. 
Surely, in the last analysis the People's Republic of China will not 
wish to seem even less generous than the Soviet Union in this 
respect. 
A Specific Recommendation for Normative Policy 
With respect to the issue of American recognition of the Republic 
of China, the United States cannot entirely and quickly wipe clean 
the slate. It has agreed to break diplomatic relations of a formal 
nature with the Republic of China. There is no reason, however, why 
its relations with the Republic of China should not be upgraded to at 
least the status of its relations with the People's Republic before 
normalization. Moreover, as more states recognize the Republic of 
China and as the People's Republic finds it commercially and 
politically impossible to break relations with these states, given the 
conditions on its border with the Soviet Union and its other economic 
and political needs, the American position eventually may be 
upgraded even further. 
My suggestion is that eventually the United States should have 
embassies in the People's Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and the Republic of Korea; but only legations in the Republic of 
China, the German Democratic Republic, and, after a peace treaty is 
signed on the Korean peninsula, in North Korea. This would 
recognize the relative differences in status between governments 
within the same state. 
The strategic arguments against this position, in my opinion, are 
weak. In the first place, the People's Republic has no offensive 
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military capability to speak of and will not have for the next 
generation at least. Its value in the American strategic option lies 
primarily in its existence, not as a counterforce to the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, the less the United States satisfies the People's Republic, 
the more the latter's potentially closer relationship with the Soviet 
Union would forfeit possible concessions from the United States. 
In the final analysis, it is not in the American interest for 
relations between the People's Republic and the Soviet Union to be as 
hostile as they are now. However, they are unlikely, given the 
potential conflicts between the two countries, to ever become parallel 
unless the United States and its allies become so weak that China 
aligns itself to a stronger Soviet Union out of fear. 
The People's Republic is probably aware, in the unlikely event 
that the Soviet Union attacks it, that the United States is likely to do 
very little effectively to aid it. It likely would protect itself mainly by 
guerrilla, rather than by conventional, warfare. However, if the 
United States has been such an unfaithful ally in the case of the 
Republic of China, why should the People's Republic expect effective 
assistance from it if any risk is involved? Thus, even considerations of 
political prudence support the more principled line of behavior. 
Practical Contraindications 
There are short-term political expectations that make rapid 
movement to the position herein outlined unwise. I certainly would 
not advocate that a high official of the American government state 
such a position now in explicit form or that there be an explicit 
strategy of moving toward it in a short period of time. Rather, the 
ideas contained in this paper should be regarded as background 
information that is relevant to more particular future decisions that 
will be made partly on the basis of other considerations. 
I have stated merely what I regard as a consistent and principled 
position on the subject of multi-system states in general, and that of 
China in particular. I have suggested some of the strategic as well as 
some of the normative factors that would support an eventual 
movement to a position of this kind. The history of events and the 
promises that have been made, as well as immediate political 
concerns, work against explicit adoption of this program now. 
Nonetheless, if policy is conducted without reference to the considera-
tions expressed in this paper, we may continue to make the same 
kinds of tragic mistakes that we have made in the past. 
The United States should promote responsible dialogue between 
the two Chinese states that responds to the rights and equitites of 
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each party in the current set of circumstances. True friendship for the 
Chinese people supports such a policy; and in the long run it is the 
policy most consonant with American interests and values. 
With respect to the eventual unification of China the issue of 
Puerto Rico and the United States has interesting similarities and 
differences. If the United States were to demand that Puerto Rico 
choose between independence and statehood now, I have little doubt 
that it would opt for statehood even though I believe that most Puerto 
Ricans in their hearts want eventual independence. I believe that 
most Chinese both on Taiwan and on the mainland want eventual 
unity. However, if the Chinese on Taiwan are forced in the near 
future to choose between a two-China policy and autonomy under 
mainland sovereignty, I believe they will opt for separate statehood. 
In that circumstance, the United States will feel bound by reasons of 
honor, friendship and reputation for reliability to support that choice. 
No one's interests will be served by attempting to force a premature 
choice. 
Some day, changes in the characters of the multi-system national 
systems and transformations of the international system may permit 
the healing of the festering wounds in multi-system nations. Whether 
this healing will take place within the confines of classical national 
state systems or within a more complex set of national, regional and 
international arrangements cannot now be forecast. But that some 
day these wounds will be healed seems to me as close to a 
foreordained conclusion as is possible in an uncertain world, provided 
that we proceed now with intelligence and compassion. 
Chapter 10 
OVERALL EVALUATION 
Robert Sutter, Yung Wei, Stephen Guest and Swan-sik Ko 
Robert Sutter 
I want to speak on the contradictions present in American 
foreign policy, as seen notably in the trade-off between U.S. support 
for moral and legal principles and the need to deal with realities in 
foreign affairs. Historically, American foreign policy has dealt with 
these contradictions between practical tough-mindedness and moral-
ity, idealism and legalism in international affairs. The Chinafl'aiwan 
case is an interesting example of how these two types of factors have 
confronted each other in U.S. foreign policy. 
In recent years, U.S. concern for ideals and law in regard to 
Taiwan has been overshadowed by the practical concerns of develop-
ing relations with a former enemy, namely, China. It seems clear 
that we should try to restore more balance in our China policy and 
move back toward principles and legality in our relations with 
Taiwan and China, as Professor Kaplan spoke of today. However, this 
will likely prove to be a difficult task because of the strong realpolitik 
factors that continue to drive the United States and China closer 
together, usually at the expense of U.S.-Taiwan ties. 
Seeking to withdraw from Vietnam, to gain leverage against the 
Soviet Union and to gain a more stable balance-of-power in East 
Asia, the United States viewed its new relationship with China as a 
practical tool, particularly useful in stabilizing the East Asian area 
in the 1970s. The question was asked as to why U.S. officials did not 
insist at that time that the PRC renounce the use of force vis-a-vis 
Taiwan. Is it not fair to ask, could the United States have done this 
and still developed the new Asian balance-of-power that it sought to 
achieve? Could the United States have attempted to use the China 
relationship to ease withdrawal from Vietnam or could it still have 
achieved some sort of leverage over the Soviet Union? To have stood 
by principles such as the renunciation of force vis-a-vis Taiwan at 
that time would have been extremely difficult, if not foolish, and not 
in the best interests of the United States. 
I noted that the United States government has tried to cover over 
the contradiction between principle and practicality in its China/ 
Taiwan policy with ambiguous public pronouncements. Thus, for 
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example, while the U.S.-PRC normalization communique assumes 
that Taiwan will be reunited some day with the mainland, the 
Taiwan Relations Act assumes that Taiwan will remain separate 
from the mainland for the foreseeable future and that the United 
States will do what is needed to sustain that situation. The U.S. 
government- ambiguously- says that it supports both documents. 
I added, in regard to the demand that the United States require 
China to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, that such a stand 
would not be popular in China nor in most of the rest of the Third 
World. It would be seen as an effort by a satisfied, status quo power 
(the United States) imposing its "imperialist logic" on the poorer 
countries of the world. 
I also referred to the issue of self determination which was raised 
this morning in defense of the interests of the current Taipei 
administration. I warned that using such a principle is probably not 
wise in the United States because there is a large group of people 
with the opinion that if there were true self determination in Taiwan, 
the current Chinese Nationalist leaders would be turned out of office 
and Taiwan would declare itself an independent state. 
In conclusion, I applauded Dr. Kaplan's call for more ideals and 
more consistency in principle in U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan. 
Although noting the difficulty of overcoming those U.S. leaders who 
will argue in favor of "practicality" in U.S. foreign policy toward 
China and Taiwan, I added that the Taiwan administration can assist 
the process by continuing to show itself as a model of favorable 
economic development, by further liberalizing political restrictions on 
the island, and by showing itself as less intransigent vis-a-vis the 
mainland, notably by no longer referring to the government there as 
"illegitimate" and by renouncing any interest in the use of force to 
overthrow the mainland government. 
Yung Wei 
Speaking on the need for conceptual framework, I wish to assert 
that while concepts, such as the multi-system nation, may be vague 
and not totally applicable, they provide some level of satisfaction and 
in this way concepts serve a purpose. In the development of concepts 
in human knowledge, concepts are often a result of trying to interpret 
reality, or they are developed to create a reality. In the case of the 
"multi-system nation," the term is a calling for concept to describe 
and to prescribe a reality, and this is done to 'soothe the nerve of 
those who have to live with the reality.' 
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The task of the scholar, in turn, is to find out how concepts can be 
developed to explain the reality; with the new concepts such as the 
"multi-system nation." New rules can be advanced to regulate the 
relationship between the different parts of the multi-system nation 
on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other. Conventional 
19th century laws of recognition provide for only three entities: the 
state, belligerents, and insurgents. Movements between these three 
entities were usually rapid. Since the multi-system nation is now 
almost a permanent feature of the international system, this 19th 
century law has become obsolete. Nevertheless, some governments 
still apply it. The Non-communist side of the multi-system nations 
had played the zero-sum game by applying the 19th century law and 
eventually became the victims of a policy which they originally 
advocated. 
Despite the fact that most likely the multi-system nations will 
continue to exist that neither side wishes the division to be 
permanent, and that there are many legal complexities involved in 
their interactions with other nations, governments and scholars have 
failed to develop rules of international law to handle the multi-
system nations on legal basis. In trying to accommodate on one-by-one 
basis, many problems have arisen. There is a need, therefore, for 
deep-thinking and communication on the part of political scientists, 
and legal scholars, and policy-makers. 
Without legal meaning, substantive relationships are useful, 
practical, but unstable, thus the more powerful side of the multi-
system nations access to pressurizing the other side and thus 
achieving purposes which they could not achieve short of the use of 
force. The communist side is playing this game in the case of China. 
In short, these states are using the obsolete 19th century law of 
recognition as an instrument to achieve aims which otherwise could 
not be achieved without using arms. Similarly, to play down the 
importance of legal recognition is to overlook the fact that nationals 
of a system which is not recognized sometimes receive less protections 
and privilege than stateless persons in the international societies. 
The key point here is to separate the problem of recognition of 
multi-system nations from that of unification. Other nations should 
recognize all parts of a multi-system nations, neither recognizing nor 
denying their respective sovereignty chains. The problem of unifica-
tion should left to the various parts of multi-system nations 
themselves. 
The Republic of China will rely upon the teachings of Dr. Sun 
Y at-Sen as a major means of reunifying China. The Republic of 
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China is willing to improve its relations with the countries of the 
world, so long as any of the following points are not required as 
pre-conditions: 
• renunciation of Republic of China's claim to mainland China; 
• request of the Republic of China declare independence of 
Taiwan; and 
• forced negotiation with the mainland. 
Stephen Guest 
A number of diversifications of interests and interpretations 
have arisen during the course of this Conference. It must, however, 
be possible for there to be some sort of conceptual apparatus upon 
which most of us can agree and for which we must seek in order to 
solve the general problem. 
Principles for such a framework can be extrapolated from the 
situation that arose in Rhodesia when it attempted to depart from 
certain principles of the United Kingdom constitutional law in 1965. 
After the Ian Smith government deClared itself no longer constrained 
by the principles of the United Kingdom 1961 Constitution originally 
in force, the U.K. government held the actions of the Smith 
government to be void. The case is similar to the situation of Taiwan 
and mainland China in that a state declares that there is no existing 
law in a territorial entity purportedly part of that state but claiming 
its own constitutional sovereignty. 
After a series of important test cases, it was finally decided by 
Rhodesian judges appointed by the U.K. soverign that the Smith 
government was the de jure government. The principles or doctrines 
used in arriving at this decision were three in number. • 
The first principle was what could be called the historical 
doctrine (or, the "nothing succeeds like success" doctrine). This 
doctrine was based upon the fact that historically, de facto govern-
ments do "ripen" into de jure governments. An established govern-
ment, effective in the executive and legislative spheres, is a 
government which should justifiably be recognized. 
The second principle was the necessity doctrine. This doctrine 
states that even though a revolutionary government is revolutionary, 
recognition should be granted because that government exercises 
power over a territorially integral population, thereby preventing 
chaos or civil war. 
The third principle is the international doctrine. Simply stated, 
this asserts that the government and the territorial entity over which 
it exercises its control should be accorded recognition if there is a 
OVERALL EvALUATION CHINA 181 
government in effective control of a state as defined by the 
international legal criteria of statehood. 
The first doctrine can be countered by the argument that merely 
because a government succeeds does not necessarily indicate the 
justice of its success or the merit of its claims. To put it another way, 
the might of the government does not make it right. Such a doctrine 
could encourage revolutionaries to take power with the knowledge 
that validity would be accorded to their acts. 
The third doctrine was untenable for a number of reasons, not 
the least being that no one would recognize Rhodesia as a state. It is 
my view that the second is the important one and the one most 
relevant to Taiwan. 
The second argument enabled the judges to fill the "vacuum" 
created by the position of the United Kingdom legislature. This 
vacuum supposedly arose at least in spurious legal theory from the 
simple denial that law existed over a sizeable and a territorially 
integral population. 
From these cases a general principle of jurisprudence may be 
proposed. Except in war, a principle of civil necessity may justify a 
means of acting towards effective but politically unrecognized 
governments. One could in some respects politically ignore a country 
(to use an ideologically neutral term), but allow certain if not most of 
its government's acts to be accorded some measure of recognition. 
Finally, the major problem of this proposal for a dual system of 
recognition of countries such as Taiwan must !>e stated. How should 
we distinguish between those acts which we may recognize in the 
dual recognition context and those which we may not? For example, 
should it be commercial, economic, civil and administrative acts that 
are given pre-eminent recognition as opposed to governmental acts of 
a purely political nature? 
Ko Swan Sik 
I will offer some remarks on how far the facts as they are known 
fit into the framework of present international law, and to what 
extent new legal constructions would be needed. 
We must examine the framework of international law as it 
applies to multi-system nations in terms of recognition and non-
recognition. Since World War II, the role of the institution of 
recognition has decreased and eroded very much. Is it possible, then, 
to continue relations between non-recognized entities and third states 
on an ad hoc basis rather than in accordance with traditional rules? 
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Any innovation in international law in this respect is found in 
the Taiwan Relations Act. The Act serves to undo the consequences of 
de-recognition while striving to bring about preferable consequences. 
In addressing the application of the German model to the China 
case, one should ask how far the German model can be applied. The 
important thing is the desire for re-unification. If there is a will for 
re-unification then traditional legal structures will not be very 
important. 
During the course of the Conference reference was made to 
article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter. Could not the prohibition 
of force referred to in article 2, paragraph 4 be combined with some 
type of guarantee by an international organization? Such a guarantee 
would eliminate the danger of the use of force between the ROC and 
the PRC, thereby allowing the development of peaceful relations 
between both parties - relations which could lead to future 
re-unification. 
The issue of self-determination can only be understood in terms 
of international law within a specific stage of development. Self-
determination was recognized after World War II in the framework of 
decolonization. It has not been recognized until now for secessionist 
movements or minority independence movements. Therefore, it is 
doubtful that the principle of self-determination could be applied to 
Taiwan. At any rate, we cannot speak of self-determination for 
Taiwan as long as it does not want to be a separate state of 
international law. 
It has been stated at this Conference that reunification is not 
necessarily a solution and that normalization need not be synony-
mous with unification. This is a reasonable position, for to maintain 
the contrary would be to encourage us to strive for something which 
may not be possible in the foreseeable future. 
The application of traditional legal institutions has proven to be 
only partially significant to cover reality. We have not come far 
enough to say what new legal institutions have been developed and 
should be applied. 
APPENDICES 
1. DIVIDED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
Political Reality and Legal Practice 
Yung Wei* 
The purpose of this brief essay is to review the current status of 
various divided states under international law in the light of a 
world-wide appraisal of Institutions for the realization of human 
dignity. It consists of three parts; the first part deals with the 
existence of divided nations, or multi-state nations, as one of the 
constant features of the international relations today. The second 
part examines the problem concerning the recognition and repre-
sentation of divided nations in their interactions with other states. 
Finally, in the last part of the paper, an agenda for systematic 
development of codes of behavior to be adopted by the states of the 
world to deal with the complex problems of the legal states of the 
divided nations is proposed. 
The views expressed here in this paper represent those of the 
author as an independent scholar, not the institutions he associates 
with. 
I. 
One of the major legacies of the Second World War was the 
creation of the divided nation: East and West Germany, North and 
South Korea, North and South Vietnam, and mainland China and 
the Republic of China on Taiwan. With the exception of the two 
Vietnams, which were unified after the Indochina War, other divided 
nations continue to be competing political systems within a territo-
rial and cultural sphere which is considered by all parties involved as 
being a single "nation". 
There are, however, different patterns in the relations between 
the different parts of divided nations and between members of a 
particular set of divided nations and other states. The two Germanys 
have somewhat "resolved" their problems, or to put it more accurate-
ly, reduced their mutual hostilities, which has led to: (1) the 
exchanges of representatives between Berlin and Bonn; (2) dual 
recognization of the two Germanys by other states; (3) dual repre-
* Delivered at the Panel on "The Legal Status of Divided States," Annual 
Convention of International Studies Association, St. Louis, Missouri, USA. March 
16-20, 1977. The contents of the paper represents the opinions of the author as a 
scholar of international relations, not of the institutions that he is associated with. 
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sentation of both Germanys in the diplomatic corp of other states; 
and, (4) membership for both East and West Germany in the United 
Nations. 
The situation between mainland China and the Repubic of China 
(ROC) represents the opposite end of the German arrangements. Here 
we find that there is virtually no interaction between two systems. 
Both political systems claim to be the sole legitimate government of 
China, and insisted that they oppose the division of China into two 
legal entities. In October, 1971 the Republic of China withdrew from 
the United Nations after the "important issue" resolution was 
defeated in the U.N. General Assembly. Since then mainland China 
has been the sole delegation representing China in the United Nations 
In addition to their victory in the U.N., the Chinese Communists also 
made substantive advances in their efforts to replace the Chinese 
Nationlists as the only recognized government of China in the 
capitals of more than one hundred nations of the world, leaving the 
ROC recognized by only 23 nations. 
The case of the two Koreas falls in between the two Germanys 
and two Chinas. Thus far, North and South Korea have not formally 
recognized each other. But a North-South dialogue has been main-
tained since July 1972. The "detente" between the two Koreas has 
not reduced significantly the hostility between the two Korean 
political systems. It did, however, lead to dual recognition and dual 
representation of the two Korean governments in a number of 
countries. Today, the leaders of both North and South Korea are still 
talking about national unification of the Korean nation, but short of 
a war, the future trend clearly points to co-existence of two political 
systems in the Korea peninsula. 
II. 
The continuing existence of divided nations creates unique 
problem for international law. According to conventional internation-
al law, there are three types of international personalities: states, 
belligerents and insurgents. Judging by the criteria specified in 
international law, political systems in the divided nations fall 
between a "state" and a "belligerent". In terms of the qualifications of 
a state- such as a government, a territory under effective control by 
that government, and the ability of that government to carry out 
international obligations- almost all the systems within the divided 
nations qualify for the status of that of a state. Yet confrontation 
between various parts of divided nations in political, economic and 
sometimes military arenas, plus the impact of East-West bloc politics, 
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have prevented a full recognition of all parts of a divided nation by 
other states. 
Other than mutual hostility and cold war situation, another 
element which has prevented multiple recognition and multiple 
representation of the divided nations, or multi-state nations, has been 
the problem of overlapping claims over sovereignty and territorial 
control. By "overlapping claims", it is meant that various systems of 
a divided nation make claims that they represent not only the people 
and the territories which are under their effective control, but also 
the part of a divided state which they do not control. Consequently, 
diplomatic recognition and representation for the divided nation have 
become a "zero-sum game" in which other states are compelled to 
choose one of the political systems of a divided nation as the only 
legitimate government of all the territory of that nation despite the 
fact that it controls only a part of it. 
The German solution actually amounts to the creation of two 
separate states. The Korean situation seems to be moving toward the 
German model. Before mainland China's entrance into the United 
Nations in 1971, the ROC had been the beneficiary of the "zero-sum 
game," with the majority of states recognizing only the government 
in Taipei. Since 1971, however, Peking has fully utilized conventional 
international law to gain diplomatic recognition at the expense of 
Taipei. 
The lack of diplomatic recognition has definitely generated 
various kinds of difficulties and inconvenience for the government 
and the people of the ROC. For instance, the absence of diplomatic 
ties between the ROC and other nations often has prevented, or made 
it quite inconvenient for, the nationals of the ROC to travel to other 
nations. A notable example was the failure of the ROC athletes to 
compete in the 1976 Olympic games in Canada. 
Clearly, the Chinese Communist leaders in Peking are trying 
their best to bring about total diplomatic isolation for Taipei. Lacking 
the ability to take Taiwan militarily, the Chinese Communists 
endeavor to subdue Taiwan through diplomatic maneuvers, hoping 
that increasing isolation of the ROC in the world community will 
produce enough discouragement and defeatism in Taiwan so that 
they can take the Island without the use of force. Thus far, Peking's 
strategy has not worked. The government and people of the ROC 
demonstrated extraordinary tenacity and resilience in resisting the 
Chinese Communist threat and in preventing complete isolation. 
Many innovative arrangements have been made by the ROC with or 
without the explicit endorsement of foreign governments, including 
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para-diplomatic representation in foreign capitals to facilitate trade 
and travel. Nevertheless, the lack of formal ties with other countries 
bothers the people of the ROC. The possibility that the United States 
may recognize mainland China at the expense of the ROC, without 
question, is a primary concern for the people of the ROC. Both the 
government and the people of the ROC are trying their best to 
prevent a breaking of ties between the United States and the ROC. 
III. 
The foregoing analysis reveals the complexity of the problems of 
the status of the divided nations under international law. Clearly, it 
is a situation that calls for innovative ideas and practical remedies. 
We should realize that the problem of recognition and representation 
of the divided nations can be very dangerous and disruptive to the 
maintenance of peace in the international system. First of all, there 
is a disproportionately large number of armed forces in the divided 
nations. Second, one part of a divided nation, mainland China, 
already has nuclear weapons; and three other divided states, West 
Germany, the ROC and South Korea, all have considerable nuclear 
capability. A hot war resulting from fierce diplomatic competition 
between the divided states could easily involve the big powers and 
lead to a global conflict. In order to prevent this from happening, I 
would like to suggest that we add a chapter or at least a paragraph in 
international law which would include the following points: 
1. International law should be a stabilizing, not a disstabilizing, 
factor in international relations. 
2. International law should not be used as an instrument to 
achieve purposes which cannot be achieved short of the use of force. 
3. Recognition and representation of the divided states should 
not be a zero-sum game, i.e., other states should not be forced to 
recognize only one of the systems in a divided nation and accept its 
claim over all the territories of a nation, including those which it does 
not control. 
4. The third state should recognize all systems in a divided 
nation without recognizing their claims beyond the territories under 
effective control yet without denying those claims either. 
5. All third states should not take a position on the question of 
unification of the divided nations, neither forcing nor preventing the 
unification of the different parts of a divided nation into one single 
state. 
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6. The principle of multiple recognition of the divided states 
should also extend to multiple representation of the divided states in 
the United Nations and in all international organizations. 
One may challenge the above-mentioned proposals by arguing 
that they are impractical because it does not correspond with the 
"realpolitik" of international relations. The fact is that even for 
highly mutually hostile systems, accommodations have been made to 
ensure certain extent of representation of the divided states which 
are not formally recognized by a third state. For instance, Taipei has 
an Embassy in Washington, D.C., whereas Peking has a liaison office 
there. In the case of Japan, the situation is reversed, with Peking 
having an embassy and Taipei having an office similar to that of the 
liaison office of Peking in Washington. 
This is not to say that the divided states have accepted multiple 
recognition. The key word here is tolerance, not acceptance! For 
example, the Chinese Communists may not like the idea of a Chinese 
Nationalist Embassy in the U.S.A. while it only has a liaison office in 
Washington D.C. By the same token, Chinese Nationalists have not 
accepted the Chinese Communist liaison office in Washington, D.C. 
But for apparent practical reasons, they nevertheless tolerated the 
diplomatic representation of the other side. 
Consequently, what we have today in regard to the recognition of 
the divided states is a series of creative accommodations to political 
reality, though without legal meaning. This naturally cannot be a 
satisfactory arrangement. For it leads to constant juggling of 
positions between the divided states in regard to recognition by the 
third states - a situation which is not stable and therefore can be the 
source of future conflicts. In sum, the current practice and norms 
concerning the status of the divided states is clearly inadequate. This 
is a problem which awaits a solution so that international law will be 
able to cope with existing reality and will function as an instrument 
for peaceful transition, and not a factor which may contribute to 
violent change. 
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2. BASIC FACTS CONCERNING TWO CHINAS, 
TWO KOREAS AND TWO GERMANYS 
People's Republic 
of China 
(PRC-Mainland) 
1 billion 
Republic of China 
(ROC-Taiwan) 
18 million Population 
Density 
Area 
270 per sq. mile 1212 per sq. mile 
3,691,502 sq. miles (not 14,000 sq. miles 
including Taiwan) 
Education 5 years compulsory 
education 0.1% of 
population are college 
students 
Literacy over 50% 
Life Expec- 61 
tancy 
Work Force 560 million 
Agriculture 85% 
Industrial & Service 
15% 
GNP 581 billion (1980) 
PerCapitaGNP $234.50 (1980) 
Growth rate 
Trade 
Budget 
(1957-78) 6.5% (1980) 
4.5% 
(1980) 19.3 billion ex-
port 
20.1 billion import 
72.8 billion (based on 
Beijing Review, Septem-
ber 29, 1980, pp. 11-12. 
In 1979 PRC's Revenue 
was 110.33 billion yuan 
(68.96 billion U.S.) and 
Expenditure was 127.39 
billion yuan (79.62 bil-
lion U.S.) with about 
17.03 billion yuan de-
ficit (10.66 billion U.S.) 
9 years compulsory 
education 1.8% of 
population are college 
students 
89% 
72 (World Bank, World 
Development Report, 
1979, p. 167) 
7.6 million 
Agriculture 34% 
Industry & Service 37% 
Transportation & Com-
merce 29% 
40.3 billion (1980) 
$2200 (adjusted for 
1980) 
(1970-78) 9.1% (1980) 
6.7% 
(1979) 19.80 billion ex-
port 
19.78 billion import 
5.94 billion 
BASIC FACTS 
People's Republic 
of China 
(PRC-Mainland) 
Republic of China 
(ROC-Taiwan) 
189 
Defense 8.5% GNP (1978 esti- 9.2 of GNP (1978 esti-
Living Stan-
dard 
Calories per 
day 
Protein per 
day 
mate) 
1800 
35 gram 
mate) 
2845 
79 gram 
Living Space 39.24 square foot per 184.68 square foot per 
Electricity 
Television 
person 
292.3 unit 
31 per 10000 
Sources: Based primarily upon 
person 
2192.8 unit 
1858 per 10000 
1. June 1981 State Department Background Notes on China. 
2. July 1980 State Department Background Notes on Taiwan. 
3. Living standard based on various official sources released by the PRC and the 
ROC. 
4. International Monetary Fund Report and U.S. Government Data. 
North Korea South Korea 
Population 19,627,000 (1980) 38,197,000 (1980) 
Density 142 per sq. k. (1978) 376 per sq. k. (1978) 
Area 47,000 sq. m. 38,400 sq. m. 
Education 11 years compulsory 6 years compulsory 
Literacy 90% 90% 
Life M: 58.80, F: 62.50 M: 63, F: 67 
Expectancy 
Work force 6.1 million (1980) 14.5 million (1980) 
GNP $14.1 billion (1979) $60.1 Billion (1979) 
Per Capita GNP $750 (1979) $1600 (1979) 
Growth rate 7.2% (1978 est.) 10% (1979 est.) 
Defense estimate of defense defense budget ending 
budget ending 12/79 is 12/81 is $4.4 billion or 
$2.9 billion or 15.2% of 37% of total budget 
total budget. 
total budget. 
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North Korea South Korea 
Trade 1979 1979: 
E: $1,320 million 15.1 billion :E 
I: $1,300 million 20.3 billion :I 
Budget $8.10 billion (1979) $10.524 billion (1980) 
East Germany: GDR West Germany: FRG 
Population (1981) 16,759,000 (1981) 61,388,000 
Density (1978) 155 per square (1978) 24 7 per square 
kilometer kilometer 
Area 41,601 s.m. 95,975 s.m. 
Education 10 grades compulsory 9-10 grades compulsory 
Literacy 99% 99% 
Life Expectancy M: 68.5 F: 74.19 M: 67.2 F: 73.4 
Work force (1981) 8.9 million 27 million 
Agriculture 11.9% Industry & 
Commerce 48% 
Industry & Com- Agriculture 6% 
merce 42.5% Service 25% 
Service 16.8% Government 10% 
Per Capita $5,310 $12,500 
Income 
Growth rate (1979) 2.3% (1978) 3.4% 
Trade E: $17.3 billion E: $172 billion 
I: $19.2 billion I: $160 billion 
Budget (1979) in million DDR M (1980) in M OM 
R: 140,633 R: 189,773 
E: 148,223 E: 214,480 
Defense 8.9% of total GMP (1978) 3% of GNP (1979 est.) 
or $3.8 billion 
Living Standard 
Calories per 
day: 3,000 per capita 2.980 per capita 
Electricity 
produced: 5,780 per capita kWh 6,100 per capita kWh 
Protein per 
day: 
Living space 
Televisions (1979) 5,634,000 (1979) 19,421,539 
GNP $89.1 billion (1979) ($) $766.1 billion (1979) ($) 
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